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iPREFACE
An appraisal of the natural gas shortage requires both a detailed
description of political and technical institutions, and an economic
analysis of the evolving performance of this industry. Not much can be
said without a description of the legal controls on producing gas in the
South for delivery to consumers in the North, or without an economic ana-
lysis of price and quantity relationships on both the production and
demand sides of gas markets. There also has to be some indication of
the present size of the shortage, of the means by which the industry would
respond to policies to reduce the shortage, and how much time this response
would take.
The approach here divides the institutional and analytical materials
into two parts. First, the political and institutional frame of reference
is described and the present-day natural gas shortage is estimated in
Chapter 1; and forecasts are made of the effects on this shortage of
various alternative regulatory policies in Chapter 2. Second, a large-
scale econometric policy model of natural gas markets- both field markets
and wholesale distribution markets---is presented in Chapters 3,4 and 5
in some detail. Thus the model is described in Chapters 3-5 after it
is used for evaluating alternative policies in Chapter 2. This is done so
that non-econometricians can deal, with least obfuscation and delay, with
the results from the policy analyses, leaving it to the more technically
oriented analyst to check these results against the model and simulation
descriptions in Chapters 3-5. However, frequent references are provided
in Chapter 2 to the technical description in subsequent chapters, so
that documentation or analysis can be obtained where needed even by the
non-econometrician.
ii
The plan of the book, then, is as follows:(l) introduction to the
natural gas shortage and the technical-regulatory frames of reference for
explaining the present extent of the shortage. This is followed by (2)
an analysis of alternative policies for dealing with the shortage, using
the econometric policy model described in technical detail in Chapters
3, 4, and 5. For those seeking to understand the general nature of the
present policy problems in the natural gas industry, Chapters 1 and 2
should suffice; for those interested in the development of an econometric
model designed specifically to assess the efficiency of alternative regula-
tory policies in dealing with shortages, Chapter 3, 4, and 5 should be of
particular interest.
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CHAPTER 1
GOVERNMENT REGULATION AND
INDUSTRY PERFORMANCE, 1960 - 1974
1.0 Introduction
The natural gas industry in the United States has experienced sub-
stantial shortages in the last few years. Rather than hour-long queues,
as at gasoline stations in early 1974, the natural gas shortage of the
1970's has resulted in partial or total- elimination of service for groups
of consumers, both residential and industrial, that demand gas rather
than other fuels. Service has been terminated for interruptible buyers--
those taking gas only part--time or off-peak--and new potential full-time
consumers have not been allowed to connect to delivery systems. At many
locations, industrial and commercial consumers have been told to replace
gas with oil at least on a part-time basis. The sum total of these
unfilled demands has been fairly extensive. The Federal Power Commission
found that interstate gas distributors were 3.7 percent short of meeting
consumption demands of communities and industries in 1971 and that they
are expected to be 10 percent short of demands in 1974.1
There appears to be small prospect for amelioration of shortage
conditions in the near future, Unless there are unexpected discoveries, or
unless FPC regulation changes significantly, excess demand is expected to
grow to more than one-quarter of total demands This is not only the
prediction of econometric forecasts. Indeed. the FPC staff of gas experts
cf. National Gas Supply and Demand, 1971-1990 (FPC Bureau of Natural as,
Washington D.C., February, 1972).
This forecast is the result of use of an econometric policy model to stmu--
late continuation of present geological and regulatory constraints over tihe
period 1975-1980. The model is described in Chapters 3-5, and the simulations
outlined in Chapter 2, below.
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forecasts that, assuming continuation of present day regulatory conditions,
the shortage will grow to be as large as 20 percent of demands by 1980.3
Those that are now being told to curtail consumption or toswitch to other
fuels are not likely to be told anything different unless public policies
change.
Consumers in some regions of the country have fared worse than those
in other regions in obtaining the gas they demand. So far, buyers in the
North Central, the Northeast and the West--in that order--have incurred
most of the shortage. New residential buyers and new as well as some old
industrial buyers in those regions continue to be kept off distribution
systems. By the late 1970's, shortages in the North Central region could
exceed one-half of demands. If this occurs, then industrial and commercial
establishments will face 100 percent elimination of supply, in order that
there would still be enough gas to meet the "old household" consumption
draughts on local utilities. In other regions, industry may not be cut
off entirely, but substantial industrial buyers seeking to expand their
uses of gas would face curtailment at most locations. Some of these
buyers should be able to obtain more supply in the South, outside of
regulation and the shortage by relocating their activities 4 If they
were to relocate in significant numbers, there would be important changes
in regional industrial development. Industrial growth in the energy-related
industries of the upper Midwest would be reduced relative to the rest of
the country.
cf. National Gas Supply and Demand, op, cit.; this forecast calls for
almost as much shortage as the gas econometric forecast; presumably
it is based on continuation of present price regulation (although this
is not explicit).
4These statements are once again predictions from the econometric model
described in detail in Chapters 3-5. The forecasts for 1975-1980 shortage
conditions are developed at length in the next chapter.
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These conditions should elicit questions from many consumers in
the next few years. As service is curtailed, they might well ask, where
the shortage came from. In particular, they should know how long it
will last under continuation of present conditions in gas markets. and
if the shortage can be reduced at an earlier date by policy changes
of companies and governments.
It is important to know first where the shortage came from," so
that policies specific to type of consumer, location and time period can
be formulated to eliminate the shortage-creating conditions. The next
section of this chapter (1.1) specifies the details of the production
process in gas fields necessary for an understanding of the shortage sit-
uation. In Section 1.2, there is a lengthy description of gas field
price regulation by the Federal Power Commission. Regulation has become
an important precondition of production, and certain aspects of regulation
can be seen to have caused the development of the shortage. The third
section below (1.3) describes the behavior of field markets under present
regulatory controls as compared to "no control" conditions. The conclu-
sions here, showing the effects of controls, give credit to the regulators
for the shortage, Subsequently, Chapter 2 attempts to answer the question,
"how long will there be an extensive shortage" under present conditions. Also,
stud-es ae presented. of the effects from alternative governmental policies that
show that extensive change in the present method of control, and present
price levels, can have substantial ameliorative effects on the shortage.
1.1 Production and Distribution of Natural Gas
The field markets for natural gas center around transactions In
which petroleum companies dedicate newly-discovered reserves of natural
gas for production into pipeline transmission lines. Major petroleum
5The forecasts are based on simulations with the econometric policy model
described in Chapters 3-5,
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companies, along with smaller independents, initiate activities by using
seismic logging and the drilling of wells to "discover" new gas reserves,
or to complete the "extension" or the "revision" of previously known
reserves. They bring gas production to the surface where liquid by-products
are removed. Then the pipeline companies take the gas in the field and
deliver it to wholesale industrial users or to retail distributing com-
panies, that in turn deliver it into individual households, commercial
establishments or to retail industrial users. Ultimately, more than
45 percent of the natural gas production goes to residential and com-
mercial consumers, while the rest is consumed as boiler fuel or process
material in industry.
Reserves, production, and the pattern of consumption depend on
certain technical and economic conditions. The most important of these
relationships, in terms of an "economic model," are sketched in the
flow diagram below. Each of the boxes will be dealt with later in detail
(since this is a simplified version of the flow diagram for the econo-
metric model described in Chapters 3-5); but it is posited here that
prices of oil and gas are critical policy variables, such as the leasing
practices on government lands that determine production. Also, oil and
gas prices are policy-related determinants (along with non-policy variables
such as other fuel prices and consumer incomes) of residential or industrial
6The percentage of total consumption by residential and commercial buyers
was 45 percent in 1962, and 43 percent in 1968: as the natural gas shortage
appeared on the horizon, the amount of residential consumption declined.
cf. Federal Power Commission, Statistics of Natural Gas Pipelines (annual);
cf. also S. Breyer and PW. MacAvoy, "The Natural Gas Shortage and Reg-
ulation of Natural Gas Producers," Harvard Law Review (vol. 86, no. 6,
April 1973), pp. 977 et seq.).
demands for gas.7
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panies ascertain that there are inground deposits of (1) "assoc.ated" gas
in newly discovered oil reservoirs and (2) "nonassociated" gas found in
reservoirs not containing oil.
Figure 1.1 Simplified Diagram of the Econometric Model
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Companies claim such reserves as a result of new discoveries, or extensions
or revisions of previous discoveries (where extensions result from stepping
out beyond the limits of known field boundaries, and revisions are changes
in estimates of reserves in place within known field boundaries).
After reserves are known to exist, the producers "dedicate" them in a con-
tract calling for production over a five-to-twenty year period. In effect,
the producers estimate the size of newly-found inground deposits and provide
sufficient documentation to support contract commitments to pipelines for
production over that period. Of course, reserves are never known for certain
(as indicated by extensions and revisions each year), so that the contracts
are in effect "futures" agreements or promises to deliver an uncertain volume
of a commodity.
The process of adding to reserves begins long before commitments to
pipelines. Years earlier, the producer undertakes geophysical exploratory
work to show the existence of a potential inground hydrocarbon reservoir,
after which he sinks wells into the reservoir to determine whether there
is oil, gas, water, or whatever. The decision to conduct preliminary
geophysical research and drill wells is essentially an investment decision
under uncertainty; as the potential profitability of the investment increases,
the number of wells drilled increases and total discoveries increase.
Profitability depends upon future prices and costs, which relate in a com-
plicated but positive way to present prices and costs. Thus if present
prices increase, there should be an increase in exploratory work; this
9In the econometric model, tis process is described as being divided
between decisions on "well-drilling" and "size of discovery" per success-
ful well. Operating at the intensive margin implies increased drilling
and reduced size of find per successful well. Operating at the extensive
margin-implies increased drilling and an increase in the size per success-
ful well. Both together imply rising supply of reserves as prices increase.
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would lead, in a year or two, to additional drilling activity and subse-
quently to the offering of additional reserves for sale to pipeline
buyers. Of course prices are not the only determinant of reserves. There
is a fixed stock of gas to be discovered in a region, and it is suspected
that the larger and most profitable volumes are discovered and dedicated
there first. Technical progress in drilling or production techniques could
compensate for the limits in any area by pushing down costs of finding the
smaller volumes; also, some areas may not yet have experienced the initial
10
stages. But over time, at fixed prices and costs, we should observe that
the volume of discoveries declines per well drilled. 1
The discovery of reserves is the first step in the production process.
The second step is contractual dedication to the production of gas and its
1 0This again is dealt with explictly in the econometric model described
in Chapters 3-5. The summary here does not take account of the relative
importance of the variables (a) prices (b) technical progress (c) earlier
discoveries in explaining additions to reserves. The equations in Chapter
4 provide this important detail.
1 1At the present time, the limits on total reserves do appear to be con-
straining. We are not "out" of discoverable reserves in the United States.
The sum total of past production and of present discovered reserves, as
of 1970, totaled 648 trillion cubic feet, less than 40 percent of the
amount of ultimate discoverable reserves expected in most forecasts. The
amount remaining to be discovered has been estimated as 851 trillion cubic
feet (by the National Petroleum Council and by the Colorado School of Mines'
Potential Gas Committee), and as 2,100 trillion cubic feet (by the U.S.
Geological Survey). (National Petroleum Council, U.S. Energy Outlook: Oil
and Gas Availability, U.S. pept. of the Interior, Tables 291 and 292 on
page 367; Potential Gas Agency, Minerals Resources Institute, Colorado
School of Mines, Potential Supply of Natural Gas in the United States,
October 1971 (the latest report, issued in December 1973, gives 1,146
trillion cubic feet; U.S. Geological Survey, Circular 650, "U.S. Mineral
Resources," states that the range of estimates is between 1,178 and 6,600
trillion cubic feet.) Of course the amount actually found and put in the
reserves category will depend on the level of exploratory activity, on
costs of development, and on the prices offered by the pipeline buyers.
These are the most important (technical and economic) limiting factors; the
reserve estimates show enough additional reserve inventory to support at
least two decades of production (at forecast rates exceeding 30 trilli-on
cubic feet per annum).
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movement in the pipelines to final consumers. The amount of production
depends on a number of geological, engineering, and economic factors.
Production cannot take place at rates greater than some fixed percent of
reserves per annum, because of technical limits (sandstone in the reservoirs
is not completely permeable so that the gas cannot move to the well faster)
and because of economic costs (faster rates of depletion may reduce the
economic value of any remaining reserves by "channeling" and sealing off
parts of the reservoir from further production). But up to these limits,
more production can take place at higher short-run costs. Thus, with a
given reserve inventory, if prices are high enough to compensate for higher
costs of further drilling investment, the production rate can be increased.
Field markets for natural gas are, thus, similar to minerals or raw
materials futures markets in which present deposits are dedicated for future
production and refining. The important characteristics of these markets
generally are that more reserves will be dedicated if the buyers offer
higher prices, and that the lag adjustment process bringing forth additional
reserves by higher prices is likely to be long. Also, production out of
dedicated reserves is limited by technical or economic factors, but is
likely to be greater, the larger the volume of reserves available and the
higher the contract prices.
1.1.2. Wholesale Markets
The buyers of reserves at the wellhead are for the most part natural
gas pipelines providing gas under long--term contract to industrial consumers
and retail public utility-companies. The amounts of their annual deliveries
1 2That is, in the econometric model below, technical and economic condit-
ions determine production out of reserves, so that the level of production
will be greater, the greater is the volume of reserves in place and the
higher are prices in the contract commitment.
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determine their demands for reserves to be dedicated at the wellhead.
These annual deliveries in turn depend upon the prices they charge for
gas at wholesale (paid by industrial consumers and retail-public utilities
to the pipelines), the prices for alternative fuels consumed by final
buyers, and economy-wide factors such as population, incomes, industrial
production, etc., that determine the overall size of energy markets.
Gas wholesale prices, in turn, depend upon field prices and delivery
charges for transportation of the gas from the wellhead to the final con-
sumer. The pipelines offer instantaneous deliveries of gas as it is
burned by the final buyer: they charge a markup over their field pur-
chase prices as part of the wholesale price for these services. Markups
are determined by the historical average costs of transmission and by the
transportation profit margins allowed under Federal Power CommisiHlon reg--
lation (at least for the interstate pipelines).
Regulation of the wholesale prices, in fact, builds in significant
lags of changes in final prices behind those in field prices. The Federal
Power Commission has followed the policy of allowing wholesale prices
equal to the markup plus the historical average field price paid for gas
at the wellhead. This "rolled in" or average wellhead price changes slowly
as a result of higher prices on new field contracts, because new contracts
in any year make up only 5 to 15 percent of all contracts. The full impact
of a change in new contract prices is realized only after it has been in
effect for almost a decade (assuming O percent of deliveries in each year
come from new contract dedications). This time lag between changes Ln
wellhead and wholesale prices softens the impact on consumers of large
increases in new prices in field markets. Also, average transmission costs
change very slowly, as new construction costs or allowed returns on capital
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change slowly (at least as allowed by the FPC). From 35 to 40 percent
of the gas remains in the South Central region of the country where it
is produced; approximately 19 percent moves to the Northeast, 20 percent
to the North Central, and 7 percent to the western parts of the country.
This was the case over much of the 1960's, with only the North Central
region showing some increases over the period 1962-1968 (by three percen-
tage points, while the North Central region was reduced by the same percen-
tage).
The flow diagram shows how all these transactions work out in "normal"
circumstances. At a given level of field prices, the additions to reserves
meet the needs of the pipelines (as evidenced by their new contract demands).
If not, and there is excess demand, then the prices these pipelines offer
in new contracts increase above the previous level. Immediately, this brings
forth more production from old contract reserves, brings forth some new
contract reserves, and also cuts back on some of the marginal resale at
the pipelines. After a time, the higher new prices also bring forth more
new reserves and cut back on the long-term contracts sought by final buyers.
Eventually at some level of new contract prices the amount of new reserve
commitments by the producers is the same as the amount bought and resold
by the pipelines.
1.1.3. The Effects of Shortages on Field and Wholesale Markets
Under "normal" conditions, the reserve and production markets operate
to allow each pipeline buyer that "reserve backing" he desires, backing
that makes secure the continuation of production to meet his commitments
to residential and industrial consumers over the lifetime of their burning
13The process of setting markups on field prices is described in detail
in Chapters 3 and 4, using a truncated version (in equation form) of
FPC regulatory practice.
-11-
equipment. In a "shortage", the new discoveries fall short of the
reserve amounts demanded by the pipelines in order to provide for the
backing he seeks for his wholesale buyers. Under these conditions,
the amount of actual field contract commitments are not equal to total
"demands," but are-equal only to "supply." At that point, the pipelines
either (1) limit their commitments so as to preserve backing for old
consumers or (2) draw down previously purchased reserves at a faster rate.
If the second alternative is taken, production demands of final consumers
could be satisfied for some period, as a result of the pipelines calling
on existing reserves to produce at a higher rate,(thereby eliminating
the reserve backing of old consumers). Thus reserve shortages in field
markets may not-be perceived by final buyers whose demands are temporarily
satisfied by present production (as was the case in the late 1960's)1 4
Production to meet expanding demands from previous reserve commit-
ments cannot be had indefinitely. Eventually, reserves from old commit-
ments are reduced sufficiently so that the amount remaining limits the
amount of production. As the reserve backing becomes smaller, production
tends to fall, and a gap is opened between the demands for production
and the amounts available. Many years may pass, however, before decline
in additions to reserves is followed by a shortage of production.
Can the process be reversed? As indicated above, if prices were to
increase in new contracts by a substantial amount, then more production
could be gotten out of the previously committed reserves (because the price
increase can compensate for additional costs from secondary recovery programs).
This effect may be rather small, however, given that reserves have already
been greatly depleted. But there would be a longer-term effect caused by
This is surmised 'from the simulations with the econometric model, as
shown for the 1960's and 1970's in Chapter 5.
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price stimulation of the discovery process. Higher prices would add to
incentives for exploratory drilling, and the drilling would increase new
discoveries, extensions or revisions of reserves. After these additional
reserves have been committed, the amount of production would then again
15be increased. At the same time, over this extended period, demands
for production would be curtailed by the higher price. Total demands
would have increased because of increases in the size of energy markets
(and increases in the prices of alternative fuels). But high gas prices
should slow down the accumulation of new customers, so as to have a
dampening effect on the size of the increased gas demands.
The combination of both reserve and demand incentives should be to
reduce the excess demands. But it may take several years before the
full effects of a price change are felt in field and wholesale markets.
The period should be much longer than that required to complete the process
of market clearing in grain or metals commodity markets. Under some con-
ditions, however--with large price increases and new government policies
on reserve discovery--it is expected that most of the shortages expected
to occur in each region of the country can be reduced or even eliminated
before 1980.
1.2. Gas Field Price Regulation by the Federal Power Commission
The history of regulation bearing on the gas shortage began
1954, with the Supreme Court's decision requiring the Federal Power Comr..
missionto regulate the wellhead prices on production into the interstate
pipelines. This was an appeal in a case brought by the Attorney General
of Wisconsin against Phillips Petroleum Company; Phillips' prices to the
pipelines had been increasing, and higher prices were alleged to be contrary
15 As shown by simulation with the econometric model, the results are
given in detail in Chapters 2 and 5.
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to the best interests of consumers in Wisconsin. In lower court testi-
mony and briefs, arguments were made that the gas industry, while regu-
lated at the pipeline level by the Federal Power Commission and at the
retail level by the state regulatory commissions, was unregulated by
government and even worse was controlled by the large field producers
at the wellhead. Therefore field price increases, determined by a few
large petroleum companies, could be passed through as "costs" in whole-
sale prices to result in final price increases to the consumer. Such
pass throughs, it was argued, should be curtailed by the introduction of
FPC regulation at the wellhead. The Supreme Court, without explicitly
affirming that there was monopoly power in the hands of the producers,
found that the Federal Power Commission did have the mandate to regulate
16
the wellhead price.
For the next five years, the Commission attempted to respond to
the mandate. Price control at the wellhead covered first those contracts
in the Phillips case itself, since that case had been remanded by the
court for a finding of "just and reasonable " prices. The FPC first con-
trolled price levels in the same way that state public utility commissions
set limits on electric power or gas retail prices. The procedure begins
by estimating (a) operating costs, (b) the allowed rate of return times
the undepreciated original investment, and (c) depreciation of investment
per unit of gas produced under a contract. These unit "accounting costs"
Phillips Petroleum Company vs. Wisconsin, 347 U.S. 622 (1954). cf.
E.W. Kitch, "Regulation of the Field Market for Natural Gas by the Federal
Power Commission," Journal of Law and Economics (XI, Oct. 1968), pp. 243-
281; Kitch notes on page 255 that "the court gave no reason for the regu-
lation...considering the expertise of the Federal Power Commission... the
court gave no indication of how the regulation was to be carried out."
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are defined as equal to {[(a) + (b) + (c)]/q} for q annual production.
The permissible maximum level for average prices is set equal to these
unit costs, or to "costs of service." The "cost finding" approach to
price control was not readily applicable to Phillips, because part of the
gas was produced with oil, which was not being regulated, and some was
produced only after a number of dry wells had been drilled. Attributing
previous "dry hole" costs to particular gas contracts, and attributing
joint costs to gas or to oil, resulted in arbitrary limits on prices.
Also, the usual standards for finding the proper rate of return--the aver-
age rate of return for public utilities--scarcely applied to an exploration
and development company. In fact, higher returns were allowed to compen-
sate for exploratory risk, but these were simply stated as being appro-
priate. It turned out that the prices proposed by the Commission were
higher in some cases than the original prices objected to by the state of
Wisconsin.
During this time the Commission, dealing in infinite detail with
Phillips, was falling behind. The case had produced more than 10,000
pages of briefs and records; in the meantime, by 1962, more than 2,900
applications for price reviews had been filed by other companies. Man-
agement failure--the Commission itself forecast that it would not finish
its 1960 caseload until the year 2043 --and the arbitrary nature of
regulation together required the FPC to-try other ways of controlling
17cf. Phillips Petroleum Company, 24 FPC 537 (1960), at 545.
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field prices.l8
The FPC turned to setting the same ceiling price for all transactions
within a widely-defined geographical region. Temporary ceilings were
set at market levels established a year or two previously (in the fashion
of economy-wide "price freezes" common in the later 1960's). This way
of regulating resulted in a freeze on prices at the 1958-59 level, so
that new gas committed to interstate pipelines after 1961 had to be
priced at a level not higher than the 1958-59 level. The freeze was to
be temporary and was to be followed by "area rate" decisions which set
permanent prices. The permanent prices were to be based on the average
historical costs of gas within the region; and, in fact, considerable
attention in the area rate proceedings was given over to calculating
regional production costs, investment outlays and rate-of-return averages.
18James M. Landis was particularly critical of the FPC's performance in
the field of natural gas regulation, charging it with delays as well as
with disregard of the consumer interest. He wrote:
"The FPC without question represents the outstanding example in the field
of government of the breakdown of the administrative process. The complexity
of its problems is no answer to its more than patent failures. These failures
relate primarily to the natural gas field . . . These defects stem from
attitudes of the unwillingness of the Commission to assume its responsibilities
under the Natural Gas Act and its attitudes . . . of refusing in substance
to obey the mandates of the Supreme Court of the United States and other
federal courts. The Commission has exhibited no inclination to use powers
that it possesses to get abreast of its docket . . . The recent action of
the Commission on September 28, 1960 in promulgating area rates . . . has
come far too late to protect the consumer . . . The Commission's past inaction
and past disregard of the consumer interest has led the States to seek to
force it it discharge its responsibilities .. Delay after delay in certi-
fications and the prescription of rates has cost the public millions of
dollars . . . The Commission has literally done nothing to reduce the delays
which have constantly increased . . . The dissatisfaction with the work of
the Commisssion has gone so far that there is a large measure of agreement
on separating from the Commission its entire jurisdiction over natural gas
and creating a new commission to handle these problems exclusively'. .
Primarily leadership and power must be given to its Chairman and qualified
and dedicated members with the consumer interest at heart must be called into
service to correct what has developed into the most dismal failure in our
time of the administrative process."
See James M. Landis, Report on Regulatory Agencies to the PresidentElect,
December 1960.
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The FPC, faced both with an enormous backlog of individual cases
and with great difficulties in using orthodox procedures of price regu-
lation in this industry, cut through the procedures to set regional
maximum prices on the basis of regional average accounting costs. The
new approach turned out to he as fraught with logical difficulties as the
old approach. The Commission used estimates of regional costs from a
period when temporary ceilings were in effect to set permanent ceilings.
Since producing companies took on drilling projects with prospective costs
less than forecast prices, and on average probably realized the expected
level of costs, then the companies probably experienced costs up to the
level of temporary ceiling prices. Thus, the FPC, noting that average costs
were close to the temporary ceiling prices, found that the temporary
ceilings were appropriate for permanent ceilings. Temporary ceilings set
costs which set permanent ceilings.
Arbitrary or not, these prices did serve the Commission's interest,
which seemed to be in preserving the price level of the late 1950's. No
specific reason was given by the agency for preferring the early prices.
Neither case materials nor Commission decisions showed they thought that
prices should not be increased because such was dedicated by non-competitive
producers. Price increases seem to have been undesirable in and of them-
selves because they were subject to controversy (or could have been ob-
jected to by the pipelines) and because they could have run into difficul-
20
ties in court review.
19The "competitiveness of conditions" itself was never faced by the
Commission. cf. S. Breyer and P.W. MacAvoy, Energy Regulation by the
Federal Power Commission, Chapter 3 (Brookings Institution, Washington D.C.,
July 1974).
20 cf. Breyer and MacAvoy, op. cit., Chapter 3.
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The courts added to the freeze by arguing that price increases were
to be denied simply because they were increases. This is exemplified by
the 1959 case in Atlantic Refining Company vs. Public Service Commission
(360 U.S. 378) where it was stated that price increases were to be denied
because "this price is greatly in excess of that which Tennessee pays
from any lease in Southern Louisiana."2 1
The Commission's determination to "hold the line against increases
22
in natural gas prices" was sufficient to result in a constant price level
on new contracts for gas going to the interstate pipelines during the
1960's. The weighted average new contract price was 18.2¢ in 1961, and
19.8¢ per thousand cubic feet in 1969 (in the intervening years the aver-
age price fell by approximately .6¢ per Mcf to a low of 17.6¢ in 1966).23
The average wellhead prices on old and new contracts increased from 16.4¢
to 17.5¢ per Mcf from 1961 to 1969, primarily as a result of the replace-
ment of very old contracts at low prices with new contracts at the eililng
levels close to 16¢ per Mcf.2 4 These prices resulted in the consumer (at
wholesale) paying approximately 33¢ per million Btu for natural gas
2 1This case is discussed in detail by Edmund Kitch in the article
"Regulation of the Field Market for Natural Gas by the Federal Power
Commission", Journal of Law and Economics, o..cit. p. 261. Kitch
argues that "the court reasoned from the premise that prices higher than
prevailing prices were questionable simply because they were higher ." He
shows that an examination of the increases that were occurring at the
time does not support an argument that this was in response to demonstrated
manipulation of the market by the producers.
2 2cf. Federal Power Commission, Annual Report for 1964 (vol.43), p. 15.
These and data series described in the next few sentences are from the
data bank used in compiling the econometric gas policy model. Appropriate
references are provided in Chapters 3, 4, and 5.
24At the same time, average industrial drilling costs did not increase --
otherwise, they alone would have been the justification for regional price
increases given the process of regulation. But the combined efforts of
cumulative disLoveries and faster rates of production must have increased
marginal production costs. This is indicated by simulations with the econometric
model described below, showing declining reserves qdditions at constant prices.
throughout the decade, with a range from 32.0¢ per million Btu in 1962
to 33.4¢ per million Btu in 1970). (At the same time prices for oil at
wholesale increased from 34.5¢ to 39.8¢- and coal from 25.6¢ to 31.2¢
25
per million Btu.) The Commission succeeded in holding gas prices down,
while prices of other fuels were going up from 10 to 25 percent over the
same time period.
Regulatory policy was reversed in 1971, with a series of FPC rate
reviews and decisions that substantially increased the level of field
prices. Based on "recognizing the urgent need for increased gas explor-
ation and much larger annual reserve additions to maintain adequate service,"
the Federal Power Commission "offered producers several price incentives.2 6
For those producing areas in the country containing more than 85 percent
of reserves, the Commission increased prices by 3 per thousand cubic
feet (in Kansas) to 5.2¢ per thousand cubic feet (in South Louisiana).
These increases applied to new contracts signed that year. The FPC also
began a proceeding (Docket R-389A) to set national ceiling-prices on all
new contracts, and howed some intention of providing substantial increases
25An example shows even greater disparities. Wholesale prices charged by
Columbia Gas Transmission Company to the Baltimore retail gas company
(Baltimore Gas and Electric) were 43.5¢ per mcf (or per million Btu) in
1970 as a result of frozen fiold prices, while wholesale terminal prices
for #2 fuel oil were 86.3¢ perl million Btu at the same location that year.
Although retail delivery charges could explain part of the difference, it
could not explain it all. The size of the difference increased by 30$ per
million Btu per annum in the succeeding three years.
The oil and coal price series are from Edison Electric Institute,
Statistical Annual of the Electric Utility Industry, for these fuels
consumed in electric power stations; this is as close to a wholesale
price series as can be obtained for comparability with gas sales by
pipelines to either retail gas utilities, electric utilities, or other
industrial users.
cf. Federal Power Commission Annual Report, 1971 (U.S. Government
Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1972) p. 36.
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by this route by new preliminary prices at the same time in the Rocky
27Mountain area 7¢ higher than those previously in effect. Further
increases were also promised as a result of the Commission establish-
ing a procedure for certifying new producer sales above the prevailing
area price ceilings. This procedure would allow higher prices when they
were "shown to be in the public interest." 2 8 Although no explicit schedule
of higher prices was forthcoming from the new exceptions, the setting out
of an explicit path for avoiding the ceilings pointed to price increases.
In fact, the results of these policy changes have included a sub-
stantial increase in new contract prices in the last few years. The
weighted average new contract price increased from 19.8¢ per thousand
cubic feet in 1969 to 33.6¢ per Mcf in 1972. During 1973, the average
new contract price probably rose to 36¢ per thousand cubic feet (although
this is a preliminary estimate). The price freeze of the 1960's was in
effect abrogated in the early 1970's with new contract prices increasing
by 70 percent in four years. The question is whether this was "too little"
and "too late" to clear excess demands for reserves and production over
the rest of the decade.
1.3. The Behavior of Field and Wholesale Markets under Price Controls2 9
Institutional and political conditions together produced the shortage.
The technical conditions of production resulted in long lags between new
2 7cf. Federal Power Commission 1971 Annual Report, op. cit., p. 42,
"Initial Rates for Future Gas Sales from All Areas", Docket no. R-389A.
2 8cf. Federal Power Commission Annual Report for 1972 (U.S. Government
Printing Office, 1973), p. 49.
2 9Much more detail could be provided on the operating practices, and regu-
lation, of the pipelines before going on the describe the actual develop-
ment of the shortage. The pipelines are regulated by the FPC on the basis
of the procedures described above as"orthodox" public utility price controls,
except on charges to direct industrial consumers or interstate consumers.
Suffice it to say at this point that equities stressing "cost averaging" capture
much of the results from this regulation in the econometric model in Chapters
3-5. The simulations from the model as a whole are stressed at this point.
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discoveries of gas and final production of that gas for the consumer.
At the same time, however, regulation, by preventing price increase over
most of the decade of the 1960's, was the critical precondition for emer-
gence of excess demand.
The fixity of prices contributed to the winding down of exploratory
activity and the resulting reduction in new reserves over the last half
of the 1960's. This is shown by simulations of actual prices, with
the econometric model, as reported in Table 1.1. Total additions to
reserves, at prices on new contracts ranging from 18¢ to 33¢ per Mcf,
declined over the period from 17 trillion cubic feet in 1967 to 15 tril--
lioncubic feet in 1972 (with a low of 14 in 1971).
The reserves decline would not have been the case if new contract
field prices had been higher. This is indicated by considering any of
a number of alternative sets of prices in the econometric model--where
each set is a possible replication of what unregulated prices would have
been. There is no way if telling which set is more appropriate.
But one likely hypothetical "unregulated" price, shown in Table 1.1,
would probably have added more than a trillion cubic feet of additional reserves
each year in 1969-1972 sufficient to prevent a drawing down of the total
reserve stock.
At the same time that new reserves were being added at a lower rate,
gas pipelines were realizing increases in final demands at a higher rate.
3 0This price level was inserted into the cononetric modell n order to
simulate, over the 1967-71 period, the behavior of additions to reserves.
Reserves are estimated with the equation relationships for dscoverles,
extensions and revisions as a function of prices, costH, and potential
reserve discoveries. This simulation is described in detail. In Chapter
5. The basis for choice of the prices shown in Table 1.1 for "unregulated"
was that they maintained a reserve to production ratio of 15/1 -- the
lowest ratio actually experienced in the early and middle 1960's. Given
that demands for reserve backing by final consumers was constant throughout
the decade, this ratio is the lowest in keeping with equilibrium of demand
and supplies of reserves as well as production throughout the period.
-22-
The pipelines then had the choice of either refusing buyers or of meet-
ing expanded additional demands for production by taking from their inven-
tories of old committed reserves. The companies in fact continued to
meet new demands for production out of old reserves. There was no pro-
duction shortage in the late 1960's or early 1970's; this is indicated,
as shown in Table 1.2, by simulated "production" and "demands" in the
econometric model being approximately equal each of these years.
Instead of drawing down reserves, the pipelines could have denied
new customers access to the reserves. The interstate pipelines, ack-
nowledging that there would be a reduction in the reserve backing then
committed to established customers, could have refused to take on new
customers unless they could be provided the reserve-production ratio avail-
able in the early 1960's. The level of production from this policy would
have been less, as indicated by the model simulations reported in Table 1.3.
The estimates for production at the constant R/P for the early 1960's,
in Column (1), are approximately 4 trillion cubic feet less than actual
production in Column (5) of Table 1.2. This difference is the amount
"diverted" frnm the inventory reserved for old customers to provide immed-
iate increased production.
This "reserve saving" alternative would have required cutting back
production to less than would have occurred without price controls. The
amounts expected without controls are shown as Column (2) of Table 1.2.
These are from simulations with the econometric model at the hypothetical
"unregulated" prices shown in Column (3) of Table 1.1 Both "reserve
saving" and "no regulation" would have had less production than the actual
amount because actual production was extended to meet extra consumption
demands of new buyers induced into the gas market by the low frozen prices.
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The conclusion is that price ceilings imposed by the Federal Power
Commission, in conjunction with long lags from prices increases to production, had
a two-stage effect upon gas field and wholesale markets. First, the frozen
prices reduced the amounts of reserves found over the last half of the
1960's. Second, the attrition in reserve additions was not matched by
reductions in the growth of production. Rather, additional demands from
both new and old customers were met by taking more production out of the
existing reserve stock.3 1 The established consumers with 15 to 17 years
of reserve backing on annual production lost some of that backing, to the
advantage of consumers receiving the expanded service, at least up to
1972. After 1972, there was not enough reserve backing to allow production
to meet all of the increased wholesale demands, so that the "production
shortage" then set in.32
The lags among reserves, production, and consumption makes it diffi-
cult to say who benefitted and who lost up to 1972. But customers in the
Northeast, the North Central, and the West received a proportionately
smaller share of the increased production out of old reserves, as compared
to consumers in the Southeast and the South Central. This is indicated
3 The demands in turn were increased by the relatively low prices at whole-
sale following from the frozen field prices. The additions to demands as
a result of frozen prices can be seen from comparing "production demand" at
actual average wholesale prices (shown in Column (4) of Table 1.2) with the
demands that would have been realized at the hypothetical "unregulated 4
prices (shown in Column (2) of Table 1.3, which shows both production and
demands at prices sufficiently higher to hold the 1965 reserve-production
ratio through the rest of the decade). These "artificially' induced" addi-
tions to demand from the lower- frozen prices were of the order of 3 to 4
trillion cubic feet per annum by 1971-1972, and were realized mostly in the
South Central and Southeast prtions of the country as demands for boiler
fuel that would have been met by residual fuel oil in the absence of the low
gas field prices.
32
The 1973-1974 production shortages are shown in the Federal Power
Commission staff study of the supply and demand of natural gas (op. cit.)
and in the econometric model simulations shown for those years in Chapter
2 below.
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in Table 1.4, where demands at actual prices are compared with demands at
hypothetical higher "unregulated" prices for each region and for each year.
The differences, as derived from the econometric model simulations, indicate
that demands were increased by relatively low frozen prices more in the
South Central and Southeast (almost 45 percent of the increased consumption
occurred in the South Central region alone). Since the increased demands
were satisfied in large part by production out of old reserves, then,
in effect, the backing for old customers was being used to cover additional
demands induced by low prices in the South. This reallocation of consumption
must be considered to be perverse, since those losing the reserve backing
were customers under the protection of regulation, while those gaining
the additional consumption were mostly intra-state or industrial consumers
in the South not covered by Federal Power Commission regulation.
Can anything be said about the size of the dollar gains and losses
from this pattern of regulation? Money estimates of benefits are excep-
tionally difficult to make. The gainers were customers not having to
pay the higher "unregulated" prices for that amount of service actually
received without any reduction in reserve backing. At least, on this
consumption the service was still secure and the price had been held down.
The losers were customers unable to increase their consumption without
taking a reduction in reserve backing (or without undertaking additional
risk of running out of gas before the end :of the lifetime of their gas-
using equipment).
An approach to such measurement would begin with the first class of
consumers. Their dollar gains should equal their consumption at
constant R/P ratios times the difference between regulated and "unregulated"
prices. The dollar loss of the second class roughly should equal
one half of (a) the difference between their actual consumption and their
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Figure 1.2 Gains and Losses from Field Price Controls
S
uantity
rN1l c1lV, - - - - -
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hypothetical unregulated comsumption at constant reserve backing multiplied
by (b) the difference between the unregulaed and the "shadow" price (that
33
would clear the market of regulated demand at constant reserve backing).
Field producers experience losses from price ceilings as a matter
of course. They lose by price ceilings those amounts gained by consumers
on established service, and also lose roughly an amount equal to one-half
the difference between regulated and unregulated prices times the difference
between regulated and unregulated production.
Any estimates of these price and quantity differences is most inexact,
particularly because they depend on "unregulated" prices, when regulation
throughout the decade has prevented observations of any such prices. Also,
any overall assessment depends upon whether the gains to established con-
33
This can be seen by inspection of the rudimentary supply-demand diagram,
in Figure 1.1, as follows: the gains of established consumers are repre-
sented by Area A and the losses of consumers with reduced backing is shown
by Area C.
The statement on prices in the text can be understood by inspection of the
diagram. Here ql and q2 are at the old reserve production ratio (since
otherwise measurements of gains and losses would be made while "quality
of service" in reserve backing was also being allowed to vary). The measures
used here are the levels of production implied by constant R/p ratios shown
in Table 1.3 The estimates for ql are given by production at hypothetical
"unregulated" field prices (Column 2) and for q2 by production at regulated
prices at constant R/P ratio (Column 1). The price appropriate for regu-
lated q2 is P*2 which clears the market of the reduced quantity q2 (result-
ing from the freeze at P2). This price P 2 has been estimated by simulation
with the econometric model.
There is also a loss by producers equal to Areas A and B. Again, these
are measured at the mid-1960's constant R/p ratio, and thus are the same
ql and q2 as in the last paragraph. The net losses to all groups combined
are equal to Areas B plus C, unless specific weightings are assigned to
the "worth" of a dollar taken away from producers and a dollar given to
consumers. Such a specific weighting of, say, 0.0 on the first and 1.0
on the second would attribute Area A to net economy-wide gains. No such
attribution is made here.
3 4 This is the number of dollars equivalent to Area B in the diagram in
the preceding footnote.
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sumers are treated as worth more than the losses of producers. Neverthe-
less, as an indication of the orders of magnitude of gains from the price
controls, estimates of prices and quantities have been made from simulations
with the econometric model. Field prices are as under regulation or, alter-
natively, at the simulated "unregulated" levels shown as being necessary
to preserve the reserve backing. Alternative levels of production are as
simulated at actual prices at a constant R/P ratio, or as simulated at
hypothetical unregulated prices.35 From these prices and quantities, the
gains and losses have been estimated as follows:
(1)
Gains to
Consumers
(Area A)
billions of dollars
0.3
0.7
1.2
1.7
2.2
2.5
(2)
Losses to Consumers
from a Reduction
in Reserve Backing
(Area C)
billions of dollars
0.0
0.1
0.1
0.1
0.1
0.1
Losses to
Producers
(3) (4)
(Area A) (Area ];)
billions of dollars
0.3 0.0
0.7 0.1
1.2 0.1
1.7 0.1
2.2 0.1
2.5 0.1
3 4This is the number of dollars equivalent to Area B in the diagram in the
preceding footnote.
35
The two simulation series for quantities are as shown in Table 1.3 as
Columns (1) and (2) respectively. The Column (1) series is correct for
regulated prices because it shows the amount of production at the "same"
or constant R/P ratio. This amount is the proper level on which to assess
gains of established consumers, since no reserve backing has been lost to
that point. This takes account of net benefits after adjustment has been
made for the losses to consumers from the elimination of reserve backing.
The calculations of Areas A, B, and C are based on the assumption that the
loss of reserve backing was equivalent to the reduction of present consump-
tion at constant reserve backing, and that that reduction of present consump-
tion is equivalent to the lowest level of production q2 in the diagram
above.
Year
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
-
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These are "static" gains and losses) since they include only one
year's production results.3 6 As limited as they are, they show that con-
sumers as a group gained. What they gained, producers lost. The losses
which would have gone into dividends to stockholders of gas companies,
or into new investment in exploration and development, cannot be ignored
entirely even if they were recognized by the regulatory commission. All
that can be said is that the price freeze did more good for buyers in
holding down their monthly payments of gas bills than the losses to them
from reductions in reserves, and that the freeze did slightly more harm
to producers in income and production losses.37
Whether this array of benefits and costs from field price controls will
continue. in the 1970's is the concern of the next chapter. During the
later 1970's, the shortage of production consequent-upon the reduced reserve
backing should by itself lead to greater losses to established customers.
An attempt is made in the next chapter to show whether there will still be
net gains from regulation to customers then--particularly to interstate
customers (since they are being protected by the Federal Power Commission
from price increases).
1.4. Summary
The Federal Power Commission, having been given tle task of regulating gas
field prices by the Supreme Court, tried any number of ways of adapting old
regulatory techniques to new contracts for producing gas reserves. The
rationale for regulation provided by the courts centered on keeping prices
36 Because of the extreme imprecision of the basis for estimates, a more
complex dynamic analysis was ruled out at this point. Nor would the general
results be further illuminated by discounting these numbers to present value
at the time of the temporary area rates.
That is, the sum of consumer gains (Areas A-C) falls slightly short of
producer losses (Areas A+B).
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at the levels experienced in the late 1950's; prices were to be stabilized
for stability's sake. The Commission's resolve to hold the price level
was strengthened by court decisions stressing that the FPC could set
prices using whatever review process seemed most appropriate. Eventually,
in the area rate proceedings, the FPC found the means for invoking freezes
on prices over wide regions.
There is little question but that price stability was achieved.
Stability probably led to deficiencies in supplies of reserves and, ulti-
mately, deficiencies in production of gas in the early 1970's (as shown
by simulations with the MIT econometric model described below. In the
absence of controls, prices probably would have gone up enough to have
maintained at least a fifteen--to-one reserve production ratio, and to
have held back demands'so as co have cleared field markets of all new
reserve demands. Model simulations based on these conditions show that
higher "unregulated" prices (sufficient to have cleared reserve markets)would have
dampened demands and would have been at best 60 percent higher on new
contracts, and when such prices were rolled in to wholesale changes, resi-
dential and commercial customers would have paid 20 percent more for the
amounts they actually consumed.
To some extent, given these conclusions, the rationale for regulation
can be judged in retrospect. Even though the courts and Commission are
not explicit on who should receive the benefits from regulation, it might
be assumed that those who actually did benefit were meant to be blessed by
the regulatory process. Assuming such does not lead to a very clear and
consistent view of regulation. Consumers, particularly in the South outside
of FPC controls benefited from low prices on the production they received.
But they and others lost their reserve backing, since old reserves were
used to provide for expanded production for new consumers--indeed into the
-33-
market by relatively low frozen prices. The model simulations of benefits
and losses for particular groups indicate that consumers as a whole
received benefits from lower regulated prices, even after accounting for
losses for some from reduced reserve backing, and producers as a whole
experienced losses to a somewhat greater extent than the consumers gained.
Thus up to the beginning of the production shortage consumers at least
may have benefited from controls. The rationale for regulation may
have been no more than that of income redistribution to gas customers
up to the point of production shortage. The rationale for the production
shortage then remains to be found.
-34-
CHAPTER 2:
ALTERNATIVE REGULATORY POLICIES AND THE
GAS SHORTAGE, 1974 - 1980
The development of production shortages in the last few years has
had a strong effect on the conduct of regulation. Soon after the appear-
ance of such shortages--manifest in the inability of pipelines to meet
commitments to consumers--the Federal Power Commission, through the intro-
duction of new regulatory procedures,brought about extremely rapid increases
in new contract field prices. This was partly in response to widely-expressed
opinions--from both producers and pipelines---that higher prices were needed
to bring about more discovery activity and from that more production.
However the lags in the system from price changes to more production which
resulted were so extensive that, by 1974, there has been little production
change from large price increases. The continued shortage has placed new
pressures on the Commission for further changes in policy as well as in
price levels.
At the same time Congress and the Office of the President have become
focal points for complaints that FPC policies have failed to ameliorate
gas production shortages. Many of these complaints have come from buyers--
the pipelines and retail gas utilities--in the northern and western :iparts
of the country feeling the production shortfalls. With neither producers
nor consumers supporting gas regulation, there has been:;substantial pressure
for change. The changes most often proposed have been in the realm of new
legislation reforming the controls allowed the Federal Power Commission.
The proposals for legislative reform have been in two contradictory
directions. The first is towards more regulation, while the second calls
for elimination of-Federal Power Commission controls over field markets.
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The justification for moving in either direction is that the shortage would
be reduced and consumption expanded for those users of-gas needing it the
most if the legislation is passed. However both justifications cannot be
correct--either more of less regulation could be expected to reduce the
shortage. but not both.
This chapter considers these alternative directions for policy,
and evaluates each in terms of its ability to reduce the gas production
shortage. No one specific bill before Congress, or specific rate schedule
proposed to the FPC, is evaluated in detail, because legislation and cases
change rapidly enough to render any such detailed evaluation quickly
obsolete. Rather, attempts have been made to characterize policy and then
to evaluate for each type its general effects on the gas shortage. Two
classes of policies--(l) a reaffirmation of regulation and (2) deregulation
of field prices--are described, and then evaluated in terms of the shortage
by simulating with the econometric model to obtain predicted prices and
quantities for 1975 to 1980.
2.1. Strengthened Regulation
Stronger controls over wellhead prices have been proposed before
Congress and the Federal Power Commission. Many reasons have been given
for this position, but most pervasive is the argument that producers have
been holding back reserves in anticipation of relaxed controls. Because
of the long lag structure from discovery to production, many years have
to pass before there is any effect from higher new contract prices. It
is argued that this period can be extended by producers if they think that
future prices are going to be higher after regulation has been relaxed.
The argument for tighter controls is that strict ceilings will cause producers
to see the futility of holdinLg back supplies and, as a consequence, more
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gas will be forthcoming at present prices.l The blame for the shortage
lies with the FPC and its price increase policies: "[The FPC], with the
best motives, has so tittilated the speculative expectations and ambitions
of the producer industry with a promise of imminent deregulation and ever-
higher prices, that t has become perfectly rational profit-maximizing
behavior on their part to move slowly on development and production of
.2
reserves."
The case for stronger regulation has been made with a different
argument as well, that higher prices in fact will have little effect on
the size of the shortage. This is asserted, for example, by Peter Schuck
of Consumers Union when, after reviewing data on past increases in the
price of natural gas and on the resulting quantity responses, he concluded
that "deregulation would not significantly increase natural gas supplies.3
This is asserted to be because the response of production to price is
limited by the lack of competition in field markets. As concluded by
Dr. David Schwartz of the Office of Economics of the FPC, ;'a review of
the evidence indicates a lack of workable competition in the producer
market (and) due to structural imperfections, deregulation would result
in extensive prices, windfall profits to the producers, consumer exploitation
cf. Testimony of Mr. Lee White, Chairman, Energy Policy Task Force,
Consumer Federation of America, Hearings on Gas and Oil Regulatory Bills
(U.S. Commerce Committee, 1973-1974) pages 457 et sic. White's argument
is compromised by an attempt on his part to separate "increased demand"
and "reduced supply" from "price" as factors contributing to the present
natural gas shortage. (cf. page 478).
2Testimony of Peter Schuck, Director, Consumers Union, in Hearings on Gas
and Oil Regulatory Bills (U.S. Commerce Committe, p_. cit.) page 737.
3 Testimony of Peter Schuck, op. cit.
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and little assurance of adequate supplies of natural gas."4 Although
none are necessary for the case, the three arguments that are presented--
(1) speculative non-response (2) low supply elasticity and (3) lack of
competition--alleged together or separately, cause price increases to
have no effect.
With no supply response, there is no need, in any way, for weakening
price controls. In Schwartz' terms, "If administered fairly and firmly,
regulation can assure an equitable framework for producers and consumers.
There is strong evidence that the present unavailability of gas supply
is related to the speculative anticipations of significantly higher prices."5
The thrust of any new policy would be to affirm ceiling price regulation
as a price freeze process, with any frozen price level to hold for a
considerable period of ime in the future.
Many proposals hav3. been made for determining the level of frozen
prices and for deciding which producers should be subject to the freeze.
Some have called for extending regulation to include intrastate sales,
so that the "speculative outlet" of higher intrastate prices would be
foreclosed. Others have proposed limiting the freeze to only the large
producers. Proposals along the lines of the Consumer Energy Act of 1974
4
Cf. testimony of David Schwartz, Hearings on Gas and Oil Regulatory Bills,
op. cit., page 220. Others, particularly Professor Alfred Kahn, have
argued that supply is inelastic (thus assuming that markets are competitive
enough for there to be a supply function). Cf. testimony of A.E. Kahn, The
Permian Basin Area Rate Proceeding FPC Docket ARGl-1(1960). This assertion
was not supported by evidence on supply elasticities. The econometric
policy model used below deals with the extent of market imperfection directly,
by fitting equations for production out of reserves that contain terms for
degree of market imperfection. These terms then are used in equations
for predictionof future production in the econometric model (as described
in Chapters 3 and 4).
5Testimony of David Schwartz, p.-cit., page 221 and page 223.
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proposed in the Senate (S.2506) called for abolishing the FPC alternative
pricing procedures and establishing a national ceiling on prices of both
gas and crude oil. The nation-wide rates would be based on historical
costs plus a "fair rate of return" determined by an orthodox public
utility rate review.6 The goal of all those proposed stricter controls
is to slow down. the rate of increase of prices.experienced in the 1970-
1973 period, while adding to reserves and production.
If this goal is not achieved, so that no new legislation is passed,
the FPC could continue its recent policies of increasing prices on new
contracts by as much as 5 per Mcf each year. In doing so, the Commission
is not likely to be hindered by the Courts of Appeal. The Supreme Court
has continually affirmed te Commission's right to proceed; in the most
recent case, the.Court once again quoted the words of FPC Versus Natural
Gas Pipeline Company whereby rate-making agencies "are permitted to make the
pragmatic adjustments which may be called for by particular circumstances."
7
The courts "have consistently held that there is a presumption of validity
that attaches to each exercise of the Commission's expertise. Those who
would overturn the Commission's judgement undertake the heavy burden of
making a convincing showing that it is invalid because it is unjust and
,8
unreasonable in its consequences.. Within this context, the Commission
6But there would be more latitude within proposals to allow the Commissionl
to consider in finding the rate of return "factors which are relevant to
assuring that the nation has adequate supplies of oil and gas at reasonable
prices to the consumer." Cf. "Congress Near Showdown on Proposal to Decontrol
Gas Prices," National Journal Reports (May 25, 1974), page 772. The quotat-
ion is from a market-up version of the Consumer Energy Act, still in committee
as of July 1, 1974. Although "supply and demand factors" could allow the
Commission to set any price ceilings it wished, without reference to a
Congressional mandate for stronger control, the goal of a price freeze is
still predominant in this legislation.
FTC v. Texas Inc. et al. 42 United States Law Week 4867 (June 11, 1974).
8Cf. Mobil Oil Corporation v. Federal Power Commission, 42 United States
Law Week 4842 at 4855 (June 11, 1974). The words are quoted from the deci-
sion in Permian Basin Area Rates 390 U.S. 747 (1968).
has followed the practice of increasing prices on new contracts each year
of the last few years, based in part upon historical cost considerations
and in part upon price increases as the means for reducing shortages.
This judgmental procedure, continued into the future, would be the "least
vigorous" reaffirmation of regulation.
Thus there are two distinct alternative types of policies that
could be characterized as "strong regulation." The first would be the
product of new legislation, and would result in the installation of price
freezes along the lines of the area rates of the early and middle 1960's.
The general level of prices on new contracts would change only if the
(extremely slow moving) historical average costs of production warranted
changes. The second would, from default of Congress, be no new legis-
lation, but would allow the Commission to exercise its "pragmatic" judgment
that further changes in price levels were warranted, In such cirsumstances
the Federal Power'Commission, .in keeping with decisions.in the 1970's,
to this point would likely allow changes in new contract price levels of
up to 5 per Mcf per year.
2.2. Elimination of Regulation of Field Prices
The more widespread reaction to increasing production shortages has
been the call for the removal of wellhead price regulation. Since prices
were frozen over much of the 1960's, and shortages developed first in
reserves in the middle 1960's and then in production in the early 1970's,
it has been argued that controls were the cause. Furthermore, eliminating
controls altogether should hasten the process of eliminating the shortage.
The call for dereg ulation of wellhead prices on new contracts is asserted to be
a first step in that direction. Calling natural gas "America's premium
fuel," the President in April 1973 proposed legislation to exempt gas
V
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newly dedicated to the interstate pipelines from ceilings so as to "stimu-
9
late new exploration and development. The same case was made by the Chair-
man of the Federal Power Commission by noting that "gas supplies are short
and the way to encourage more drilling and discoveries may be to let prices
rise.,10
Deregulation as a policy is based on the argument that there is sub-
stantial responsiveness of both production ad demands to price increases.
Decontrol is the quickest way to take advantage of this responsiveness
and thus to eliminate shortages. Although lag structures are not assumed
away, most proponents of deregulation expect it to result in the elimination
of the shortage in at least the near future. Decontrol should allow higher
prices to clear markets of excess demand by increasing both reserves and
production, and by decreasing demands at wholesale. Also, it would be
expected that gas now being channeled away from controls into intrastate
markets would go back to the interstate pipelines as the prices offered
interstate either matched or exceeded those offered by local industry.
There is less than perfect agreement among proponents of deregulation
as to how and over what time period decontrol should occur. The Republican
Administration has proposed gradual or "phased":' deregulation of new contract
prices. Price ceilings would still be. in effect on old contracts now deliv-
ering production, and the prices of new contracts would be allowed to increase
only by steps over the next few years, until presumably by 1980 any further
increases would be determined by market conditions alone. The step ceil-
ings would be administered by the Federal Energy Administration, and would
Cf. "Congress Nears Shutdown on Proposal to Decontrol Gas Prices " National
Journal Reports, op. cit., page 764.
1 0Cf. "Federal Power Commission Head Urges End to Gas Curbs," The New York
Times, April 11, 1973, page 19.
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be based on forecasts of future production and economy-wide demand
conditions rather than on backward-looking accounting costs. But total
deregulation of all contracts has been proposed as well (Senate Bill
371, sponsored by Senator John Tower in 1973). Also, immediate dereg-
ulation of new.contract prices has been proposed, and came close to
passage as an amendment to other energy-related legislation (the Buckley
amendment to the Energy Emergency Act of 1973).
There have been many reasons advanced for elimination of regulation
other than that' there would be a quick market-clearing response. Most
basically, it is argued that the regulatory process itself produces
systematic shortages, so that there s no way of even avoiding a shortage.
This is because price changes lag behind costs under historical average
cost rate-setting procedures. With rising resource costs there is no
way that regulated prices can ever "catch up."
Without going into the validity of these arguments justifying price
decontrol, the question here is whether decontrolled prices would "do
better" in the late 1970's. Would higher prices of the sort proposed
for FEA significantly reduce the size of production shortages? This is
an empirical question. The answer supports either the case for strengthened
regulation ("low elasticity") or deregulation ("high elasticity").
2.3. Assessing the Effects of These Policy Alternatives
With long lags from price increases to more reserves and production,
it might be expected that any policy would be effective only after a number
of years had passed. Also, there would be only gradual changes in demands
1 1This point leads to questioning whether a process designed for public
utility controls applies to a natural resource industry. Cf. Stephen
Breyer and P.W. MacAvoy, "The Natural Gas Shortage and the Regulation
of Natural Gas Producers," The Harvard Law Review (Vol.86, no.6, April
1973), page 941 et sic.
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as a result of new contract price policies, since "rolled in" procedures
pass field price increases through to wholesale price increases only after
a number of years; after that, the wholesale prices affect industrial or
final consumer demands. But even so it is expected that there would be
some change in the first few years and a significant change by 1980. No
political process taking a decade to show results is relevant in this
system. Thus advocates of either (1) stronger controls or (2) decontrol
expect their policies to eliminate the gas shortage and improve gas markets
for consumers by 1980.
These possibilities are investigated by introducing the proposed
policy changes into the econometric model of gas field and wholesale
markets. Assuming certain rates of growth of production costs, of economy-
wide determinants of demand, and of oil prices, the econometric framework
leads to predictions of additions to reserves and production from each
of twenty-nine production districts. There are also predictions from the
model for residential and industrial demands in five regions of the country.
By inserting new contract field prices consistent with each alternative
policy into the modules for production, and by marking up field prices
through roll-in pricing procedures in the modules for demand, predictions
are made of reserves, production, and demands for each policy. Thus a
policy can be examined in terms of the implications of its pricing schedule
for levels of the production shortage.
2.3.1. Strong Regulatory Controls of Field Prices,
Regulation could bring either a strict price ceiling for the rest of
1 2The last half of the 1970's, assuming a rather expansive economy,
would have inflation rates of 6.5 percent, real growth of incomes and
investment of 3.5 percent, and substantial oil prices (close to $7.00
per barrel in 1979 dollars).
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the decade or, at the other extreme, price increases on new contracts
by as much as 5 per Mcf per annum. The strict price ceiling would be
in keeping with legislation calling for a return to public utility controls,
as that offered by the Senate Commerce Committee in 1974. On the other
hand, price increases by as much as 5 per annum would be in keeping with
the Commission continuing its 1971-1974 price-increasing practices. Both
of these pricing policies will be simulated with the econometric model,
in order to determine their effects on production and demands. Also, an
intermediate policy proposed recently will be evaluated in terms of its
effects on production and demands.
The most restrictive of these strong controls would require a price
freeze at the 1974 level, with adjustments allowed only for changes in
historical average drilling costs thereafter. Given that average drilling
costs in the last four years have increased close to tile rate of 3¢
per Mcf per year, it can be expected that new contracts would be limited
to the 1974 level of 39¢ per Mcf, with 3 cent increases thereafter (as
showa in Table 2.1).
Such limited price changes would hold additions to reserves and
production close to pre-1970 levels. The simulations indicate that new
discoveries should increase somewhat, from the ten trillion cubic foot
level in the early 1970's to 14 or 15 trillion cubic feet, but primarily
as a result of the incentives to exploration which follow from the assumed
high level of oil prices (close to $7 per barrel in real terms). Total
additions to reserves would be less than 25 trillion cubic feet each year,
while production would rise to as much as 30 trillion cubic feet. As a
result, the reserve base would decline from 230 to 217 trillion cubic
feet by 1980.
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The model smulations show demands much greater than production with
ceiling prices held at these levels. Total demands for new production
are forecast to increase from 24 trillion cubic feet in 1973 to approxi-
mately 41 trillion cubic feet, as a result of the rapid increases in oil
prices combined with the ceiling on gas prices (which prevents new con-
tract prices from rising even as much as general price increases due to
inflation.)
As a result, excess demands are expected to increase for the remainder
of the decade. The gap between production and demand is forecast to
increase as time passes, from approximately 3 trillion cubic feet in
1975 to 10 trillion cubic feet by 1980. The ceiling price would appear to
exacerbate excess demands so that the shortage will be close to 25 percent
of total demands for production by 1980.13
The Federal Power Commission itself has recently proposed a new form
of regulation that inadvertently may have about the same effects. In
its decision in Docket R389A case (considered "promising of future price
increases" (as noted in Chapter 1), the FPC on June 26, 1974 allowed all
gas produced from wells drilled after January 1, 1973 to sell at prices
of 42¢ per thousand cubic feet. This uniform national rate would increase
by 1¢ per annum thereafter. The ceilings were arrived at from review of
13These results from strict controls can be expected whether values of
exogenous variables assumed here are used, or whether reasonable "higher"
or "lower" values are used. As shown in the simulations in Chapter 5,
when "high" values are used the size of the excess demand in 1980 is
larger, and when lower values are used the excess demand is somewhat
smaller. The results are approximately as sensitive to changes in oil
prices as they are to changes in the values of economy-wide variables.
Simulations based upon high versus low values of exogenous variables
differ by approximately 7 trillion cubic feet in forecast excess demand
for 1980. But this amount of difference, while substantial, does not
affect the conclusion that strict regulation cannot eliminate the present
natural gas shortage, and is likely to make it worse.
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both costs and market conditions. The Commission did not expect these
prices to be sufficient to clear excess demands immediately; the Commission
said the demand for gas "is much higher than the supply and will remain
so for the immediate future."1 But the Commission in its judgment con-
cluded that "these rates for natural gas sold in interstate commerce are
adequate to bring forth the requisite supplies to fill reasonable demand"
but "not so high that natural gas consumers are exploited during times
of shortage." 5 These proposed prices are not different in kind from
"strengthened regulation," because they require a low national ceiling
and a small increase each year.' By setting this national ceiling, the
Commission has in effect frozen prices on some contracts already at the
42 cent level. These contracts are those with the most advantageous
reserves and production (large in quantity and close to final delivery
points); because these are frozen, the effect may be the same as a
general price freeze, although the FPC did not intend it to be so. Also,
the overall allowed increase of 1¢ per annum is significantly less than
sufficient to compensate for expected inflation. Thus the effect over
time as well as over space may be similar to a general price ceiling.
The forecast results are shown in Table 2.2. New discoveries are
expected to be 30 percent less than under "cost of service" regulation
in Table 2.1, and, given production close to 29 trillion cubic feet,
the reserve stock in the United States is expected to fall below 200
trillion cubic feet by 1980. At the same time, demands are expected to be
Cf. J.L. Rowe, "Price Boost Approved for Natural Gas," The Washington
Post, June 26, 1974, quoting from the Commission decision'in Dockets
R389a, National Area Rates.
15J.L. Rowe, op. cit.
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enhanced by the low field prices and to grow to 42 trillion cubic feet
by 1980. Excess demands are forecast to exceed 13 trillion cubic feet,
or 30 percent of total demands. The forecast results imply that the
Commission not only will be unable to reduce the shortage, but will create
even greater excess demand than would occur by invoking old "cost of
service" procedures on a regular basis through the rest of thedecade.
A more promising alternative is the FPC form of regulation. The
Commission, in the absence of new legislation, would continue its 1970-
1973 policy of allowing average price increases each year on new contracts.
Area rate reviews, along with individual case reviews, could result in
five cent annual increases on new contracts. The basis would be the prag-
matic judgment of the Commission as to what was necessary to ease a grow-
ing production shortage. As shown in Table 2.3, additions to reserves
would be expected to increase by 1980 to approximately 30 trillion cubic
feet per annum, as a result of substantial increments in discoveries,
extensions and revisions. Production would be expected to fall slightly
short of the total additions to reserves each year. As a result, the
total stock of reserves would be expected to decline somewhat by 1976, but
to return to the level of 230 trillion cubic feet by 1980.
Unfortunately, neither the additions to reserves nor the level of
production would appear to be sufficient to eliminate the shortage. Simulated
demands increase at a slightly lower rate than under the two alternative
regulatory policies discussed above, principally as a result of the average
wholesale price increasing from 48¢ to 72¢ over the period from 1975 to
1980. Even so, the demands of 39.9 trillion cubic feet by 1980 exceed
production by 8.3 trillion cubic feet. Worse.still, because of smaller
additions to production than to demand, the shortage is expected to increase.
Excess demand is a smaller percentage of total demand than under strict
-49-
"cost of service" regulation, but still exceeds 20 percent of total demands.
In this case, as with the previous simulations of "strengthened regulation,"
policies that result in small annual price increases do not of themselves
eliminate the shortage of production. Price ceilings would appear to
make the shortage worse.
2.3.2.. Phased Deregulation of Field Prices
Given the large number of alternative proposals under the rubric
of "deregulation" of field prices, no single price schedule can be proposed
for an exact depiction of market conditions under decontrol. Most proposals,
however, would allow new contract prices to seek their own levels after
1980, with increasingly higher ceilings on new contract prices in the
intervening period.!6 The ceilings in fact would not eliminate excess
demand in the mddle 1970's, because they would be set to prevent substan-
tial price increases in the immediate future. Many rules of thumb have
been proposed for setting the interim prices; among the most frequent is
that of keeping average wholesale prices from increasing by more than 100
It should be stressed that "phased deregulation" is in no way a synonym
for complete deregulation within a few months' time. Although complete
and instantaneous deregulation is an alternative being considered, it has
not been examined here for political and economic reasons. The chances
of its acceptance by Congress seemed so small that it did not merit space
in this short chapter. Also, there is no analytically acceptable procedure
for simulating complete deregulation, since the equation relationships
in the model were constructed on the basis of data for two decades in
which regulation was predominant. Extrapolation of relationships during
regulation, to indicate other relationships in unregulated markets,
seems unacceptable; the chances in patterns of price expectations alone
would be so great as to eliminate any similarities of producer performance
under the two regimes of control. Simulations of "phased deregulation"
over the next five years seem to be legitimate, since they involve the
continued use of price controls of the nature of those in the 1960's
and 1970's when the data for equation estimation were generated.
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17
percent over the 1975-1980 period. Using wellhead prices in keeping
with such interim ceilings, a representative sequence would include a
25 cent increase in 1975, with 5 per annum increases thereafter. Simu-
lations with this price sequence have been completed as representative
of price and production behavior under "phased deregulation."
The simulations indicate increased discoveries each year, up to
29 trillion cubic feet by 1980, and total reserves to the level of 270
trillion cubic feet by that year (as shown in Table 2.4). The impact of
the price increases on new discoveries would not occur immediately, but
rather would begin to appear in the second and third year after the 25
cent price increase. Production out of reserves would increase somewhat
faster than reserve accumulations themselves since production depends on
price as well as the reserve level. As a result, simulated production rises
from 23 to 35 trillion cubic feet, at the rate of more than 1 trillion
cubic feet per annum.
At the same time, simulated demands for gas Fe. reduced as a result of
the pass-through of the higher new contract field prices to the wholesale
level. In fact, wholesale prices are not expected to increase very rapidly.
These price equivalents were presented to members of the House of
Representatives in individual briefings in the Spring of 1974 by the
Columbia Gas System, 20 Mountchanin Road, Wilmington, Delaware as a.
basis for legislative proposals allowing higher gas prices. As a matter
of fact, they would allow price increases that would still not place
natural gas prices at the same level as oil prices forecast for New
Jersey in 1980. The sequence of such "equitable" prices would be as
follows. Gas wholesale prices start at approximately 44¢ per Mcf in
1974 and increase to 88¢ per Mcf in 1980. The final price is equivalent
to crude oil prices close to $5 per barrel. But the addition of
further delivery charges to places as far North along the eastern coast
of the United States as New Jersey would add at least 30¢ to these
average nation-wide wholesale prices. The resulting East Coast oil
and gas prices would be $7 per barrel in 1980 dollars--the level of
oil prices in 1974 dollars used in the econometric forecasts.
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(The average wholesale price up to that point in time rises only to
84¢ per Mcf, while the new contract field price in 1980 is 90¢ per
Mcf.) Even so, the price increases are sufficient to hold demands down
to the level of 35 trillion cubic feet per annum by 1980. "Phased"
increases in gas prices curtail the growth in demands for production
by almost 36 percent (as compared to FPC regulation with 3 cent per
annum price increases).
The results of this policy would seem to include a substantial
reduction in the gas shortage within a reasonable time span. By 1979
the levels of production and demands for production are both expected
to be approximately 35 trillion cubic feet. Of course there is some
chance that there would still be some shortage, given that these fore-
casts, based upon the "probable" values of economy-wide determinants of
costs and demands, are not going to be perfectly accurate. But the most
likely general price increases, oil price increases, and gas increases
(in keeping with phased deregulation) should clear production markets
of excess demand. In comparing this with "strict regulation" policies,
it would appear that this is the policy more appropriate for eliminating
the gas shortage. The process would be extended over many years, and would
As in keeping with the simulations for "strict control," attempts have been
made to assess the precision of the forecasts. The approach consists of
inserting different values of exogenous variables into the econometric model
to determine how the size of forecast excess demand changes. The different
values of exogenous variables are discussed below, in Chapter :5. But, even
with a wider range of values than likely would occur, the size of the shortage
as a result of this phased deregulation policy does not vary greatly. There
would be a shortage as large as 2 trillion cubic feet if either "high" oil
prices or "high" economic factors prevailed; but if low values of both exo-
genous oil prices and economic variables were in effect, the shortage would
be a surplus as large as 6 trillion cubic feet at prevailing phased dereg-
ulation prices. Under these last circumstances, it would be expected that
the price ceilings would not "operate." Prices would be below ceiling
levels, or reserves would be put back into the reserve inventory rather
than produced (so as to raise the reserve-production ratio).
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involve large field price increases. But "phased deregulation" should
reduce the shortage to negligible levels by 1980, while more regulation
would likely increase the shortage so that the excess demand would range
from 8 to 13 trillion cubic feet out of 40 trillion cubic feet of total
demands per year. If the goal is to eliminate the shortage, as those
proposing policy changes all espouse, the proper direction.would seem to
be that of "phased" deregulation.
TABLE 2.5:
TAXES ON CONSUMPTION
TO ELIMINATE THE GAS SHORTAGE
Field Price on
Year New Contracts
¢/Mcf
1974 39.7
1975 44.8
1976 49.8
1977 54.9
1978 60.0
1979 65.1
1980 70.2
Taxes on
New Contracts
¢/Mcf
0
10.9
21.9
32.9
43.9
55.0
66.0
Production
Supply
trillion cu. ft.
24.6
25.4
26.4
27.4
28.7
30.1
31.5
Production
Demand
with Taxes
trillion cu. ft.
26.3
28.7
30.6
31.9
32.5
32.3
31.2
Of course there are other ways of eliminating the shortage, but
they are more expensive for the consumer and/or the taxpayer than "phased
deregulation." Consider two alternative policies deliberately designed
to eliminate the gas shortage. The first is to tax consumption so as
to reduce demands to the level of 31 trillion cubic feet--that level of
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production forecast to occur under continuation of regulatory "status quo."
As simulated by the econometric model, the taxes levied on pipeline buyers
in new contracts would have to begin at 10¢ per Mcf in 1975 and rise to
66¢ per Mcf in 1980 (as in Table 2.5). These taxes would be added onto
new contract field prices, so that the pipeline pays 136¢ per Mcf for
new gas at the wellhead in 1980. When these prices are "rolled-in", they
would be sufficient to cut back on wholsale and final demands so as to eliminate
excess demands.
The shortage could be eliminated by increasing gas supply an additional
10 trillion cubic feet. This could conceivably be done by subsidies on
new contracts added to the controlied prices paid--subsidies that would provide
income to the producer, but ould not add to the field or wholesale prices
paid by the buyers. Table 2.6 shows the subsidies required to bring forth
the additional supply necessary to match the demands, given a regulatory
price freeze, of 39.9 trillion cubic feet . The simulations from the
econometric model suggest that this could be achieved by 1980 with subsidies
of more than 1 per lief on new contracts, so that the field producers would -receive
$1.78 per Mcf that year on new commitments to interstate pipelines. In this
case, the "price" of $1.78 per Mcf on new contracts would be "split" between
buyers and taxpayers.
Both of these policies would seem more costly than phased deregulation,
simply because each uses only one-half of the market at any time. The
tax policy uses the "demand dampening" mechanism of increasing prices to
consumers, while the subsidy policy uses the "supply expansion" mechanism
of increasing profits to producers. But "phased deregulation" uses both
supply and demand incentives, so that the amount of price increases or pro-
fit per unit of "excess demand reduction" is less than with either of the
fiscal policies.
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TABLE 2.6
SUBSIDIES TO ELIMINATE
THE GAS SHORTAGE
Field Price on
Year New Contracts
¢/Mcf
1974 39.7
1975 44.8
1976 49.8
1977 - 54.9
1978 60.0
1979 65.1
1980 70.2
Production
Demand
trillion cu. ft.
26.3
28.8
31.3
33.6
'35.8
37.9
39.9
Subsidy on
New Contracts
¢/Mcf
0
17,9
35.9
53.8
71.8
89.9
108.1
Production
Supply with
Subsidy
trillion cu. ft.
24.6
26.6
28.9
30.7
33.3
36.2
40.0
2.4. The Effects of Gas Policy Changes on Producers1 Consumers,
and Others
The superiority of the "phased deregulation" policy, at least insofar
as reducing the shortage is concerned, is so great that there would seem to
be little basis for support of the alternatives. But there is substantial
concern over the income effects from policies centered on working only on
the shortage. Consumers are subject to substantial price increases from
deregulation, which recur to producers as higher profits.
The effects involve more than simple income gains or losses. The
shortage itself affects incomes. Curtailments this last winter in the
use of gas in the North in residential and commercial consumption left
consumers with lower real incomes.
In fact, there may be important groups of consumers that would gain
from phased deregulation. Residential consumers already not attached to
a retail gas utility company would gain from phased deregulation if they
were allowed to join the ·system because there was increased production
available. Industrial consumers would gain because they would receive
ga's that otherwise would not be available to them. Northern consumers
would benefit most from decontrol at the expense of consumers in the
South Central part of the country.
These patterns are indicated in Table 2.7. Under "status quo" regu-
lation, excess demand would be greatest in the North Central and second
19
greatest in the Southeast region of the country. If all residential
demands in the North Central and Southeast are met, as a result of allo-
cation requirements by the FPC that residential consumers be served first,
then the excess demand there has to be realized by industrial buyers. Thus
from 90 to 100 percent of industrial demands in those regions would have
to be cut off, with buyers going to alternative fuels and/or curtailing
production of final products and services. Thus, given the most likely
pattern of control over who gets the shortage, the industrial consumers in
the North Central part of the country would receive "real income" or bene-
fit from "phased deregulation" more than anyone else.
Price decontrol would have an-impact on other industries--particularly
other energy industries--so that they would be important "gainers" and
"losers" as well. In the presence of excess demand for domestic natural gas,
a new industry could develop in the early 1980's to provide gas from other
19
There would be less excess demand in the Northeast and West, because of
access to pipelines going into the more likely productive new field areas,
particularly offshore and in the Permian Basin. There is expected to be
no excess demand in the South Central region, because higher intra-state
prices in that region allocate additions to reserves to buyers there first.
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TABLE 2.7
SHORTAGES BY REGION, 1978 - 1980
Northeast:
Excess Demand
(a)
0.7
0.7
0.7
North Central:
Excess Demand
(a)
4.3
5.0
5.6
West:
Excess Demand
(a)
0.2
0.3
0.4
Southeast:
Excess Demand
(a)
1.7
1.8
1.9
Total Residential
Demand
(b)
2.9
3.0
3.0
Total Residential
Demands
(b)
3.9
4.1
4.3
Total Residential
Demand
(b)
1.8
1.9
2.0
Total Residential
Demand
(b)
1.1
1.3
1.4
Total Industrial
Demand
(c)
2.4
2.4
2.5
Total Industrial
Demand
(c)
4.6
5.1
5.6
Total Industrial
Demand
(c)
3.0
3.1
3.3
Total Industrial
Demand
(c)
2.1
2.3
2.3
Source: Simulations with the Econometric Model derived from regulatory
"status quo" conditions. All estimates in trillions of cubic feet.
Year
1978
1979
1980
1978
1979
1980
1978
1979
1980
1978
1979
1980
-59-
parts of the world. Liquified Natural Gas would take the place of domestic
natural gas not developed under price controls. This Liquified Natural Gas,
presumably from North Africa or the Soviet Union, could eliminate excess
demands; at FPC regulated prices, it is forecast that LNG prices could exceed
$1.00 per Mcf delivered into the North Central region for demands greater
than 4 trillion cubic feet (if the LNG prices were "rolled in" to wholesale
prices before being passed on to wholesale and retail consumers). LNG prices
could exceed $2 per Mcf and demands would still be greater than 2.5 trillion
cubic feet that year. But under phased deregulation, there would be negli-
gible excess demands by 1980; in effect, the market for LNG is "made" by
strong regulatory controls. Phased deregulation would make LNG producers
and transporters losers."19
Of course there are always specific groups of potential gainers or
losers from industry-wide changes in regulatory policies. The losers from
phased deregulation like LNG companies are "special interests" not likely
to be mistaken for the general consumer, when the rationale of consumers'
interests is invoked for or against regulatory policy changes. The substi-
tution of LNG at $2 per Mcf for domestic natural gas at 80¢ per Mcf must
be considered a special interest proposal for solving the natural gas shortage
in the period 1975-1985.20
No attempt is made here to describe the full market for LNG, and LNC as
a "solution" to the gas shortage. This would require an analysis and fore-
casts of foreign reserves, production out of reserves, and of demands in
other countries than the United States. These would call for a world gas
econometric model. However, these demand forecasts for LNG are described In
detail in Chapter 5.
2U
But it should be noted that-these special interests are'economically sub-
stantial. The licencing of LNG contracts by the Federal Power Commission
would create large-scale new construction of storage facilities and of LNG
tankers in domestic United States ship years. These facilities add con-
siderably to the rate base for profit. regulation of wholesale pipelines
or retail gas utility companies, and this rate base is welcomed in a period
when the capital base from construction of pipelines in the 1950's has
been in a good part eliminated. Thus important parts of the pipeline in-
dustry constitute a group of beneficiaries from the shortage or of losers
from phased deregulation.
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Another group affected by changes in regulatory policies are producers
and distributors of crude oil in the United States. If the FPC price controls
were to be continued, and the resulting shortage given to industrial users,
then the demands for distillate and residual fuel oil would be substantially
increased (in the absence of a Liquified Natural Gas industry). The econo-
metric model has been used to simulate the changes likely to occur in fuel
oil markets, by assuming that alternatives are either "phased deregulation"
prices or FPC prices. Forecasts are then made of fuel oil demands in the
Northeast under these two sets of gas controls. They indicate that residual
demands will increase by 1.0 million barrels and distillate demands by .3
millionbarrels per day as a result of the gas shortage. Similar results
in sections of the country with even larger shortages indicate a substan-
22tial increase in fuel oil consumption from regulation. The loss of these
markets from "phased deregulation" would constitute another "interest group"
which loses from decontrol.
This is not to deny that some consumers are favored by regulation and
that they would lose if it were discontinued. Being able to get all the
gas demanded in 1970 prices for the rest of the .decade is a favorable
position, wherever created by strict regulation. It would be expected that
the income transfers away from these consumers resulting from "phased
deregulation" would exceed 1 billion dollars per annum by 1975 and 3.7
billion dollars by 1.980 (where the alternative to "phased deregulation"
would be a continuation of FPC regulation). This income transfer would go
2The procedure consists of finding that price P 2 in Figure 1.1 that clears
excess demands for gas (since the model does not recognize excess demands
for one fuel as the determinants of demands for another fuel). Then oil
demands at P*2 are compared with oil demands at P2.
22
-Forecasts cannot be made of increased fuel oil demands in the North Central
portion of the country, because of inability to construct a demand equation for
*fuel oil in which gas prices were a significant variable. This vagary of the
data of the 1960's prevents use of the approach in this paragraph for evaluating
the impact of the shortage where it is greatest on fuel oil demands in that region.
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from consumers with uninterrupted service to oil and gas.
But accompanying this loss from "phased" deregulation, there are
gains to those other consumers who otherwise would do without. The gas
not forthcoming at controlled prices is available for industrial and
commercial use in the northern parts of the country. The dollar gains
from deregulation, measured by the prices these consumers would be willing
to pay for this gas rather than do without in the period 1978-1980, is
forecast to exceed 2.5 b.llion dollars (in 1978) and 5.6 billion dollars
24
in 1980. Thus this group is expected to incur greater gains from dereg-
ulation than those who lose from no longer receiving the gas at lower prices.
Since these are all consumers--there would seem to be general gains from
deregulation for consumers as a group through phased decontrol at this
time. Only if the appropriate horizon for political decision-making were
less than two years would support for more regulation seem to make sense
from the point of large groups of consumers.
2.5. The Rationale for the Shortage and Regulation
Naming the "gainers" from phased deregulation is not to assert that
certain groups resisting deregulation benefit from the shortage, and that
they have influenced policy out of self-interest. The "demands" for regulation
2 3The amount of "gain",estimated from the simulation results described below,
is equivalent to Area A in the diagram in Chapter 1.
2 4This is equivalent to Area "C" in the diagram in Chapter 1, except that,
because consumers are doing without entirely, this area extends from the
level of consumption to zero levels of consumption as follows:
P
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Thus these losses are particular to the regulatory procedures used by the
Federal Power Commission and the state commissions of allocating the shortage
entirely to new consumers and to industrial consumers in the regions exper-
iencing excess demand.
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from special groups would not seem to have controlled the "supply" of
strict regulation to date--at least not in an obvious way, since losers
from deregulation compose a very motly group which seems to change rapidly.2 5
Rather than purposeful regulation, there would seem to have been a
classic failure of process in natural gas fuel price controls. The reg-
ulatory mechanisms were mandated by court decisions, calling for price
stability without reference to market conditions of production or demand.
These court decisions imosed a task on the Federal Power Commission that
it was not able to.perform; eventually the consumer was in fact made worse
off by their ceilings on prices, arrived at in the same way that more
appropriate ceilings are found for electricity prices. The failure of
controls as a means to benefit the consumer would seem to have been a fail-
ure of logic and perspective.
The failure of logic comes from reasoning by analogy.. The process
of regulation used by the Commission followed time-honored procedures.
The FPC dealt in calculations of historical costs, and in finding a fair
rate of return by comparing profit rates with those in other industries.
These methods of control had been an accepted part of public utility reg-.
ulation for decades. But these methods had not been applied systematically
In the late 1960's and early 1970's, residential consumers in most
parts of the country, and all consumers in the South Central part of the
country, gained from price regulation. Certain of the pipelines that had
very large reserves were gainers from price controls, because their field
purchase prices didn't go up-with new contract prices frozen under regulat-
ion. These groups no longer benefit from regulation. Certain of the
pipelines would gain in the future from continued regulation from the
sales of liquified natural gas; and certain oil producers experiencing
large increases in fuel oil sales in industrial regions consequent from
the gas shortage would continue to benefit from regulation.. Some residential
consumers, under firm delivery in the South, probably could expect a few
more years of consumption at low prices under regulation. Naming these
categories of producers and consumers as "losers" from the phase decontrol
and designating them as a coalition for continued regulation would not
appear to be credible at this time.
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to the gas industry, where costs of new reserves- even more expensive to
find--could not be determined from historical accounting data on old reserves.
New prices based on old costs guaranteed that increments to production
would in the long-run fall short of increments to demands. By asserting
that controls developed in one setting would work in the other, the regu-
latory agency made logical errors that undermined the efficiency of the
results.
To this was added the failure of perspective. Taking a two-to-three
year view of price ceilings, when industry reserve accumulation and product-
ion took place over much longer periods, was incorrect. Since this view
still predominates in legislative proposals for reform--where results are
expected from new price policies immediately--this part of the mistake could
well be repeated. The only question that remains is how long it will take
to understand these mistakes and to learn from them in revising regulatory
policy.
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CHAPTER 3:
THE STRUCTUREOF THE ECONOMETRIC MODEL OF NATURAL GAS
3.1. Overview of the Econometric Model
The econometric model developed for the natural gas industry has the
important characteristics of (a) simultaneously describing the behavior of
both reserves and production markets (b) describing the regional organization
of the industry at a disaggregated level and (c) accounting for the time-dynamics
inherent in the various activities of the industry. There are good reasons for
including this level of detail in the model.
In order to analyze the effects of alternative regulatory policies, it is
necessary that the industry be viewed as a complete system. Most previous econo-
metric studies of natural gas have investigated either supply or demand, but have
neglected the simultaneous interactions of the two. Balestra,L8 ] for exanmple,
in his classic study of the demand for natural gas by residential and commerciil
consumers, assumed perfectly elastic supply (as was probably justified for the
1950's and 1960's, since deliveries to final consumers were then made on an
"as needed" basis. However, this would not be valid for a model of the 1970's
where total demands for gas exceed production. Given that prices and other
variables now affect both production and demands, our model accounts for the
simultaneous interaction of output and demand at both field and wholesale levels
of the industry.
Regulation has been in effect for both field sales and trantport;tilon of
gas. Consequently two distinct sets of markets must be accounted or in modeling
the gas industry. Production and demand must be described in both the market for
reserve additions (gas producers dedicating new reserves to pipeline companies
at the wellhead price) and the market for wholesale deliveries (pipeline companies
selling gas on long-term contracts to retail utilities and industrial consumers).
Furthermore, the spatial relationship of these two markets must be modeled properly.
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These markets are regional in aature; reserve additions are contracted for
in regional field markets, and gas production is delivered by pipelines to
regional wholesale markets. These regional markets are interconnected through
the network of natural gas pipelines across the country. Individual whole-
sale markets receive gas from different combinations of producing markets,
so that it would be possible for a shortage of natural gas production to exist
in another wholesale region. In analyzing regulatory policy and its impact
on natural gas shortages, it is thus necessary to account for this spatial
organization of field and wholesale markets.
The time-dynamics of the different stages of reserve accumulation, of
production, and of demand are an important aspect of the model. Policy
questions center on not only how much production or demand will be forthcoming
at higher regulated prices, but also on how long it will take for the effects
of a new pricing policy to occ(Ir. Attempts are therefore made to ncludeL
appropriate time lags in all of the relationships of tile model.
A block diagram of the model is shown in Figure 3.1, and shlould provide
an overview of both the model's organization and the relationships between
field and wholesale markets. This diagram ignores (for simplicity) the
spatial interconnections between production districts and regional wholesale
markets, but it nonetheless provides a good starting point for understanding
the model's structure. We will therefore broadly survey each part of the
model with reference to the diagram and then discuss the individual modules
in more detail later.
3.1.1. Gas and Oil Reserves
Reserve additions are made up of new discoveries, and extensions and
revisions of previous discoveries. New discoveries include both associated
and nonassociated gas (associated gas includes both gas "dissolved" in produced
II
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I
I
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a
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oil and gas forming a cap in contact with crude oil). New discoveries also
provide the major component of reserve additions for oil.
The discovery process begins with the drilling of wells, of which some
will be successful in discovering gas, some will be successful in discovering
oil(with or without associated gas), and some will be unsuccessful (i.e.,
dry holes). Although wells are drilled in regions which offer some probability
of gas or oil discovery, many are drilled without an a priori expectation of
one specific hydrocarbon. As a result, the exploration and discovery process for
both gas and oil are considered simultaneously.
Drilling takes place under two modes of behavior, depending on whether
it is done extensively or intensively. On the extensive margin, few wells
are drilled, but those that are drilled usually go out beyond the geograph-
ical frontiers of recent discoveries to open up new locations or previously
neglected deeper strata at old locations. There the probability of discovering
gas is relatively small, but the size of any discovery may be large because
it would be the first in the region. On the intensive margin many wells are
drilled in an area already the source of gas production. Under these con-
ditions the probability of discovering gas is larger, but the size of discovery
is likely to be smaller.
The producer who is engaged in exploratory activity has, at any point in
time, a portfolio of drilling options available on both margins. In deciding
where to drill, producers make a trade-off between expected risk and expected
return, and thereby decide whether additional drilling will be extensive or
intensive. This choice between extensive and intensive drilling will be infltl-
enced by changes (or expected changes) in economic variables such as field
prices of oil and gas and drilling costs. The model developed here has an
1See Fisher [28].
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equation for wells drilled which is based on a rational pattern of producers'
responses to economic incentives in forming. their portfolios of intensive
and extensive drilling.2
Drilling alone does not establish discoveries in the model. Equations
are specified to determine the fraction of wells drilled that will be successful
in finding gas, and the fraction successful in finding oil. These "success
ratios" depend on whether economic incentives (e.g., price increases) result
in drilling on the extensive or intensive margin (and this must be determined
empirically). For example, suppose that the choice is on the extensive
margin. In that case the gas success ratio depends positively on the size
of gas reserve found per successful well (the larger reservoir is easier
to find), negatively on changes in the gas price (higher gas prices mean more
extensive drilling for gas), and positively on the oil price (higher oil
prices relative to gas prices result in more intensive drilling for gas since
oil becomes relatively more profitable).
Two equations determine, for gas and oil respectively, the size of
discovery per successful well. Discovery size is related to the number of
successful wells drilled previously, to the volume of previous discoveries
in that region (or to the "age" of fields there), as well as to gas and oil
prices. A larger number of previous successful wells means that discovery
sizes will be smaller, since the larger reservoirs are found earlier. The
"age" of fields itself is a fnction of how much previous drilling has been
done, so that size decreases with age. If economic incentives result in
2Economic incentives affect the number of exploratory wells drilled through
the determination of expected risk and expected return. This is done by
calculating returns as functions of current gas and oil prices, and also
through average drilling costs and the interest rate (reflecting captial
costs). Expected revenue per well is the sum of expected gas revenue and
expected oil revenue, where each expected revenue is the product of current
price, the estimated success ratio and the estimated size per successful well.
Expected risk is an estimate of the variance of expected revenue.
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extensive drilling, then higher gas prices (or lower oil prices) result in
larger discovery size as a shift is made to the extensive margin.
Finally, the model generates forecasts of new discoveries from this set
of equations. Total new discoveries (calculated for gas and oil separately)
is the product of number of wells, success ratio, and size of find per
successful well. This level of detail allows us to give explicit consideration
to the process of long term geological depletion as well as the role of risk
in determining the amount of exploratory activity. We account for the fact
that, from the viewpoint of exploration, oil and natural gas are in fact
joint products, and must be treated symmetrically. Also, this framework allows
for shifts in the relative proportions of intensive and extensive drilling
in response to changes in economic incentives,
Additions to reserves also occur as a result of extensions and revisions
of existing reserves. These xtensions and revisions for both gas and oil
depend theoretically on 1) price incentives 2) past discoveries of gas and
oil 3) existing reserve levels for both gas and oil and 4) the cumulative
effect of past drilling. In fact, extensions seem to be influenced most by
past discoveries and total drilling activity.3 Revisions of established
reserve levels, on the other hand, seem to be essentially proportional to
prior discoveries and reserve levels.
As can be seen in the block diagram, additions to gas reserves
are the sum of new discoveries, extensions, and revisions. Aside
from changes in underground storage, subtraction from gas reserves occurs
as a result of production. Similarly, additions to oil reserves are the
sum of new discoveries of oil, extensions, and revisions. Since our model
does not explain the production of oil from reserves, we do not determine
3Extensions can result from either exploratory or development well drilling.
Our model does not explain development well drilling, and therefore only
exploratory wells will be used to explain extensions.
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year end oil reserves.4
These partly engineering, partly economic equations determine additions
to reserves made by petroleum companies. If the natural gas industry were
not regulated, or if regulation of the wellhead price were ineffective (i.e.,
if the ceiling price of gas were the equilibrium wellhead price), this model
would also contain demand equations for reserves. In particular, the demand
for new reserves would be given by a wellhead price equation for pipeline
offers to buy reserve commitments at specified new contract wellhead prices.
Since 1962, however, there has been excess demand for new reserves, and thus
the demand function for new reserves has not been observable. Instead the
price has been given by the exogenous wellhead ceiling price.5
3.1.2. Natural Gas Wholesale Markets
The level of natural gas production out of reserves depends not only on
the size of the reserve base, but also on prices that buyers are willing to
pay for larger deliveries. The formulation of production supply in this model
has the marginal cost of developing existing reserves determine a particular
level of annual flow (e.g., by drilling development wells and then operating
them). Marginal production costs are dependent on reserve levels relative
to production, so that as the reserve-to-production ratio becomes smaller,
marginal costs rise sharply. The exogenous regulated price is assumed in
turn to set the upper bounds on marginal costs. Thus, as can be seen in
4Aseparate "sub-model" for reserve additions (as well as production out of
reserves) was constructed for offshore Louisiana, but is not shown in the
block diagram. Certain onshore data used for the exploration and discovery
equations described above were not available for offshore (e.g., detailed
success ratio data), and furthermore offshore exploration as well as production
depend to some extent on different variables than is the case onshore (e.g.,
the number of acres leased). The offshore submodel permits us to examine
additional policy alternatives relating, for example, to acreage leasing.
5Note that it is possible to have at the same time excess demand for new reserves
but clearingin production markets by running down the existing reserve-produc-
tion ratio. This was in fact the case in the late 1960's.
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the block diagram, the level of gas production out of reserves is a function
of both the field price of gas and the quantity of year end reserves in any
one production district.
The level of production out of reserves must be assessed relative to
the demands for that production after it has been transported to wholesale
markets by pipelines. The wholesale demand for natural gas production is
a function not of the wellhead price of gas but rather the wholesale price.
Average wholesale prices for gas are computed in the model for each consumption
region in the country through a series of pipeline price markup equations.
The price markups are based on operating costs, capital costs, and regulated
rates of profit for the pipeline companies.
Of course wholesale gas prices are not the only determinants of
wholesale gas demand. ·,Residential. and commercial demand, and industrial
demand, depend as well on :,the- prices of: alternative fuels
(including the wholesale prices of oil), and "market size" variables such
as population, income, and investment which help determine the number of
potential consumers. Separate residential/commercial and industrial equations
are formulated for each of five regions of the country. There is a third
category of natural gas demand which is formulated within the model, and
that is the demand for gas as field extraction fuel. A certain quantity
of gas is used as fuel for operating pumps to extract gas from the ground
in the thirteen major producing states, and although this quantity is small
it should be modeled to determine properly the total gas demand.
Natural gas is competitive with fuel oil both in industrial and resldential/
commercial markets. When analyzing the impact of alternative regulatory
policies, it is desirable to determine not only the changes in the demand
for'gas, but also how changes in gas demand are related to changes in oil
demand. We would like to know, for example, whether a decrease in the demand
-72-
for gas resulting from a higher price of gas results in an increase in the
demand for fuel oil, as well as how changes in the price of fuel oil affect
the demand for natural gas. The model therefore contains a set of wholesale
demand equations for fuel oil. Fuel oil demand is disaggregated into residential/
commerical demand (for numbers 2 and 4 oil) and industrial demand(for number
6 residual oil). Separate equations are estimated for each of three consuming
regions: the North East, the North Central, and a "South" region which includes
the South East, South Central, and West regions of the country. The fuel
oil demand equations have the same structural form as do the natural gas
demand equations, thus making it possible to compare changes in oil and gas
demand in a consistent manner. As can be seen from the block diagram,
these demands for oil depend on the wholesale prices for both oil and natural
gas, and also on the same "market size" variables as gas demand.
The determination of natural gas production at the wellhead and,
concurrently, the volumes delivered to buyers in wholesale markets, is
accomplished in the model by an input-output table connecting production
districts with consuming regions. A flow network is constructed which, based
on the relative flows calculated from 1971 data, determines where each consuming
region obtains its gas. This flow network also determines the pipeline
price markups for gas, since those markups are functions of the volumetric
capacities of the pipelines as well as the mileages that gas must be trans-
ported across the country.
Once the model has been spatially closed, wholesale deliveries can be
determined and summed to produce total deliveries for each region of the
country. Then, given the forecasted demands from the wholesale demand equations,
we can forecast excess demand on a regional basis.
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3.2. Structural Equations for Gas and Oil Reserves 6
The process of exploration and discovery, and the resulting accumulation
of new reserves, are probably the parts of the oil and gas industry that are
the most difficult to capture in a conceptual model. The exploration and dis-
covery process is complicated, and has not been studied (or modeled) in detail
by engineers. Thus structural econometric relationships formulated to link
economic, geological and technological variables that govern reserve additions
are likely to be rather crude at this time. Attempts are made here to for-
mulate those relationships that show clearly the effects of regulatory policy,
and that can be said to be based on maximization assumptions.
The model for reserve additions describes the process of generating new
discoveries of oil and natural gas in two stages. The first stage describes
investment in exploration under conditions of geological uncertainty and
a continuing process of depletion of the hydrocarbon resource base. Exploratory
companies are assumed to choose a level of investment that maximizes the firm's
value after balancing expected returns against the expected risks and
corresponding costs involved in exploration. Combined with a characteri-
zation of costs of exploration and development, this analysis leads to an
expression for the number of exploratory wells drilled in each production
district. In the second stage, the model predicts the parameters of the
size distribution of drilling prospects, and updates them from period to period
This section and section 4.3 are based on Krishna Challa's Ph.D. dissertation
"Investment and Returns in Exploration and the Impact on the Supply of Oil and
Natural Gas Reserves," M.I.T. Sloan School of Management, 1974.
Thus an. attempt is made to go beyond simply connecting independent and dependent
variables in a "black box" formulation. At a number of places in the model
particular relationships are posited from maximization of producer or consumer
utility. At other places, however, where theory failed us, "black box" formu-
lations are involved.
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to reflect the continuing process of reduction in prospects as well as new
information on geological and economic variables. Equations for the ratio
of successful to total wells, and for the size of discovery (conditional on
a success), are formulated so as to depend on these parameters. Discovery
volumes are then the product of wells drilled, success ratio, and discovery
size per successful well.
Additions to proved reserves also occur as a result of extensions and
revisions of existing fields and pools. Extensions and revisions are modeled
as functions of'previous discoveries, exploratory wells drilled, existing
levels of accumulated reserves and production, and an index of geological
depletion.
3.2.1 The Number of Exploratory Wells Drilled
The aggregate industry function for exploratory wells drilled is, of course,
the composite of the individual drilling decisions of several explorers
operating simultaneously. The individual driller makes his decisions after
taking into account the currently available information that can help him
ascertain expected return and risk in exploratory drilling, as well as the
relevant costs. Individual firms have a range of drilling options available,
each with its own expected risk and expected return, and a set of options is
chosen that maximizes the present value of the certainty equivalent net
cash flow resulting from exploration. To obtain a "certainty equivalent"
there must be a measure of the risk in any chosen set of drilling options;
we assume that risk can be represented by the variance of the cash flow, so
that the present value in certainty equivalent terms of the net cash flow
th
to the jth firm is given by
Vj = (l/r)(j - Xaj) (1)
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where Ij is the total end-of-period cash flow to firm , j = E(jT) is the
expected value of Ij, qj is the variance of I.j, X is an index of risk aversion,
and r is a long-term market interest rate.8
Now let-us examine how each firm can choose drilling options that will
maximize V. At any point in time there is an inventory of undrilled prospects
about which some'information is available. Maximizing behavior on the part of
the risk-averse explorer leads to the choice of prospects that yield the
highest expected return for a given level of risk, or, conversely, prospects
that have the lowest level of risk for a specified mean return. These
prospects are on an efficient frontier which may be represented as an upward
sloping curve in the risk-return plane, as shown in Figure 3.2. The frontier
includes small and relatively certain prospects (which correspond to intensive
drilling) such as point B, as well as large but less certain prospects
(corresponding to extensive drilling) such as point A. The particular prospect
chosen would depend on the individual driller's preference for risk. The
more.risk-averse he is the more likely it is that he will'choose prospects
8This is based on the single-period mean-variance model for pricing of capital
assets under uncertainty developed by Sharpe [80], Lintner [50] and Mossin[62].
Consider a single-period world in which all investors are expected utility
maximizers whose investment decisions can be characterized by the maximization
of a preference function U(Wt, ei, Vi) where W is the individual's wealth
at the beginning of the perioA, e is the expected value of the cash flow to
be generated one period hence by the investor's portfolio,. and Vi is the variance
of this cash flow. If one assumes that aUi/aWi>0, Ui/3e >0 and DUi/aVi<O,
and that all investors have homogeneous expectations and hat transactions
costs and taxes are zero, then the certainty equivalent of the random cash
flow i has a risk discount equal to the product of the price per unit risk X
and the risk itself. The risk of the cash flow is given by the sum of its
variance and covariances with cash flows from other investment opportunities.
We assume that (a) the alternative to drilling is an investment at return r,
and (b) drilling risks are independent across firms (so that the probability
of success at a site owned by firm A is independent of whether or not firm B
drilled successfully at another site). Under these assumptions the covariances
are zero and the risk of a cash flow is given by its variance.
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Figure 3.2 Efficient Frontier
Var [73]
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yielding small but relatively certain returns - i.e., that he will drill
intensively.
Once a well is drilled, oil and/or natural gas might be
discovered. Suppose that in a given period the jth explorer is considering
drilling a set of independent prospects which are expected to yield mean
dollar receipts RW per exploratory well from oil and gas discoveries.
Let (RW)v represent the corresponding variance of dollar receipts per exploratory
well. The expected net return E(f) from drilling W wells may then be
expressed in terms of RW and Ce(W), the expected total costs of exploration
and development if W wells are drilled:
E(j) = WjR - C (W (2)
If RWGj and RWOj are the mean sizes of discoveries respectively of natural gas
and oil per exploratory well, (RWG), (RWO)v the corresponding variances, and
PGe and POe the expected prices of natural gas and oil respectively, then we
may write
RWj =k(RWGPG + RWOjPOe ) (3)
and E(.) = k(W.RWG.PGe + W.RWO.POe ) - Ce(W.) (4)
3 3 J J 3 3
where k is a multiplicative factor that accounts for the fact that discoveries
may be extended or revised later in the development process.
At
_ *
11ir
Probably the largest source of uncertainty in returns from exploration
is geological unpredictability, i.e. the randomness of discovery size. For
simplicity the economic parameters will therefore be assumed to be known with
certainty so that
Var () = W (RW) (5)
or Var (?j) = k2 W (RWG)V(PGe) 2 + W (RWO )V(poe)2] (6)
if no significant correlations exist between oil and gas discoveries.
Before we can determine the number of wells to be drilled we must examine
the components of total expected costs, Ce(j). These include the costs
of exploration CE and the costs of subsequent development activity CD.
Although there is little theory establishing a functional relationship between
exploration costs and wells drilled, we can observe that (a) costs vary in
total and at the margin from one production district to another, depending
on average well depth, rock permeability and other geological conditions,
and (b) costs per well in a given drilling district seem to rise with the total
number of wells drilled in that district within a specific period, i.e., average
costs are increasing. Based on these empirical regularities, exploration costs
can be characterized by a quadratic function, so that the costs of drilling
Wj wells are:
CE(W) + W + (W 2 (7)
The historical average drilling costs per well (ATC) vary from district to
district because of the geological conditions of depth, permeability and
porosity. Using the historical values of ATC, we posit that
-= so + 1ATC
which gives us
cEW+a. + a(w)2 a(8)CE(W) a a lWi + a2 ATC + a3(W)2
where a, al, a2 and a3 are constant parameters.
o 2 3
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The cost of subsequent development activity is governed partly by the
same geological factors that affect exploratory costs (e.g., depth, rock
permeability, shape of the decline curve, type of drive, etc.) and also by
the amount of reserves withdrawn from the ground. This leads us to assume
CD (W ) ko klWRWj + k2ATC . (9)
Substituting expressions (8) and (9) into (2), we obtain an expression for
expected net return of the fork.
E() = b + bW. + j)+ bW b(Wj) (10)
We now substitute equation (5) for oj and equation (10) for Wj in equation
(1), and then differentiate the resulting expression with respect to the
number of exploratory wells drilled (so as to maximize V). This gives
us the following expression for WXTj, the total number of exploratory wells
drilled by firm :
WXT co + c RW + c2 (RW)v + c3 ATC
Aggregating over all firms in the district,. we expect the same relationship
to hold:
WXT - c + clRW+ c2 (RW) + c3(AT) (11)
Here RW and (RW)V stand for the values of the mean and variance of dollar
receipts over all of the exploratory wells drilled 'in the district.
Because of the "one-period" nature of this formulation, the riskless
interest rate r cancels out and does not appear in the final expression for'
total exploratory wells drilled. This would be correct only if costs and
corresponding revenues occurred in the same period; but since there are in
fact considerable lags between investment outlays for exploration and the accrual
of revenues from discovered and produced reserves, we include an interest rate
term INTA as an additional explanatory variable in equation (11). Adding this
-79-
term, and substituting the aggregate average values of the parameters RWG,
RWO, (RW)V and (RWO)V, we obtain the estimating equation for exploratory
wells to be:
WXT- c +c l (RWGPGe + RW Oe ) + c 2 [(RWG) (CRWO) ( POe)2 ]
+ (ATC) + c4 (INTA) . (12)
3.2.2. The Geological Environment as It Affects Size of Discovery
A single production district will in general contain reservoirs of
distinctly different geological types. Following Kaufman et al. [41] we
assume that reservoirs can be classified into a finite number of geologically
homogenous subkpopulationsa'. A begins when an exploratory well leads-
to the discovery of'the first reservoir in a particular sub-population,
Drilling then continues in the sub-population until the economic returns from
drilling no longer compensate for the associated costs and risks.
This description of the physical evolution of a play relies on three
postulates suggested by Kaufman et al. [41], and supported by earlier empirical
studies including Arps and Roberts [6], Kaufman [40], and Uhler and Bradley [85]:
I. The size distribution of reservoirs within a sub-population is
lognormal.
II. Conditional on a discovery being made within a sub-population, the
probability that the discovery will be of a 'given size is pro-
portional to the ratio of that size to the sum of sizes of' as yet
wudiscovered reservoirs within that sub-population.
III. Conditional on a play beginning within a sub-population, the proba-
bility that an exploratory well will be successful in finding a new
deposit is proportional to the ratio of the sum of volumes of the
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ass et undiscovered. deposits to the total unexplored volume of potentially
hydrocarbon bearing sediment.
Postulates I and II together can be used to determine the probabilistic
behavior of the amounts of oil or gas discovered by each successful well in
the order of discovery. Postulate II implies that on the average the larger
reservoirs will be found first, and that as the discovery process continues,
sizes of discovery tend to decline. Postulate I, II and III together imply
that within a given sub-population, as the play unfolds, the probability
of success tends to decrease, as does the average size of discovery. The
result, then, is to shift the efficient frontier of Figure 3.2 towards the
left. This may in part be compensated for by addition of some new, hitherto
unknown, prospects to the efficient set, but these additions are the result
of new geological information acquired during the activity of exploratory
drilling in the previous period, and are relatively unpredictable.
3.2.3. The Size of-Discovery
We can now develop the dynamics of the size distribution of reservoirs
as drilling continues. Let 6k represent the mean rate of decline in the size
of new reservoirs discovered in the kth sub-population, expressed in volumes
of hydrocarbons per successful exploratory well drilled. Let k(t) be the
mean size of the discovery at time t in the kth sub-population, and sk(t)
a random variable representing the anticipated size of the next reservoir
discovered in this sub-population. Based on the postulates cited above, sk(t)
may be assumed to be lognormally distributed, at least to a reasonable approx-
imation. Then if WXS[tl, t2] denotes the total number of successful explora-
tory wells (gas or oil) drilled into the kth sub-population during the time
interval [tl, t2] the anticipated size of the next reservoir discovered at
time (t + h) would be lognormally distributed with
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E[sk(t + h)l = ik (t) - 6kk (t)WXSk [t, t + hi
= k(t + h) (13)
and
,% 2 2
Var[sk(t + h)] = (t + h) ok (14)
2 2
= Vk(t)k for small h
where ok is the variance parameter associated with the lognormal density
th
governing sk. The parameters 6k and aok are characteristics of the k
subpopulation and are assumed to remain constant over the range of geological
depletion we are concerned with. Thus, over a small interval of time h, the
mean rate of decline in the size of discovery per successful well drilled is
E[sk(t + h)] - k(t) (15)P k (15)k
Ik(t)WXS[t, t + h]
and the variance of the rate of decline per successful well (for small h) is9
Var[sk(t +h)]
= ak (16)
2k(t)
Under our set of assumptions, as long as an estimate of the mean size of
reservoirs k at some initial point in time is available, knowledge of the
values of the two parameters 6k and ok is sufficient to describe the dynamics
of the probability distribution of discovery sizes. This is true in the
following sense. Given an estimate of the mean size of k(to) at some
initial point in time to, we can predict (using (15) and (16) repeatedly) the
9As we will see in the next chapter, since the error variance in (16) is
constant over time, we can estimate 6k by ordinary least squares regression
to estimate the relationship in (15) without the expectation operator on
the left-hand side. The standard error of regression in this estimation
would directly give us a consistent estimate of the variance parameter o
.
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mean size of discoveries, and the variance of the sizes, at any subsequent
point in time t. This holds as long as we know the number of successful
wells drilled into this sub-population WXS[to, t] during the interval
between t and t.
This procedure for determining discovery size distributions will have
to be modified however. Four modifications will be undertaken, with a goal
partly to improve the specification of the model and partly to facilitate
use of a better econometric procedure for fitting the model. First, although
it has been assumed that observations of Sk, the size of individual discoveries,
are used, we must use the average sk[t-0, t+e] of the sizes of all reservoirs
discovered in a specified small interval of time [t-e, t+e]. Second,
in equation (15), the term (sk(t + h) - lk(t))/Pk(t)
denoting an estimate of the percentage change in average size during the time
interval t, t + hi will be replaced by A(log Sk). We can rewrite
equation (15) in the more convenient form
log (sk(t + h)) = log (k(t)) - cOWXSkt, t + h] . (17)
The value of c, when estimated in a regression equation, provides a direct
estimate of 6k'
The third modification requires more detail. We have thus far assumed that
the parameter 6k, representing the mean rate of decline in size, is constant
throughout the evolution of discovery in a subpopulation k. This may not be ail
unacceptable assumption during the earlier stages, when the size of the as yet
unexploited resource base is very large relative to the amount of incremental
depletion occurring in one period. However, the rate of decline in discovery
sizes is likely to be greater when firms are close to exhaustion of the
resource base. To capture this effect, we define the following index of
accumulated exhaustion of the undiscovered resource base as a "depletion" index:
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Estimate of total Cumulative Current estimate
original oil or - production - of proved
DE gas in place to date resources
DEP = '
Estimate of original oil
(or natural gas) in place
i.e., DEPk(t) at any point in time t is the index of estimated potential
th
reserves still left in sediments of the k geological type at time t
expressed as a fraction of the total reserves originally in place. 6k may
then be expressed as a function of this index:
6k(t) - f(DEPk(t)) . (19)
A reasonable postulate would be
6k(t) = cO + clDEPk(t) (20)
where c and cl are parameters to be estimated.
Finally, each production district might well contain more than one sub-popu-
lation, and shifts in drilling across populations might occur in response
to changes in prices of natural gas or oil. Since the data on size of dis-
coveries are aggregated by production districts, observed average size of
discoveries might change in response to price changes because of shifts from
one sub-population to another. For instance, if on the average a given price
change motivates explorers to increase the proportion of extensive drilling
(i.e., drilling in high risk sub-populations which also have larger deposits),
the observed average size of discoveries aggregated over all the sub-populations
might actually show an increase. The magnitude of such shifts in aggregate
average size in response to price changes would be positively related to the
amount of new geological knowledge regarding deposits in, the district
which in turn has been conjectured to be proportional to the number of
successful exploratory wells drilled in the region in the recent past. Since
the value of 6 occurs multiplicatively with the number of successful wells
drilled (WXS) in the estimating equations (15) and (17), a natural way to
capture the price effects on the aggregated average sizes would be to use the
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specification 6 = f(DEP, PG, PO). Thus, the estimating equation (17)
may be modified to:
log(s(t + h)) = log(V(t)) + f(DEP, PG, PO)WXS[t, t + h (21)
where the function f( ) represents the mean decline rate of discovery sizes 6
aggregated over an entire production district.
3.2.4. The Success Ratio for Exploratory Wells
The discussion in the previous section is relevant conditional upon an
exploratory well striking oil or natural gas. In order to estimate size of find
per exploratory well, then, the formulation must be modified to take into account
the probability that any well will result in a success. Using postulates I, I1
and III of Section 3.2.2., it can be shown that once exploration in a sub-
population has begun, the probability of a success tends to decrease monotonically
throughout the evolution of the play in a pattern similar to that derived for
the average discovery size. This leads us to specify a proportional relationship
between probability of success SR and discovery size (s). Thus as more explora-
tory drilling takes place in a given sub-population, we expect to find propor-
tional changes (declines) in average discovery size and success ratio. Olce
again, to the extent that we are forced to use size and success ratio data
aggregated by production district rather than by sub-population, we expect to
see some price effects on the mean success ratios reflecting shifts in the
relative proportion of extensive and intensive drilling in response to price
changes. The success ratio equation should then be
log(' ft) l '(,t> (22)
S(-(tO)7 log (t)) + fl(PG,PO) (22)
where fl ( ) is a function of the current and/or lagged prices of oil and
natural gas. The observed price coefficients in the success ratio equations
(unlike the average size equations) would also reveal any shifts in direc-
tionality in response to changes in the relative prices. For instance, if
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directionality is strong, a higher oil price might result in an increase in the
tendency to "drill for oil" rather than gas, which in turn would increase the
fraction of successful oil wells out of total exploratory wells.
We now have all the components for new discoveries of gas and oil. One
last point should be made, however, The size of discoveries per exploratory
well SW is defined as the product of the success ratio SR and the size of
discovery conditional on a success, S, i.e., SW = (SR)(s). It can be shown
that under our assumptions,
Var(SW)(SW) 24a02 (23)
where a2 is the variance of the distribution of size per successful well.
This relation provides a means of computing the parameters (RWG)V and (RWO)v
of the exploratory wells equation (12).
In smmary, a total of five structural equation forms must be estimated
for new discoveries of gas and oil. Equation (12) determines the number of
exploratory wells drilled, equation (22) determines the success ratio (esti-
mated separately for oil and gas), and equation (21) determines discovery size
per successful well (again estimated separately for oil and gas). The esti-
mation of these equations will be discussed in the next chapter.
3.2.5. Extensions and Revisions
Additions to oil and gas reserves also occur as a result of extensions
and revisions of existing fields and pools. Extensions are recoverable
reserves that result from changes in the productive limits of known reservoirs,
Following the discovery of a reservoir, a producer normally drills additional
wells to delineate the productive limits of the reservoir. In doing so, he
finds more reserves or less reserves than expected from the discovery well.
i Ln general, a substantial portion of extensions are realized withlii a year
or two following the reservoir discovery. This provides the following working
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hypothesis for the specification of the extensions equation:l0
Extensions = fl ( lagged lagged exploratory
t discoveries, wells,1 discoveries, wells, prices, depletio (24)
Revisions are the least predictable category of reserve additions. They
refer to changes in oil and natural gas reserve estimates brought about by
new information on reservoir characteristics such as porosity, permeability and
interstitial water. They result from improved estimates 'of the size of
previously known reservoirs, mostly made without new drilling. We have little
economic explanation for the observed size of revisions. Since the total
amount of proved reserves at the end of the previous year represents the size
of the base susceptible for revision, we expect this to serve as the main
variable for explaining revisions. Secondly, information can also arrive
from operations in a producing field; lagged incremental production of natural
gas (or oil) is therefore included as an explanatory variable. Finally, reserve
depletion should have a negative impact on the level of revisions. The
specification for the revisions equation is therefore of the form
agged incremental
Revisions = f2 year-end production, depletion (25)
reserves,
It is not expected that all of the variables on the right-hand side will figure
prominently, but a priori, year-end reserves are expected to have a significant
effect.
3.3. Structural Equations for Production of Gas
The relationships that specify the level of gas production out of reserves
are an important part of the model, since it is a shortage of production in
1As the basin is depleted of the richer prospects, it is reasonable to expect
the size of extensions to drop. The index of accumulated depletion DEP may
therefore be added as an additional explanatory variable on the right hand side.
However, it is likely that depletion effects on extensions are already reflected
in the functional relationship of (24) through its effects on discoveries and
exploratory wells. This is a matter to be resolved on the basis of empirical
evidence from econometric estimation. Similarly, an argument may be made to
include the price of natural gas (or oil) as an additional explanatory variable
on the grounds that incentive to gain more extensions is influenced by price
expectations. This too must be resolved empirically.
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wholesale transactions that affects government pricing policies in field
transactions. We saw in the 1960ts a general condition of depletion of the
base of proven reserves, as reserve-to-production ratios fell from 20 at the
beginning of the decade to about 12 at the end of the decade. Sufficient
production with falling R/P ratios cannot be had indefinitely; at some point
the amount of reserves available to back production is "insufficient", in the
sense that a gap is opened between the demand for production and the supply
that can be produced. The extent to which that gap occurs depends on the
characteristics of the relationships between prices, reserves and production.
The characteristics of production will depend on the extent of competition
among natural gas producers. In general we might consider three alternative
hypotheses that could apply to the structure of the natural gas industry:
(I) The industry is competitive (at the production level) so that the
supply price is simply the marginal cost of developing existing
reserves to achieve a particular rate of annual production.
(II) The industry is non-competitive, but whatever degree of monopoly
power individual firms have in the absence of regulation has been
stripped away by regulation. This would imply that the regulated
ceiling price is at or below the competitive price, so that
marginal cost pricing again applies, 11
(III) The industry is non-competitive, and existing regulation is not
sufficient to strip away all monopoly power. This would imply
that the regulated price is greater than marginal costs,
If the regulatory agency forced the company to lower its price below the
"competitive price", the quantity produced would decrease and would be
determined by marginal costs.
~lSome elaboration may be in order for the second hypothesis. Suppose that
only a single company, a monopolist, discovered and produced all of the gas
in some region of the country, and that because of regulation the company
were forced to lower its price from the profit-maximizing equilibrium level.
The quantity produced would then increase. As he ceiling price were lowered
the quantity produced would continue to increase until the oint at which
the average revenue and marginal cost curves intersected. That price could
be termed the "competitive price", and the corresponding quantity the "com-
petitive quantity", because at that point the monopoly has effectively been
stripped of all of its monopoly power, and behaves as though it were broken
up into a set of identical, competitive, unregulated firms.
The structural equations based on the first.two hypotheses are much the
same, since both imply marginal cost pricing. Let us therefore examine the
characteristics of marginal costs, and use those characteristics to con-
struct some alternative specifications for a production equation. Then we
will modify those specifications to account or deviations from marginal cost
pr.lcItg iii t wiy tlaL will all.ow or til 4Nlriltltrtl Hl)pcl l cttLlo, I atmic l (,ll
the third hypothesis.
The marginal costs for a production level q out of proved reserves R
depend upon the decline rate, discount rate, and other parameters. Assuming
a constant decline rate, a, in percent per year of production out of reserves,
a = q/R = 1/reserve-production ratio, (26)
we can write the proved reserve level as
0o
R q f -at dt = q/a. (27)
Then for a discount rate 6 the "present-Mcf-equivalent" (PME) of a constant
production level q is:
0
The next step in arriving at a marginal cost function is to specify a
functional form for the amount of development investment, I, needed to ob-
tain the constant production level q. Unfortunately, little theory exists
on which to base this specification, so that we must consider one or more
functional forms that follow intuitive reasoning about the behavior of
investment costs, and then test those functional forms by fitting them to
data. We will consider the following development investment function:
I = A + cea q, (29)
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where A is a start-up cost, c is constant over the range of zero well inter-
ference, and is a parameter with value around 10. Thus, when a is small
(e.g., the reserve-production ratio is much larger than 10), I will be
roughly linear in q, but when a becomes larger (e.g., the reserve-production
ratio approaches 5), exponential increases in costs at the margin predominate.
The marginal development cost (MDC) is given by:
dI dI dq
MDC d(PME) dq d(PME)
8I da + aI . dq 
a dq aq d(PME)
Now we can substitute equation (29) for I into the right-hand side of
equation (30) to yield the marginal development cost function:
MDC X (s eaq + ceBa) . 6
= (Ba + 1) ce a a + 6
2
a (31
= (Ba + 1) c6ea ( + ) (31)
During the 1970's we can expect reserve-to-production ratios no greater than
10, so that a"' should be at mast 0.1. A reasonable value for the discount
rate is also 0.1, so that the above marginal cost function could be close to:
MDC = 4(Oa + 1) c(ea a c 0e (32)
Aside from its fit to recent data, this formulation is appropriate because
it has implications for production under conditions of declining reserve-
production ratios. To analyze such conditions, we will in fact consider two
exponential approximations to equation (32):
MDC = a 1qt'j /R t
-- _tj _
X __.'
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and
lq -t, j 2Rt,j
MDCt j = e (34)
Setting the wellhead price of gas PGtj at time t in region j equal to the
marginal development cost,1 2 and taking the logs of both sides of (33) and
(34) results in the.structural equations:
q = 'R + 'R log PG (35)t,j 0 Rt,j + t,j t,j (35)
and qj = a' + ' log PGt.j + aR t j (36)
Let us now go back and consider an alternative investment function which
also has "reasonable" characteristics:
I = A + ce(a 6)/6(37)
This investment function is also exponential, but it is more flat in the
range of a < 6. Now for this function marginal cost is given by:
(a-6)/6 2 2MDC = ce (a + 6)2/62R . (38)
Again, setting price equal to marginal cost and assuming that a 6 0.1,
we have
% 0 (a-6)/6PG t~j e (39)
PGt,j R e
After taking logs of both sides, we then have
qtj= 'Rtj + 6 R log Rt, + 6 Rtj log PG * (40)t,j o t,j t,j
12Under the first two hypotheses price is set equal to marginal development
costs in present-Mcf-equivalents. Assuming all present and future production
costs to be included in I, and the competitive price constant over time, the
discounted sum of all present and future profits is given by P(PME) - I, which
when maximized, yields P = dI/d(PME).
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Assuming that 6 is a parameter to be estimated (and expecting its estimated
value to be close to 0.1), we would estimate the structural equation:
qtj aRt + 6 R,log (RtPG ) (41)t~ 0 tj tj tj t,j
All of the formulations described above assume that either of the hypotheses
(I) or (II) hold, or that regulated prices are equal to marginal costs. It
is straightforward to modify these formulations to account for deviations from
marginal cost pricing and thus provide a means for testing hypothesis (III).
Setting marginal revenue equal to marginal development cost we have
Pj(1 + l/njej) MDC (42)
where n. is the number of equivalent equal-sized firms in region j,and e.
is the market elasticity of demand in region j.13
The alternative estimating equations (35), (36), and (41) can now be re-
written to include this term that accounts for varying degrees of competition
in different regions:
qt,j = aRt ; + aRtj log PGt j + a2 log (1 + 1/njej) (43)
qt, = a + al log PGt,j + aRt, + log (1 + 1/njej) (44)
j r + Rt, log (Rt,j PGt j) + a log (1 + 1/n e ) (45)
Since the number of firms is different in different production regions,
we would expect the last term in each of the above equations to be statis-
tically significant when the equations are estimated. If this term is8 not
13
This formulation, consistent with both the Bain and the
earlier Cournot analysis, is probably the most general model of imperfect'
competition subject to estimation by a regression equation. See W.S. Vickrey,
Microstatics, Harcourt, Brace & World, 1964, pp. 337-339.
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significant that would cast some doubt on the validity of hypothesis (III),
and lead us to believe that marginal cost pricing indeed applies to the pro-
duction of gas out of reserves.
In summary, a total of six structural equation forms can be estimated
for gas production. Equations (35), (36), and (41) represent marginal cost
pricing (hypotheses I and II) for alternative investment cost formulations;
equations (43), (44), and (45) are the analogous forms that account for
deviations from marginal cost pricing (hypothesis III). We will test the
fit of all of these equations in the next chapter.
3.4. Equations for Reserves and Production of Offshore Gas
The discovery and production of natural gas in offshore regions is a
particularly important part of the econometric policy model. There are now,
for geological and economic reasons, high probabilities of 'finding large
discoveries offshore. As both gas and oil prices increase and more offshore
acreage is leased by the Federal Government, these regions will probably
provide an increasing share of gas production.
There are a number of theoretical reasons for including separate structural
equations for offshore reserves and production in the model. Reserve accumu-
lation and production take place under somewhat different engineering and
economic conditions from those onshore. For example, almost all drilling off-
shore is extensive in nature, while onshore tracts may be explored on either
the intensive or extensive margins. Also, drilling costs are much higher off-
shore (thus limiting offshore drilling largely to major petroleum companies),
and offshore leasing procedures of the Federal Government do not apply to
privately-owned onshore land (resulting in checkered patterns of drilled
14This section, as well as section 4.5, are based on Philip N. Sussman, "Supply
-a and Production of Offshore Gas Under Alternative Leasing Policies", unpublished
Master's thesis, Sloan School of Management, M.I.T., June, 1974.
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acreage offshore.5
There are also empirical reasons for constructing a separate model for
the offshore region. Different data are available on offshore drilling
activities. There is only very limited data available on gas and oil success
ratios offshore, so that the offshore discovery process must be modeled
without direct estimation of success ratios. On the other hand, there are
political limitations on acreage leasing offshore, so that acreage availability
is an additional source of explanation of offshore drilling activity.
The model here describes relationships between reserves and production
of gas off the coast of Louisiana and such policy variables as the new contract
field price of gas and the amount of acreage leased annually.l6 Important
exogenous variables are interest rates, the price of oil, and the number of
drilling rigs operating offshore. The model is shown schematically in Figure
3.3, and operates as essentially three interacting blocks that determine
respectively (1) total acreage, (2) producing acreage and (3) reserve additions
and production.
It is the practice of the Interior Department's Bureau of Land Management
to hold periodic auctions of acreage to be explored for oil and gas. Total
acreage leased by the Federal Government is by definition last year's total
acreage plus acreage leased this year minus acreage forfeited this year.
Forfeited acreage is primarily acreage leased five years ago on which
producible quantities of oil or gas were not found. Total acreagei.s an
1 5The Bureau of Land Management decides to accept bids for offshore tracts based
on a variety of considerations, including the degree of true bidding competi-
tion, environmental consequences, etc. Once a tract is leased, however, the
discovery of producible quantities of oil or gas must occur within five years or
else the lease is forfeited. This regulation encourages early exploration of
leased tracts and leads to discoveries relatively soon after the lease sale.
6The model pertains to Offshore Louisiana rather than the entire Offshore Gulf
of Mexico because data on reserve additions were not available for Offshore Texas.
One would expect, however, that the structural equations are valid for
other offshore Gulf of Mexico regions as well.
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important variable because it is a determinant of well drilling activity.
Without lease rights, no wells can be drilled at promising locations. Cumu-
lative acres leased, which is the total number of acres leased by the Bureau
of Land Management since 1954, also appears as a variable in the model, and
is one of the determinants of new producing acreage.
The second block in the model determines the amount of producing acreage,
and it contains only definitional equations. Producing acreage this year is equal
to producing acreage last year plus new producing acreage minus producing acreage
forfeited. The producing acreage forfeited is acreage that was producing in the
previous year, but is now nonproducing and is dropped from the leasing program.
NonLproducing acreage is equal to total acreage minus producing acreage.
The third block of equations, which is behavioral, determines reserve
additions and production from reserves. Reserve additions contain two com-
17
ponents: new discoveries, and extensions plus revisions. The discovery
process begins with the number of exploratory wells drilled, which is
18
determined by an index of gas and oil field prices together with total acreage.
The average discovery size per well drilled (whether the well is successful
or unsuccessful) is determined by a second index of gas and oil prices, as
well as the cumulative number of wells drilled (this last variable serving to
indicate a depletion effect in the model). New discoveries are determined
by the product of wells drilled and size of discovery per well.
The theoretical arguments that led to the specification of our onshore
Because of data limitations, offshore extensions and revisions could not be
modeled separately from each other,as was the case onshore.
18Because of data limitations, we include in offshore exploratory wells only
wildcat wells, which are wells drilled in areas that have not yet been shown to
contain gas or oil. Our onshore equations use a broader class of exploratory
wells, including those used to search for extensions of known fields.
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reserves equations cannot be extended completely to offshore. One reason
for this is that we cannot estimate a success ratio equation offshore.
Another reason has to do with particular geological conditions. Offshore
19
drilling costs rise considerable as the water depth increases. This is
important because the acreage leased each year has been at progressively
greater depths, so that in a given year with constant prices one would
expect a smaller increase in the number of wildcat wells drilled per
new acre than in the previous year. In order to embody these conditions,
the following specifications are used for well drilling and discoveries
per well;
WWT= b + b log ACT + b2 log Pog (46)
and
DG
WT CO + cl log CWWT + c2 log Pog (47)
Here DG is new discoveries, WWT is the number of wildcat wells drilled, ACT
is total acreage, CWWT is the cumulative number of wildcat wells drilled, and
P is a combined price index of oil and gas.
og
The quantity of new reserves added by extensions and revisions (XRG) will
also depend on well drilling, but here the relevant variable is field (develop-
20
ment) wells rather than wildcat wells. Extensions and revisions will be taken
to be a linear function of the number of field wells drilled (FWT) and the
19 For example, the cost of exploratory drilling on a lease 600 feet under water
is 2-1/2 times that at 100 feet and at 1000 feet it is 4 times that at 100 feet.
The cost of development well drilling at 600 feet is 1-1/2 times that at 100
feet, but at 1000 feet it is 8 times that at 100 feet.
20 Different well data is available offshore than onshore. Only exploratory well
data is available on shore, which is why our onshore extensions and revisions
equations do not contain field wells as an explanatory variable.
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number of producing acres in the previous year (ACP):
XRG = f(FWT, ACP_1) . (48)
The number of offshore field wells drilled is determined endogenously in the
model as a function of the number of offshore drilling rigs (DRO) and the
interest rate (INT), Drilling rig availability places a capacity constraint
on field well drilling, and the interest rate reflects capital costs.
FWT o f(DRO, INT) h (49)
Total offshore reserves can now be determined. They are equal to last year's
reserves, plus new discoveries (equal to (46) times (47)), plus extensions
and revisions, minus.current production.
Production of gas out.of reserves follows the same formulation as for
onshore, so that equations (35), (36) and (41) above would apply.. The
offshore production equation will differ in one respect, however, in that
total reserves should ppear in the equation with a longer lag than is the
case onshore. The reason for this is that development costs are much more
extended over time offshore because the construction of offshore pipeline
systems precedent to production requires not only extensive regulatory
review before construction, but in many cases the.completion of discovery
activities in a large block of leases.
Two more behavioral relationships are needed in the offshore model,
and these explain forfeited acreage and new producing acreage. Forfeited
acreage (ACRD) is explained as a function of the amount of acreage leased
(ACR) five years previously and an average of the total acreage (ACT)
five and six years previously:
ACRD f[ACR_5, (ACT_5 + ACT_6)/2] (50)
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New producing acreage (A(PN) is explained by nonproducing acreage (ACN) one
and two years previously, the amount of new discoveries (DG) in the previous
year, and the cumulative number of acres leased since 1954 (CACR):
ACPN = f(ACN 1, ACN.2' DG 1 , CACR) (51)
The offshore model thus contains a total of twelve equations, of which
seven are behavioral (wildcat wells, discoveries, extensions and revisions,
field wells, production, forfeited acreage, and new producing acreage) and
five are identities (total acreage, producing acreage forfeited, producing
acreage, nonproducing acreage, and total reserves). Although the offshore
model contains less of a theoretical basis for describing reserves than is
the case onshore, it explains in some detail the process by which lands are
leased and become available for exploration and ultimately gas production.
This makes it possible to use the overall gas model to study the effects of
changes in acreage leasing policies by the Federal Government. Such policies
may play an important role in determining natural gas availabilities over
the coming years,
3.5. Pipeline Price Marklp Equations
Pipeline companies purchase gas from producers and sell it to other
pipeline companies,to industrial consumers, and to retail gas utility companies
for delivery to final industrial, residential, and commercial consumers. The
pipelines buy gas at the field price and then add a markup based in part on
the transportation costs from production to consumption regions. The whole-
sale prices of gas paid by buyers from each pipeline are simply equal to the
average field price paid by that pipeline plus the various markups charged
by that pipeline.
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In modeling the pricemarkup we must consider those variables which directly
or indirectly determine the cost of transporting gas. One would expect that
the most important explanatory variable in determining the size of the
price markup is the distance over which the gas is transported; the greater
the distance between producer and consumer, the greater the transport costs
and thus the larger the markup. There are, however, economies of scale involved
in the transportation of gas, so that the cost per mile per Mcf decreases as the
volumetric flow through the pipeline increases. Thus we would expect that some
measure of volumetric capacity in the pipeline system would also be an
important explanatory variable in determining the markup, and we would
expect to find that, other things being equal, pipelines with larger volu-
metric capacities would charge smaller price markups.
Other economic variables should affect the size of the markup. The level
of total pipeline sales should be another determinant of economies of scale,
and as the level of total sales increases we would expect a decrease in the
size of all markups. It is also important to include some variable that
reflects the capital costs of the pipeline. We use the interest rate as
a variable to reflect capital costs, and expect the interest rate to be
positively correlated with the markup.
Finally, we would expect that as the amount of competition between pipe-
line companies increases, the size of the markup would decrease. The markup
equations should include an index of the degree of competition as an independent
variable; here we use the Herfindahl index
N
H. = l 2 (52)
J i=l ij
where H. is the index for the jth consuming region, x.. is the fraction of gas
I 10
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consumed in region j provided by company i, and N is the number of firms
operating in the jth consuming region. 2
The general form of the pipeline price markup equation is thus
PGW - PG = f(Mj ,Vj SALESj ,INTt ,H) (53)
.j~t j~t j,t j,t' ,t 'J
Here PGW is the wholesale price of gas, PG is the average wellhead price (on
both old and new gas), M is the average mileage between producing and consuming
regions, V is volumetric capacity, INT is theinterest rate, SALES reflects
average annual sales, and H is the Herfindahl index described above.
Since
N
Z ixij =
the Herfindahl index will always lie between 0 and 1. A value of 1 usually
is taken to indicate monopoly and a value of 0 to indicate perfect competition,
but such values are not definitive.
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3.6._ Structural Equations for Wholesale Demand for Natural Gas and Fuel Oil
In this model wh6lesale demand for natural gas is disaggregated both
by region and by type of user. This is necessary because the buyers of gas
differ from region to region, and among themselves in each region. Price
elasticities of demand differ across regions, as do the determinants of the
long-run growth in demand (as a result of different degrees of industrialization,
differences in housing, etc.). Also price elasticities and the determinants
of the growth of demand are expected to differ between residential and industrial
22
classes of consumers.
The wholesale demand for fuel oil is modeled in the same regional "markets"
as wholesale natural gas demand. Since fuel oil is not transported across
the country through a fixed pipeline network, the markets in which it is sold
are not the same as those for natural gas. On the other hand, fuel oil and
natural gas are competitive with each other both in industrial and residential/
commercial markets, and when analyzing the impact of natural gas regulatory
22
One might argue that industrial demand for gas should be further disaggregated,
since there are three broad uses of natural gas by industry, and for eachl use
the quality required of the gas (and thus the price paid) is somewhat different.
Gas used for chemical processes must be of extremely pure quality and may
be sufficiently unique to that process that there are few substitutes. A
second use for industrial gas is for boiler fuel, and here the gas need not
be very pure and competes with oil and coal. The third (and smallest ) use
of industrial gas is for electricity generation and transportation, and here
too, the quality of the gas need not be very high (so that there is substituta-
bility), since this is again for boiler use. Contracts for industrial gas
are also made on either a "firm" or an "interruptible" basis. Firm contracts
require that gas be supplied throughout the year at a more or less constant
flow rate, while interruptible gas may be supplied only in the off-peak season
when there is excess capacity. In this model all industrial gas sales are
aggregated together. One reason for this is that it is difficult to obtain
data on industrial gas sales broken down by use or by quality; pipeline
companies must report to the FPC gas sales to each industrial firm, but ticey
do not report the ultimate use or quality of the gas sold. Similarly, 11 Is
difficult to separate "interruptible" from "firm" sales, particularly silIt? -
the proportions of each purchased even by individual companies will chiangil over
the year, so that data series disaggregated in this way will necessarily 1e)
quite noisy.
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policies, it is desirable to be able to determine how changes in gas demand
are related to changes in oil demand. Thus, in constructing fuel oil demand
equations we use the same regional breakdowns as for natural gas demand.
Fuel oil demand is also disaggregated into residential/commercial demand
(for Nos. 2 and 4 oil) and industrial demand (for No. 6 residual oil).
3.6.1. The "New" Demand for Natural Gas
Our objective is to construct demand equations that relate, for each
wholesale market region, the quantity of natural gas demanded to the
wholesale price, the price of alternative fuels, and "market size" variables
such as population, income, and investment, which determine the number of
potential consumers. In all of our equations, rather than explain the level
of total demand, we use as the dependent variable the level of additional or
"new" demand, which we denote by 6Q.
In the short run, as Balestra has shown in his classic study of resi-
dential gas demand [8], the level of total demand should be relatively price
inelastic and would simply depend on the total stock of gas-burunhig apl llceC
in residential and industrial use. New demand, however, should respond to
the price of gas and to the price of competing fuels; decisions to buy new
appliances are affected by fuel prices. The new demand for gas, 6Q, is made
up of the increment in total gas deliveries Q = Qt - Qt-1' plus the replace-
ment of run-out agreements with old buyers so as to allow for continuation of
old deliveries. To find replacement, total wholesale gas demand could be
considered to be a function of the stock of gas-burning appliances, A:
Qt = XAt,
where is the (constant) utilization rate. Then, if r is the average rate
at which the stock of appliances depreciates, the replacement demand for
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gas equals rXAt1' and total new demand is
6Qt = AQt + rAt (55)
Now substituting (54) into (55) gives
6Qt = AQt + rQt- (56)
so that new demand for gas is the sum of the incremental change in total gas
consumption (AQt) plus the demand resulting from the replacement of old
appliances. It is this new demand that Balestra has shown to be sensitive
to the price of gas, as well as to the prices of competitive fuels such as
oil.
Our a priori assumption on causal factors is somewhat more general
than Balestra's. It is posited that new wholesale demand depends on wholesale.
gas and oil prices as well as total income and population (operating through
purchases of new appliances by final consumers). But it is also posited
that the level of total demand is itself a function of income and population,
so that new demand is also a function of. new" income Y and "new" population 6N;
6Y = AY + rY (57)
t - Ytt-l
Nt = AN + rN (58)t t t-1
where r is the same depreciation rate described above. Thus an eqluatlon
for residential/commercial gas demand (TRCS) should have the general form:
6TRCStj f(PGWt jPFOIL Yt,Nt, 6Yt, N t,j)(59)
where PGWt is the wholesale price of gas in region j at time t, PFOILtj
is the average wholesale distillate oil price in the region, Y is disposable
personal income, and N the population by state.
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We would expect that our industrial demand equations should be similar
in form to those for residential/commercial demand. The prices of gas and
oil at wholesale are determinants of "new" demand, as are capital expendi-
tures by industry K (although with some lag, since capital expenditures
"gestate" into additions to the stock of working capital only after some
time). The level of total industrial demand should also be related to
overall industrial activity. The equation for industrial demand (TINS),
then, has the form:
6TINSt,j = f(PGWt j ,POIL t ,j ,VAM Kt )
where value added in manufacturing (VAM) is a measure of industrial
activity in state . When actually estimating equations (59) and (60) we
follow Balestra and specify linear relationships, There is no specific
theoretical motivation for linear demand equations, and an alternative
specification, which has some theoretical justification, s discussed i
the Appendix to this chapter.
3.6.2. Wholesale Demand for Fuel Oil
The equations describing the wholesale demand for fuel oil are similar
in form to those described above for natural gas. We relate the quantity
of fuel oil demanded to the wholesale price of oil, the-price of alternative
fuels (in this case natural gas), and "market size" variables including
population, income, and capital investment.
As was the case for natural gas, we use as the dependent variable the
level of "new" demand rather than the level of total demand. Thus our oil
demand equations resemble equations (59) and (60). Residential/commercial
(60)
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demand for oil (Q02) has the form:
6QO2t j = f(PFOILt,j PGWtj,Yt,jNtj,6Yt,jNtj (61)
and the equation for industrial demand (RSID) has the form:
6RSIDt,= f(POILt jPGWtj,6VAMt, ,Ktj) .(62)
Again, when actually estimating regression equations for (61) and (62) we
will specify linear relationships.2 3
3.7. Connecting Supply Regions with Demand Regions
To complete the specification of the model it is necessary to describe
how gas flows from producing regions to points of final consumption. The
interregional flows are important because they permit use of the model
for policy analysis and forecasting on a regional basis. Tn particular,
in a situation of excess demand, the flow table enables us to caltculate
the size of the excess demand in each consuming reglon, as well as the
amount of "underproduction" in each production district.
Here we designate a matrix for the interchange of gas supplies from
eight large production regions by the pipeline network with five demand
areas of the U.S. The interregional input-output matrix shows both the
fraction of each producing region's gas that goes to each demand area (gij)
and the fraction of each demand area's gas that comes from each producing
region (fij). The construction of this matrix is made necessary by the fa(t
that the average price of gas in each state within a demand region is
Note that the appliance depreciation rate used to calculate nw deimandl
may be different for oil than for gas. In fact, when these depreciation
rates were estimated, the value for oil appliances was found to be 0.10,
while for gas appliances it was 0.07. This will be discussed further in
the next chapter.
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dependent on both the wellhead prices and the quantities delivered from
each production region. Once the matrix has been constructed, i.e., once
gij and fij have been calculated, it then becomes possible to calculate
an "average wellhead price" of gas delivered to each state, PGi = ~PGjfij
where PGi is the average wellhead price of gas (before a pipeline markup)
delivered to demand region i, PG. is the wellhead price of gas in production
district j, and fij is the fraction of demand region i's consumption that
is supplied by production region j. The difference between the actual
wholesale price in the region and the average wellhead price is simply
the price markup charged to buyers in that particular demand region.
The input-output matrix enables the calculation of excess demand on a
regional basis. The average wholesale price of gas in each state deternline;
demand in the state, while the amount of gas acttzally provided Is tcettrnlclle(l
by adding the fractions of each production dstrict's output going nto tt
state (with the fractions again determined from the input-output matrix). The
difference between demand and supply thus calculated is excess demand:
EDi = Di - ZgikQk (63)
where EDi is the excess demand in region i, Di is the demand in region i,
Qk is the production of supply district k, and gik is the fraction of k's
production going to demand region i. The production shortage in regio k
24
can be likewise calculated from PSk = Qk - fjkDj
2 4One might ask whether it is reasonable to expect the input-output coefficients
fij and gij to remain constant over time. In the next chapter we will see how
these coefficients are calculated, and we will in fact find that they have changed
somewhat over the period 1966 to 1971. The question, however, is whether these
changes are largely random or are instead the result of a feedback mechanism in
the pipeline network system that alters the distribution of gas in response to
excess demands or price differentials across regions. An attempt was made to
empirically model price-dependent time-varying input-output coefficients, but
the data failed to support the thesis that this feedback mechanism has been the
cause of coefficient fluctuations. This result, together with the fact that
coefficient fluctuations have been relatively small, led us to use a static
framework for modeling interstate flows of gas. This will be discussed further
when we examine the empirical results in the next chapter.
-107-
Special relationships must be established for intrastate flows
of gas. Because of the large differences between the wellhead prices
of interstate gas under FPC regulatory policy and intrastate prices not
under regulation, some production districts have experienced large changes
in the relative volumes of interstate and intrastate gas. It is impor-
tant that future changes in interstate/intrastate allocations that
occur because of the difference between interstate and intrastate prices
be properly accounted for in the model. Therefore, the static inter-
regional flow matrix is altered to allow for price-dependent changes
in the amount of gas delivered for transmission to interstate pipeline
companies in the gas producing states. If we assume that proportional
price increases for both interstate and intrastate gas will not affect
percentage allocations, then the allocation mechanism can be modeled
simply as
PCT f(Pin /Pout) (64)
where PCT is the fraction of gas production allocated to intrastate sales,
Pi is the average intrastate wellhead price, and Pout is the average inter-
state wellhead price. An equation of the form of (64) will be estimated
and used when the model is simulated to distrihute gas between nter-
and intrastate markets. Interstate gas can then be distributed via the
static input-output matrix. 25
25 We are modeling the pipeline network as it is, and not as we believe it
should be. Ideally gas should be distributed according to an optimal
feedback mechanism that prevents large excess demands from occurring in
some whoelsale regions while other regions experience market clearing at
low prices. An optimizing pipeline network model using mathematical
programming is currently being constructed as part of a Ph.D. dissertation
at M.I.T.
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3.8. Summary of the Structural Model
There are, in addition to the input-output matrix, a total of 22
structural equations that are behavioral in nature (i.e., that must be
estimated), and these are summarized in Table 3.1. Note that alternative
structural forms have been specified for some of the equations, and the
choice of one form over another must await econometric testing. Other
structural equations (e.g., onshore reserve equations) must be modified
before they can be fitted to data, due to statistical considerations that
will be discussed in the next chapter. Finally, some equations contain
explanatory variables, price indices, or parameters that must themselves
be estimated from structural specifications; these too are largely statistical
problems. The "specification" of the model as a whole has therefore been
completed only insofar as one or more structural forms have been designated
for each of the model's components.
There is a good deal of variability in the degree to which these
equations of the model are theoretically based. We have presented strong
theoretical arguments for the onshore reserve equations and for production
out of reserves. The price markup and wholesale gas and oil demand equations
have less theoretical justification, and the offshore acreage and reserves
equations could be considered "black box" representations. It is our hope,
however, that those parts of the model that tend towards "black box" at
least meet the basic test of being intuitively plausible,
In the next chapter we carry through the estimation of the model, in
a fashion that fills in the details of model specification. This involves
choosing among alternative equation forms, selecting particular exogenous
explanatory variables, and determining the exact lag structure for each
equation.
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Table 3.1
The Structural Equations
Block
Reserves
(onshore)
Production
(onshore)
Offshore Model
Price Markup
Wholesale Gas
Demand
Wholesale Oil
Demand
Interregional
Flows
Variable(s) Explained
Exploratory Wells (WXT)
Size of Discovery, gas
and oil (SZG, SZO)
Success Ratio, gas and
oil (SRG, SRO)
Extensions, gas and oil
(XG, XO)
Revisions, gas and oil
(RG, RO)
Production Out of
Reserves (QG)
Acreage, Reserves,
Production (WWT, DG,
XRG, FWT, QG, ACRD,
ACPN)
Wholesale Gas Price
(PGW)
Residential/Commercial
Demand (TRCS),
Industrial Demand
(TINS)
Residential/Commercial
Demand (QO2),
Industrial Demand
(RSID)
Input-Output Matrix
Number of
Equations
1
2
2
2
2
1
7
1
2
2
Equation Numbers
in Text
(12)
(21)
(22)
(24)
(25)
(35), (36), (41),
(43), (44), (45)
(46), (47), (48),
(49), (36), (50),
(51)
(53)
(59), (60),
(61), (62)
_ i 
-
- - -- - -~
-C- ----
-110-
APPENDIX:
WHOLESALE DEMAND FOR GAS
BY A REGULATED UTILITY
A large proportion of wholesale gas purchases are made by public
utility companies that operate under a regulatory constraint, and we would
expect that this constraint would affect not only the retail pricing
policies of the utility companies but also the characteristics of their
demands to buy gas from pipeline companies at wholesale. Let us therefore
examine the behavior of a profit-maximizing gas utility under a regulatory
constraint, assuming that the utility is a competitive buyer of gas from
the pipeline (i.e. it has no monopsony power), and that it re-sells all of
the gas that it buys to residential and commercial buyers.
The utility's behavior will depend on the demand functions of
final buyers, so that by positing alternative retail demand ormuilations
we can derive alternative models for wholesale gas demand by the utility.
In the analysis that follows we use the following notation:
Qg = quantity of gas sold at retail by the utility
w = quantity of gas bought at wholesale by the utility
P = retail price of gas
g
P = wholesale price of gasw
K e capital stock of utility
i = interest rate
s = allowed rate of return under regulation (assume that s i)
m marginal revenue of retail sales = -- (PQg)
We assume that the utility has only two major costs--the cost of
capital (rK) and the cost of the gas which it buys from the pipeline (PwQw).w w
11iL
Assuming also- that the amount of capital needed by the utility (in the
form of storage tanks, pumps, underground pipes, etc.) is given by the
relation:
K = Y1QgY2 (Al)
with K taken as a long-run capital requirement, and with increasing
returns to scale so that 0 < 2 < 1. Finally, since over the long-run what-
26
ever goes into the utility at wholesale must come out at retail, we have
that Qg = Qw Thus the utility's profit
= PgQg rY1QgY2 - PwQg (A2)
is maximized subject to the regulatory constraint
PgQg - PwQg < Ks (A3)
The first-order conditions for the constrained maximum include
P m r-Xs Y2QY2-
w m 1-A Y1Y2Qg2 (A4)
and P P - yQ yY2-1 (
w g lg (A5)
Here m is the marginal revenue of retail sales, i.e.
aP
m=P +Q g(
g + aQ (A6)
When regulation is effective (i.e. when the allowed rate of return s is
smaller the rate of return which the company would otherwise obtain) equa-
tion (A5) determines the wholesale demand function in terms of the retail
2Thl i nt exnctly t rte, snce te it Ity nadtld Rlim 1tmii.miiilt'I 1'l(l "!t ; I a
the natural gas Lhat It buys at wholesale in order to give It an odor.
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demand function, and tais can be substituted into equation (A4) to determine
A, the marginal profit that occurs when the regulatory constraint is relaxed.
When regulation is not effective (i.e. s is higher than any rate of return
that the utility can obtain), A is equal to zero, and equation (A4) deter-
mines the wholesale demand function, again in terms of the retail demand
function.
In the general case equation (A5) determines the demand for gas
at wholesale assuming that regulation is binding. Unfortunately the alllowed
rate of returns will be different for different utilities, so t-hat this
equation may be difficult to estimate. If we assume that A is more stable
across utilities; and that
As << r,
then equation (A4) can be estimated directly to determine wholesale demand.
The problem here is that the marginal revenue at retail, m, may (depending
on the retail demand functioin) have a form that is itself difficult to estimate.
Let us study this in the context of two alternative retail demaid formilal ions.
A.l. Linear-Expenditure System for Retail Demand
We could begin by modeling residential and commercial retail demand for
28
natural gas as part of a linear expenditure system. Writing the system in
its static form, we have the utility function
n
u = E B1 log (qi-bi) (A7)
i=l
2 7Note that our utility does not behave according to the standard model of
the regulated firm. There is no Averch-Johnson effect, for example, because.,
there is no capital-labor (or capital-fuel) substitution -- the two inputs,
capital and fuel,have a fixed relationship to each other. Thus factor dematlds
are determined entirely by the regulatory constraint (as long as that colstaint
is binding).
2 8See Phlips [69] and Pollak and Wales [74].
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Here, bi is the minimum required quantity of good i, and we assume that
EZi = 1 and q-bi > 0 for all i. Maximizing this utility function subject
to the budget constraint yields
8 i N
qi bi + (Y-i iP bi)
Pi
where y is income. Note that by writing total expenditures on the ith good
as
N
Piqi = Pibi + i (Y- Pibi) (A9)
i=l
we see that the income remaining after the required expenditures pibi have
been made is allocated according to the proportions *i'
The marginal revenue function mi corresponding to the retail demand
function (A8) can be fomund by first taking the derivative of that equation:
ap -Biy + B i Z AP i = jil pjbj P (A10)
aqi [q (1-)b qi - (1-a2)bi
i i qi
Pi i (All)
so that mi Pi -
qi- (1- i)bi
Equation (All)cannot be substituted directly into (A4); it is necessary first
to eliminate i so that the marginal revenue mi is written as a function of
only the quantity qi;
8iY - i P b
j i p b (A12)
Pi qi - (l-1i)bi
29
so that
29
Theoretically equation (A13)could be substituted for m in equation (A4)
and we would have a wholesale demand equation that related the wholesale
price of gas to the quantity of gas sold, per capita income, and the prices
of all other goods in the linear expenditure system. Alternatively, equa-
tion (A12)could be substituted into equation (A5) and a similar relationship
would result. In either case a highly non-linear equation has to be estimated
involving prices for most major components of consumption in the economy.
Since our objective is not to explain total consumption demand and its compouent:;,
but only natural gas demand, this use of a full linear expenditure system is
not promising.
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1 i - (lBi)b ) ( li1b - (A13)
A.2. Linear Medel for 'New" Residential Demand
Let us begin' instead with a retail demand function that has the same
form as the wholesale demand function described in Section 3.6.1 above.
Write new retail demand as
SQ = Q - (1-r)Qt =a a + a2PO + a Y (A1
t Qt o g,t 2 t 3 t
or equivalently,
P91t = bQ - blr t-1 + b 2Pt + b 36Y . (A15)
aP
Then g,t taq = -blr (A16)
3Qt_ 1
and m = b - blAQt - 2blrQt-1 + b2POt + b3 Y (A17)
Now substituting (A17)into (A4), assuming As is small, and taking the
interest rate to be approximately constant, we have:
P = b-b - b - + + - _ QY2- (A18)w o 6Qt blrQt- + b2POt + b36Yt 1Y2Q t
or Qt + rQt- + aP + a2PO + a36Yt 4Qt2 1 (- 1 9)
Equation (A19)is an estimating equation for wholesale demand (by
public utilities) that accounts for the regulatory constraint.3 0
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Our ability to actually fit the equation, however, depends on the stability
of a4, which in turn depends on the Lagrange multiplier and the allowed
rate of return s. If and s are constant across states (as opposed to being
constant across companies within states), then a is a stable parameter and
(A19)can be estimated using a non-linear estimation procedure. There is still
the problem that the last term will be correlated with the error terms. In
order to obtain consistent estimates one must perform the instrumental
variable regression and then use a fitted series Q in place of Q on the
right-hand side of (A19). Note that POt is the retail oil price, ut presumably
a wholesale oil price could be used as a proxy.
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CHAPTER 4:
STATISTICAL ESTIMATION OF THE ECONOMETRIC MODEL
In this chapter we will discuss, using pooled cross-section and time-series
data, the estimation of the blocks of structural equations specified in the
last chapter. In most cases a number of alternative forms will be estimated
for each equation. In some cases these alternative forms will be based on dif--
ferent starting assumptions in the specification and will thus differ-consid--
erably from each other (e.g., production out of reserves equations). In other
cases the forms will differ only in lag structure or choice of exogenous var-
iables (e.g., wholesale gas and oil demand); here the theory suggests a gen-
eral equation form, but econometric tests are needed to determine the time
lags and particular exogenous variables that provide the best fit to the data.
In the next section of this chapter we concentrate on the explanation of
problems involved in estimating a model such as this, as well as on the par-
ticular econometric methods that were used. The data used, and the sources
of that data, are described in some detail in the following section. In the
remaining sections we present the estimation results themselves on a block-
by-block basis, following the order of the summary table of structural ,equations
in the last chapter.
The equations of this model cannot all be estimated using the same
regional groupings or the same time bounds. Obviously regional groupings
are different for field market and wholesale demand equations, but, even within
field markets, exploration and discovery equations use different regional
groupings than production equations. The reason for this is that in pooling
data we designate regions on the basis of homogeneity in certain characteris
tics, and the characteristics that are relevant depend very much on what it
is that is being modeled by the particular equation. Thus an equation des-
cribing exploratory well drilling can be estimated over all production districts
(with the exception of offshore Louisiana), since heterogeneities in the struc--
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ture of final sales are not relevant. These heterogeneities are very relevant,
however, to an equation that describes production of gas out of reserves, so
that in fact different production equations are estimated over four separate
and distinct groups of production districts. The regional breakdown for whole-
sale demand is based on a similar criterion; separate equations are estimated
for what we see as five separate "market" regions across the U.S., each of
which is roughly homogeneous.
The time bounds used in the regressions are also different for different
equations. This is the case for a variety of reasons. First, the time horizon
for which data are available for estimating one part of the model (e.g., explor-
ation and discovery) is different from that for data which applies to another
part of the model. However, even if data were available over a homogeneous hor-
izon, we might not wish to use all of that data in estimating particular equations.
For one thing, we would like the time horizon to reflect a period of structural
stability for the relationships described by the equation, and that period could
be different for different parts of the model. Also, we do not wish to Include
in the time horizon those years for which a particular equation is not Identi-
fiable. Thus, industrial demand equations for gas are estimated over the years
1963 to 1969, while residential/commercial equations are estimated over the years
1963 to 1971. This is done because there was already excess demand for indus-
trial gas by 1970, so that the demand equations would not be identifiable in
1970 and 1971.
The groupings and time bounds actually used are summarized for the equations
of the model in Table 4.1 They will be discussed in detail as we examine
the statistical results for individual equations in this chapter.
4.1. Estimation Methods
A number of problems must be considered when estimating a model such as
this with the data and groupings that have been used here. Of first importance
is multi-equation simultaneity and its implications regarding the assumptions
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Table 4.1
CROSS-SECTIONS AND TIME BOUNDS
FOR THE MODEL'S STOCHASTIC EQUATIONS
EQUATIONS
WELLS (WXT)
DISTRICTS POOLED
18 FPC DISTRICTS
TIME BOUNDS
69-72
DISCOVERY SIZE FOR GAS (SZG)
SUCCESS RATIO FOR GAS (SRG)
EXTENSION FOR GAS (XG)
REVISIONS FOR GAS (RG)
DISCOVERY SIZE FOR OIL (SZO)
SUCCESS RATIO FOR OIL (SRO)
EXTENSIONS FOR OIL (XO)
REVISIONS FOR OIL (RO)
WILDCATS DRILLED OFFSHORE
(WWT)
SIZE OF DISCOVERY PER
WILDCAT DRILLED (SZGW)
EXTENSIONS & REVISIONS FOR
WILDCATS (XRG)
PRODUCTION FROM RESERVES
(QG)
PERMIAN
GULF COAST AND MID-
CONTINENT
OTHER CONTINENTAL
LOUISIANA SOUTH (OFF-
SHORE)
PIPELINE PRICE MARKUP
I
**
20 FPC DISTRICTS
If
LOUISIANA SOUTH (OFFSHORE)
NEW MEXICO SOUTH, TEXAS 7C, 8, 8A
KANSAS, LOUISIANA SOUTH (ONSHORE),
OKLAHOMA, TEXAS 1, 2, 3, 4, 10.
COLORADO + UTAH, LOUISIANA NORTH,
MISSOURI, MISSISSIPPI, NEW MEXICO
NORTH, PENNSYLVANIA, TEXAS 6, 9,
WEST VIRGINIA + KENTUCKY, WYOMING
LOUISIANA SOUTH (OFFSHORE)
40 DEMAND REGIONS
These include Texas 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 9, 10, California, Colorado + Utah,
Kansas, Louisiana North, Louisiana South (onshore), Mississippi, New
Mexico North, Permian (= New Mexico South + Texas 7C + Texas 8 + Texas 8A),
Oklahoma, West Virginia + Kentucky, Wyoming.
**
These include the above 18 plus Montana and Pennsylvania.
It
If
'I
'I
67-72
68-72
65-72
65-72
69-72
69-72
67-72
69-72
58-72
59-72
58-72
58-71
63-71
63-71
60-73
63-71
DISTRICTS POOLED TIME BOUND:.
RESIDENTIAL AND COMMERCIAL
DEMAND FOR GAS (6TRCS)
NORTHEAST
NORTH CENTRAL
SOUTHEAST
SOUTH CENTRAL
WEST
INDUSTRIAL DEMAND FOR GAS
(6TINS)
NORTHEAST
NORTH CENTRAL
SOUTHEAST
SOUTH CENTRAL
WEST
DEMAND FOR GAS AS FIELD
EXTRACTION FUEL (FS)
RESIDENTIAL AND COMMERCIAL
DEMAND FOR OIL (6Q0.2)
NORTHEAST
NORTH CENTRAL
SOUTHEAST + SOUTH CENTRAL
+ WEST
INDUSTRIAL DEMAND FOR OIL
(6RSID)
NORTHEAST
NORTH CENTRAL
SOUTHEAST + SOUTH CENTRAI
+ WEST
NEW ENGLAND, NEW JERSEY, NEW YORK,
PENNSYLVANIA, OHIO, MARYLAND + DELA-
WARE + WASHINGTON, D.C., VIRGINIA,
WEST VIRGINIA
ILLINOIS, INDIANA, MICHIGAN, WISCON-
SIN, IOWA, MINNESOTA, MISSOURI,
NEBRASKA, SOUTH DAKOTA
FLORIDA, GEORGIA, NORTH CAROLINA,
SOUTH CAROLINA, ALABAMA, KENTUCKY,
TENNESSEE
KANSAS, ARKANSAS, OKLAHOMA, TEXAS,
MISSISSIPPI, LOUISIANA
ARIZONA, COLORADO, IDAHO, NEVADA,
NEW MEXICO, UTAH, WYOMING, CALIFOR-
NIA, WASHINGTON, OREGON
(SAME STATES AS BEFORE)
If
I
'II
ARKANSAS, CALIFORNIA, COLORADO
KANSAS, LOUISIANA, MISSISSIPPI,
NEW MEXICO, OHIO, OKLAHOMA, PENN-
SYLVANIA, TEXAS, UTAH, WYOMING
(SAME STATES AS BEFORE)
It
-119-
EQUATIONS
63-71
rli
tI
.I
63-69
It
I,
68-72
64-70
II
II
II
II
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of ordinary least squares regression. A multi-equation model which is
completely simultaneous across all equations should of course be estimated
using two-stage least squares, since the presence of simultaneity will result
in correlations between the additive error terms and the independent vari-
ables. Many large econometric models, however, are block recursive, so that
equations are simultaneous only within individual blocks of the model. In
this case two-stage least squares can be applied on a block-by-block basis.
Our model of natural gas is "almost" block recursive. Also, within some
blocks there is little or no simultaneity. The model can be broken up into
three large blocks of equations - for reserve additions, for production, and
the third for wholesale gas and oil demand - and the simultaneous nteraction
among these blocks is weak. For example, the set of equations for new reserves;
does not require simultaneous determination of wholesale demands, and while
additions to reserves have an impact on demands through wholesale prices, this
impact occurs over a number of years since price increases are rolled in.
Also, although equations for production out of reserves do contain total reserves
as an independent variable, and thus there is technically some simultaneity
between new reserves and production, the simultaneity can be ignored because
additions are a small portion of total reserves,and two-stage least squares
need not be applied to the estimation of production out of reserves. This is
not the case, however, with equations for wholesale gas demand and for pipeline
price markups. Thus two-stage least squares is applied to wholesale demand
equations containing unlagged price variables.-
There are important issues that must be discussed related to the charac-
teristics of the additive error terms, and how these characteristics should
be modeled when estimating equations. Let us write an equation to be esti-
mated as
Yjt~~~~~~. +Yj e.js 2js tk+ (1)jt = It1 + 2jt,2 + ' + kXjtk jt
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and let N = number of cross-sections
T = number of time periods
k = number of independent variables (including constant term).
Then we can write (1) in matrix form as
Y=XB+e- . (2)
Now it is probably unreasonable to assume that the error terms Ejt
are homoscedastic and independent both across time and across cross-sections,
i.e. that they have a covariance matrix of the form:
= _ E[e2 £' = I- . (3)
It would be quite reasonable, in fact, to expect that the error terms are
heteroscedastic, and that they may be correlated across time and across
cross-sections.
Let us first consider the problem of autocorrelation of the error terms.
If the equation is estimated by ordinary least squares (OLS), and If there is
autocorrelation, we can expect that the resulting estimates.will at best be
consistent and unbiased, but inefficient, as long as the equation does not
contain a lagged'dependent variable or independent variables referenced across
districts [32]. The Durbin-Watson statistic might indicate the presence of
autocorrelation in the error terms, but it will not tell us what part of the
autocorrelation is across time and what part is between cross-sections.
Furthermore, the standard correction techniques, such as Hildreth-Lu [34],
cannot be used directly since the autocorrelation is two-dimensional.
4.1.1. Cross-Sectional Autocorrelation
The problem of autocorrelation in the cross-section dimension is often
the result of a mis-specification that can be anticipated. Suppose, for
example, that new discoveries of gas (DG) is believed to be linearly related
to the number of wells drilled (W), so that the equation to be estimated is
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DGjt = O + -iWj t + (3)
It is reasonable, however, to believe that geological differences make
some regions richer in gas than others, and therefore the wells in those
regions have a higher average "output". Perhaps in any given year,
the same number of wells per district in each of two different districts
j and ' can be expected to result in different amounts of discoveries.
This would result in cross-sectionally autocorrelated errors in equation (3).
1Consider two different districts, j and J', with average "output ratios"
given by T DG
1 ~ ~~A~Z~S.)cL (i)
T W. j
t=l j,t
T DG.,t (ii)
and C- 
t= 1 j ,t
Thus, if the number of wells in these two districts were always the same,
we would still expect to find on the average that
DG , -j c. (iii)
j,t aj, j',t ii j t
A model, then, that would account only for the geological differences between
districts j and J' would be
DGj = 0jDGj, + c, (iv)
where the error term c is independent of J. Now if equation (iv) isJ,t
substituted for DGjt in (3), and the resulting equation is written with
£j t on the left-hand side, we have
c' =0 DG - = W + (v)
Ej,t 8jj'DGj,t J0 B1Wj,t + j,t (v)
But D t +0 + Wj , and substituting this into (v) gives us
£, tjjl t 1, + + a + j j£, t -+ e,t jj' o % + 0 Jt+ J Ejrt (vi)
2
so that E[Ej, t Ej,t ] = jja (vii)
and the errors are thus autocorrelated. Errors autocorrelated in time can ocOur
._~_ in the same way. Consider the regression equation Yt = Xt + t witlh ai Ilnec-
__ t t t
plained time trend; e.g., Yt = PYt-_ and Xt= ( Xt-hl 'rcen nt-l = Y'-l - I:t
-y t - BX t = PEt, so that E[e£t -tl] = pe
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In order to account for such cross-sectional autocorrelation one should
_ estimate the equation using a full generalized least squares procedure which
2provides a full error covariance matrix. With limited data the unrestricted
estimation of all off-diagonal elements of this covariance matrix can be
difficult (and in fact misleading) since the estimates themselves will have-
large variances. Furthermore, even if a full error covariance matrix could
be estimated, this generalized least squares procedure could be computationally
very costly. As a result, we felt that it would be preferable to introduce,
where necessary, regional variables (geological or economic) to explain
heterogeneity across districts pooled in the sample. If this is done properly,
most of the autocorrelation across districts can be removed. An equation for
new discoveries such as (3), for example, should be re-specified in the form:
DGj,t 0 jt 2j t (4)
where aj is a geographical "output" variable. Thus, although we will in fact
use a generalized least squares procedure, it is a limited procedure that
accounts for autocorrelation across time (and not cross-sections) - as well s
cross-sectional heterscedasticity.
4.1.2. Time-Wise Autocorrelation and Cross-Sectional Heteroscedasticity
Autocorrelation of the error terms across time will result from trends
in variables that are not explained by the structural specification. It is
a problem that ccurs frequently but that can be corrected relatively
easily. Cross-sectional heteroscedasticity of the error terms can also be
expected, since error variances in equations are likely to be larger for large
districts than for small districts. This problem can also be corrected.
When estimating the equations of our model we will assume the following
about the error covariance matrix Q = E[c E']:
2For a discussion of how this could be done, see Kmenta [45], pp. 512-514.
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22 2
with variances ou , ov' and aow It is assumed that u, vt, and wj are all
independent of each other and that E[ujuj,] = 0 for j $ j', E[vtvt,] = 0
for t t', and E[w jtwj t] E[w t,wjt] = E[wj, t,w jt] = 0 for j $ j' and
t t'.
Given these assumptions about the error vector ejt' one can write its
2 2 2
covariance matrix as Q = E[e E'] = a A + a B + a I . Note that is an
NTxNT matrix. INT is an NTxNT identity matrix, and A and B are NTxNT
matrices defined by
-T 0 . . . 0[ :-T
A = ° JT . . . 0
where J is a TxT matrix of ones, and
-J_
-T-TB_ = !v -- .
where I is a TxT identity matrix.
If" t vr cc on a a2 2 2
If the variance components aw, u, av are known, then the minimum vari-
ance estimate of is given by the GLS estimate = (X'Q-X))- 1 X'Q- Y. If the
variance components are not known (which would presumably be the case), then
Zellner's method [110] can be used, where consistent (but inefficient) es-
timates of - are obtained by OLS, the residuals are used to obtain consistent
2 2 2
estimates of aw, au, and av, and GLS is finally used to obtain a new (and
efficient) estimate of 3.
The problem with this method is that while it accounts for differences
in the variances of the error components, it does not account for hetero-
scedasticity or autocorrelations within each error component. Thtus, if the
error component that is cross-sectionally generated s itself heteroscedastic
or if its elements are autocorrelated through time, we will still obtain ii-
efficient estimates for (although the estimates will be more efficient than
those generated by OLS).
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2 2 (5)
E(C t) = a
E(ejtit) = 0 for j 6 i ( )
. pU.(7)
jt Pij,t-1 + Cjt
2
It is assumed that a. in equation (5) will be different for different j (cross-
sectional heteroscedasticity), although this will of course be tested. Equation
(6) states that the errors are cross-sectionally independent, but this assump-
tion will also be tested. Equation (7) assumes first-order serial correlation
in the errors. (Note that the correlation coefficient pj can be different for
different regions.) In order to test this assumption, and to correct for it,
it is important that equations do not contain lagged dependent variables,
and this will impose a restriction on the lag structure of our equations.
-- Finally, we can write the assumptions of (5), (6), and (7) in matrix form as:
2 .
a oP0 . . 0
0 2P2 . * _ (8)
20 0 .. . ?-
-N
T-1
p Pj pj
with P. = P 1 P PT-l (9)
i ·
T-l T-2 T-3
P p P 1
If for certain parts of the model this assumption were grossly incorrect,
then the generalized least squares estimation procedure would have to be
complicated by including cross-sectional correlation in the error covariance
matrix. Fortunately we did not find this to be the case.
Q1
_126-
2-_ Our objective is to estimate equation (2) using generalized least squares,
i.e. to calculate
=(XQ lx) (X' -ly) (10)
4.To do this we must obtain consistent estimates of the parameters aj and p..
4.1.3. Estimation Procedure.
As long as the equation to be estimated contains no lagged dependent
variables we can obtain consistent (though inefficient) estimates of by
applying ordinary least squares. We begin, then, by applying OLS to the
equation using all NT observations. Then, we calculate the regression
residuals ujt and obtain estimates of p. from:it i
.T
t j,t-1
J T
t=2 Jt-
with u =t - ujt (12)
4Our procedure is essentially that described by Kmenta [45], Section 12.2.
It should be pointed out. that other approaches exist to estimate models
using pooled cross-section and time-series data. One approach that is
commonly used involves the assumption that the error terms are made up of.
components that originate from different sources and that therefore have
different variances. The "residual" or "error components" model was first
suggested by Kuh [46], and later generalized and applied by Balestra and
Nerlove [9] and Wallace and Hussain [106]. The approach assumes that the
error term of equation (1) is made up of three independent components, one
of which is associated with time, one with the cross-sections, and the last
an independent random variable across both time and cross-sections, i.e.,
E. is given byj,t
E. =u +v +w
j,t j t jt
(footnote continued on p. 9a)
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where u is the mean of ujt over time. Thus equation (11) can be written
equivalently as
T
E U. U - (T-l)(u-)
t=2 jtujt-1 (T-(j)Pi j- T (13)
(uj,t1 -uj)2
t=2
This can be shown to be a consistent estimate of p.5 For now we will
assume that the individual pj differ significantly from each other; if
this is not the case then a single estimate p can be obtained and the
estimation procedure somewhat simplified.
The equation's variables can then be transformed autoregressively as
follows:
jt jt j j,t-L
* A
'" Xjt1 jt 1 j, t-' 1
(1.4)
* A
Xjt,k Xjt,k - PjXj,t-l,k
* = A 
j Et - P;jt1 = Ejt
where cjt is just the non-autocorrelated part of Ejt. Ordinary least
squares is at this point applied to the following equation:
Y = X + e . (15)
Note that now N(T-l) observations can be used. The resulting regression
residuals, call them u t, can .be used to obtain consistent estimates of
it
5See Kmenta 45], Section 8.2. Kmenta assumes the mean of the residuals
Ui to be zero, and this would indeed be the case in a pure time series
regression or in a pooled regression in which the mean is taken over all
years and all districts. In a pooled regression, however, the mean of the
residuals over time for an individual district may not be zero, and our
formula for pj in equation (13) differs from Kmenta's in that we take
this non-zero mean into account.
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2the variances a.. First, we can get a consistent estimate of the variance
of Ejt (for each j) from
^2 1 * 2
a T-k l (ujt) (16)
=T - k 1 t
Then, since .= a (1 - P. (17)
3
we can obtain a consistent estimate of a2 from
n2
^2
Now equation (2) is estimated by generalized least squares using the
^2
estimates p and a that have just been obtained in the matrix Q. Equiv-
alently, ordinary; least squares can be applied to the equation
** ** **
Y =X + (19)
6 ** *
where Y. = Yj (20)it it/1~£j
Xti= Xjt ,i/ (i = 1,...k) (21)
3
Ejt = Ejt/o ·- (22)
i
The error terms E J in equation (19) are now homoscedastic and non-jt
serially correlated. Thus the standard errors computed from the OI.S
estimates of (19) are consistent estimates of the standard deviations
Note that the weights in (20), (21), and (22) are the estimated standard
deviations (not variances) of the unaorrelated part of the error term.
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of the ,i' and the t-statistics can be interpreted accordingly. The R
of the regression may, of course, be scaled down (due to the trans-
formations of the dependent variables in (14) and(20) , but a lower R2
(as compared to simple OLS estimates) does not mean that there is "less ex-
planation". The statistic simply indicates the amount of variance
explained by the structural relationship, as opposed to variance explained
by trend, etc.7
Best linear unbiased (BLU) forecasts are obtained using the trans-
formed version of the equation, i.e. the estimated version of(19).8 Of
course, after a forecast simulation has been performed the variables must
be transformed back to their original form for purposes of analysis.
It may be that the pj's do not differ significantly across cross-sections.
If this is the case a single estimate of p can be obtained from:
Zlu. u
jt j,t-l
jt
Then OLS can be performed on the transformed equation (19) using a single
value of p.
One can also test to determine whether the error terms are indeed cross-
sectionally independent. This can be done by obtaining the residuals
ujt from the OLS estimate of (19) and calculating estimates of the covari-
ances oij from:
i;
j1
1- PiPj
1 T
where Cij T - k- 1 t=2 itjt
If these covariances are large a full GLS estimation would be necessary in
order to ensure efficiency. (See Kmenta [45]),
8Our estimator is best linear unbiased with the class of single-equation
estimators. More efficient estimates could result from the use of a system
estimator such as three-stage least squares.
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Certain equations in the model (e.g., the equations for wholesale gas
demand) must be estimated using two-stage least squares. In combining
this method with generalized least squares, consistent estimates are obtained
by first performing a GLS transformation on the equation, and then applying
two-stage least squares (TSLS) using the transformed variables. The steps
are therefore as follows: First, the parameters pj and a must be estimated
consistently. This means that TSLS, rather than OLS, is applied first to
equation (2) to obtain the estimates pj, and then to equation (15) to
obtain the estimates .. Then, using these estimated parameter values,
we apply TSLS to equation (19) , i.e., we regress X (or those components
of X believed to be correlated with the error term) on exogenous and
lagged variables in order to obtain a constructed instrument X , and
then perform ordinary least squares on
Y = X 8 + . (23)
This procedure was in fact necessary only for relatively few equations of
the model.
4.2. The Gas-Oil Data Base
All of the variables used in this model, together with their defini-
tions, units of measurement, and sources of data, are listed below. The
list of variables is divided into functional groups, including wells, off-
shore acreage, reserves, production, demand, and prices.
WELLS. Exploratory wells data are from the Joint Association
Survey of Drilling Statistics, for 18 FPC production
districts, for the years 1963 - 1972.
WXT: Total number of exploratory wells drilled.
9See Eisner and Pindyck [25].
Number of successful exploratory gas wells.
WXO: Number of successful exploratory oil wells.
SRG: Ratio of successful gas wells to total exploratory wells.
SRG = WXG/WXT.
SRO: Ratio of successful oil wells to total exploratory wells.
SRO = WXO/WXT.
SRG, SRO: Fitted values of the above two variables using the es-
timated success ratio equations.
CWXT: Cumulative number of exploratory wells drilled (WXT) from
1963 to year t.
t
CWXT = WXT,
t'=1963
WWT: Number of wildcat wells drilled. (Wildcat wells are-a more
narrow class of exploratory wells that excludes extension
wells.) From World Oil Magazine, for offshore Louisiana,
for the years 1958-1972.
CWWT: Cumulative number of wildcat wells drilled to year t.
t
CWWT = Z WWTt,
t,=1958
FWT: Number of offshore field wells drilled (i.e., all wells
except wildcats, including development wells and exploratory
extension wells). From World Oil Magazine, for offshore Louisiana,
for the years 1958-1972.
FWT: Number of offshore field wells drilled (i.e., all wells
except wildcats). From World Oil Magazine, for offshore
Louisiana, for the years 1958 - 1972.
DRO: Number of offshore drilling rigs. From World Oil Magazine,
for Offshore Louisiana, for the years 1958 - 1972.
ACREAGE. Acreage data are from: Outer Continental Shelf Statistics,
U.S. Dept. of the Interior, Geological Survey - Conservation
Division, Washington, D.C., June 1973. Data are for offshore
Louisiana, for the years 1954 - 1972.
ACT: Total acreage under supervision.
ACP: Producing acreage under supervision.
Non-producing acreage under supervision.
WXG:
ACN:
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Acreage leased.
New Producing acreage, ACPNt = ACPt - ACPt_ 1
(Assumption: no producing acreage forfeited)
Acreage forfeited, ACRDt = ACTt_l + ACRt - ACT
If ACRD is less than 0, then it is assumed that this amount
of acreage was given to the Bureau of Land Management from
the states by the courts.
Cumulative number of acres leased.
All data are from American Gas Association[American Petroleum
Institute/Canadian Petroleum Association; Reserves of Crude Oil,
Natural Gas Liquids,; and Natural Gas, for 8 FPC production
districts for the years 1964-1972. Units are millions of cubic
feet for natural gas, and thousands of barrels for oil. Ex-
ceptions to this are explicitly stated, and include offshore
data for L958-1972.10
Dummy variable for Louisiana South District.
Dummy variable for Permian District.
Dummy variable for Kansas, Oklahoma, TRRC Districts 1, 2,
3, 4, and 10.
Dummy variable for Colorado-Utah, and Wyoming Districts.
Total new discoveries of natural gas.
Total new discoveries of oil.
Total revisions of natural gas.
Total revisions of oil.
Total extensions of natural gas.
Total extensions of oil.
Natural gas extensions plus revisions, XRG XG + RG.
Year end reserves of natural gas.
Year end reserves of oil.
10
Reserves data for Offshore Louisiana are from The Special Report on
Louisiana Offshore (Zones 2, 3, 4), 1954 - 1972, by American Gas Associa-
tion, Committee on Natural Gas Reserves. Also, oil reserves data are
I--- available for 20 FPC districts, and were used in the estimation of equa-
tions, whenever feasible.
ACR:
ACPN:
ACRD:
CACR:
RESERVES.
DD1:
DD2:
DD3:
DD4:
DG:
DO:
RG:
RO:
XG:
XO:
XRG:
YG:
YO:
SZG:
SZO:
SZG, SZO:
2 2
aG' O:
PGCG:
PCGO :
DEPG:
DEPO:
PRODUCTION.
QG:
Q:
CQG:
Average size of gas discoveries per successful gas well,
SZG = DG/WXG.
Average size of oil discoveries per successful oil well,
SZO = DO/WXO.
Fitted values of the above two variables, obtained from
the estimated size of discovery equations.
Estimates of the variance over time of the size distribu-
tions of gas and oil discoveries respectively. These are
obtained from the estimated size of discovery equations.
Estimate of the total potential gas reserves in each dis-
trict as of 1963. From Potential Supply of Natural Gas
in the U.S., published by the Potential Gas Association,
Mineral Resources Institute, 1971.
Estimate of the original oil-in-place in the district.
Index of depletion of the natural gas resource base in
the production districts,ll
DEPG = (PGCG - YG -CQG)/PGCG
Index of depletion of the oil resource base in the produc-
tion district,
DEPO = (PGC - YO - CQO)/PGCo
Data are from AGA/API/CPA, Reserves of Crude Oil, Natural
Gas Liquids, and Natural Gas, for 18 FPC production dis-
trict F2 6tricts, 2 for the years 1961-1972. Units are 10 cubic
feet for gas and 103 barrels for oil.
Total production of natural gas.
Total production of oil.
(Cumulative production of natural gas,
t
CQG = E QGt
t'=1963
11 See list of production variables for definition of CQG and CQO.
1 2 Production data for Offshore Louisiana are available for 1955 - 1973. The
source is The Special Report on Louisiana Offshore.
-
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CQO: Cumulative production of oil,
t
CQO= z QO,
t'=1963
DEMAND. Data are available for 40 demand regions, for the years
1962 - 1972. Units are 106 cubic feet for gas and 103
barrels for oil.
AL, AR,
AZ, CA,...,
WY: Dummy variables for the 40 demand regions (conforming to
the postal code except for NE New England).
TDUM: Dummy variable for time, such that TDUM = O if the year
is 1970 or later and 1 otherwise.
MS: Mainline industrial sales of natural gas by interstate
pipeline companies. Data on mainline sales by company and
state were extracted from the Federal Power Commission's
annual Form 2 reports of jurisdictional interstate pipeline
companies. This data was then aggregated into our 40 de-
mand region breakdown of the U.S.
INTRA: Total intrastate sales, determined by subtracting total
sales by producers of natural gas to interstate pipeline
companies (as determined from the FPC's annual Sales by
Producers of Natural Gas to Interstate Pipeline Companies)
from total state gas production (as determined from AGA/
API/CPA's annual Reserves of Crude Oil, Natural Gas Liquids,
and Natural Gas).
CS: Direct (retail) sales to communities by interstate natural
gas pipeline companies, as extracted from FPC Form 2 re-
ports, and aggregated as previously described.
TSS: Total sales for resale of natural gas as extracted from
Form 2 reports and aggregated over the 40 region breakdown.
This does not include sales for resale to other interstate
pipeline companies, but only to intrastate natural gas dis-
tribution companies.
FS: Lease and plant fuel sales. Extracted from Bureau of Mines,
annual Minerals Yearbook.
f: - The ratio of industrial gas consumption to total gas con-
sumption, both quantities as compiled by Bureau of Mines,
Minerals Yearbook.
TINS: Total sales going to industrial uses,
TINS = f · (MS + INTRA + CS + TSS)
TRCS: Total residential and commercial sales,
TRCS = (1 - f) (MS + INTRA + CS + TSS)
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QO.2: Oil quantities sold in the residentialfcommercial market,
obtained from API Petroleum Facts and Figures. The name
of the series is "Sales of Heating Oil, Grade No. 2, by
States, 1937 - 1970".
RSID: Oil quantities sold in the industrial market, obtained
from the above source. The name of that series is "Total
Sales of Residual Fuel Oils (All Uses), by States, 1934 -
1970".
PRICES AND ECONOMIC VARIABLES.
PG: New contract price of interstate sales of gas at the wellhead,
in cents per Mcf, by production district for 28 FPC produc-
tion districts, for the years 1952 - 1972. Compiled by
Foster Associates, Inc.
Average wellhead price, in cents per Mcf, by production
district for 18 FPC production districts, for the years
1962 - 1971, from Table F, FPC, Sales of Natural Gas.
Average wellhead prices for each of the eight aggregated
producing regions used in the pipeline price markup equations
were computed by weighting the average price on all contracts
for each FPC district comprising that region by the total
production in each district. In computing average wellhead
prices (before markup) for each consuming region (i.e., each
state), weights equal to the fraction of consumption coming
from each producing region are applied to the average producing
region prices.
Average wholesale price of gas, in dollars per Mcf, by
state, for the years 1962 - 1972. Determined from FPC
Form 2 Reports. This series is a weighted average price
for mainline sales, interstate sales for resale, and intra-
state sales of natural gas. It was used as the price of
natural gas in both the industrial and residential/commercial
equations.
Average price of mainline sales of gas, in dollars per
Mcf, by state, for the years 1962 to 1972. This is a
wholesale market price, determined from Form 2 Reports.
Average wholesale price of interstate sales for resale, in
dollars per Mcf, by state, for the years 1962 to 1972.
Determined from FPC Form 2 Reports. It is used as both the
residential and industrial sales for resale price.
Average wholesale price of intrastate gas, in dollars per
Mcf, by state, for the years 1962 to 1972. Determined
from FPC Form 2 Reports.
Wellhead price of oil, in dollars per barrel, by produc-
tion district for 20 FPC production districts, for the
years 1954 - 1972, from Bureau of Mines, Minerals Yearbook.
PW or PG:
PGW:
MP:
SP:
IP:
PO:
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POIL: Average price in dollars per Mcf-energy-equivalent of
fuel oil paid by electric power companies, by state, for
the years 1954 - 1972, from Edison Electric Institute,
Statistical Annual of the Electric Utility Industry. It
is assumed that this is the best available surrogate for the
industrial price of residual fuel oil.
PCOAL: Average wholesale price of coal paid by the electric utility
industry, in dollars per Mcf-energy-equivalent, by state,
for the years 1954 - 1972 (see POIL for source).
PALT: Price of alternate fuels, in dollars per Mcf-energy-
equivalent, by state, for the years 1954 - 1972 (see POIL
for source). This is a weighted average (over kilowatt-
hours generated) of prices of fuel oil and coal consumed
by the electric utility industry in generating electric
power. I
PFOIL: Average wholesale price, in cents per gallon, of No. 2 fuel
oil, by state, for the years 1960 - 1972, from Fuel Oil
and Oil Heat and Platt's Oil Price Handbook and Oilmanac.
This series was constructed from the two sources,by-taking
the average of the two sources in cases where there was
more than one observation for the same city from each
source. In cases where there was more than one city ob-
served per state reported, a weighted average was taken
by use of city population. In cases where there was no
observation at all, the price for an adjacent state was
used. (Eleven such assignments were made for states that
were very sparse consumers of No. 2 fuel oil.)
PWG: Average wellhead price of gas, in dollars per Mcf, for
Offshore Louisiana, for the years 1955 - 1973, from Outer
Continental Shelf Statistics, U.S. Dept. of the Interior,
Geological Survey - Conservation Division, Washington,
D.C., June 1973.
PWO: Average wellhead price of oil, in dollars per barrel, for
Offshore Louisiana, for the years 1957 - 1972 (see PWG
for source).
INTA: AAA bond interest rate (percent per annum), from Federal
Reserve Bulletin.
INT: BAA interest rate (percent per annum), for 1946 - 1973,
from NBER data base.
ATCM: Index of-average total drilling costs for exploratory
drilling per well, by production district for 18 FPC
production districts, from AGA/API/CPA's Joint Association
Survey. This is a time average over the period 1963 - 1971.
VAM: Value added in manufacturing, in millions of current
dollars, by state, for the years 1958 - 1971, from U.S.
Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Annual
Survey of Manufacturers.
-1374
CAP: New capital expenditures in the manufacturing industry,
in millions of current dollars, by state, for the years
--- 1958 - 1971 (see VAM for source).
VCC: Value of construction contracts, in millions of current
dollars, by state, from 1956 to 1972, from Statistical
Abstract of the U.S., and from F.W. Dodge Corp., Dodge
Construction Contract Statistics Service.
YY: Personal income, in millions of current dollars, by state,
from 1956 to 1972, from U.S. Department of Commerce,
Survey of Current Business.
NN: Population in thousands, by state, from 1955 to 1972,
from U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Census,
Current Population Reports.
M: The weighted average distances from the centers of each
of the 18 FPC producing regions to the population center
of each consumption region, by state, for each of the 40
demand states. These were measured from a 1968 FPC
pipeline map, with distances measured along the path of the
biggest pipeline groups connecting the pairs of regions.
(Canadian gas mileage, however, was measured only from the
border, since the gas purchased by an interstate pipeline from
a Canadian firm is assumed to have been made at the border.)
V: Pipeline volumetric capacity. As a proxy for actual flow data
which was unavailable, the total cross-sectional pipeline area
for gas flowing into each consuming region was measured as the
capacity variable. If a state was a net exporter, the cross-
sectional area of all pipelines flowing out of the state would
be added on as well because the inflow figure alone underestimates
the quantity of gas flowing through the state. The capacity
figure is then computed by summing the squares of the relevant
pipeline diameters (the diameters of each pipeline are shown
on the FPC pipeline map).13
H: The Herfindahl Index, defined as H Ex- , where xii is the
fraction of gas consumed in region j provided by company i.
Company sales from FPC From 2 Reports was used to calculate
Xi j and these were aggregated to compute the index for each
state each year. Since there is little variation in the
market shares over time, the mean value over time is taken for
each state.
13This sum of squared diameters measure is a valid proxy for capacity only under
several assumptions. First, the pressures in each pipeline are assumed to be
nearly equal; this is reasonable since pipeline pressure is usually 60 to 80
atmospheres. Secondly, it is assumed that each pipeline or pipeline group is at
capacity or at the same percentage of capacity. This is difficult to validate
empirically, but is consistent with the assumption of equal pressure if the
pipelines are operating at maximum efficiency. The third assumption is that
the pipeline structure is not changing much over time. This is well substantiated
by historical data on the fractions of demand coming from given producing
regions, which have been quite stable over time.
I
Finally, the following codes will be used to refer to specific production
..-a" 'regions and consuming states throughout this Chapter:
CODE LETTERS FOR DISTRICTS
Consumers
Alabama
Arizona
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Maryland
Delaware
District of
Columbia
Florida
Georgia
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri
Nebraska
Nevada
New England
New Jersey
New Mexico
New York
North Carolina
Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania
South Carolina
South Dakota
Tennessee
Texas
Utah
Virginia
Washington
West Virginia
Wisconsin
Wyoming
Suppliers (for which reserves
are modeled)
CA
COUT
KA
LN
LX
LOF
MS
NN
PE
OK
T1
T2
T3
T4
T6
T9
T10
WK
WY
California
Colorado + Utah
Kansas
Louisiana North
Louisiana South (onshore)
Louisiana South (offshore)
Mississippi
New Mexico North
Permian
Oklahoma
Texas 1
2
3
4
6
9
10
West Virginia + Kentucky
Wyoming
Suppliers (for which reserves
are not modeled)
AR
CN
MI
MO
NB
NY
ND
OH
PA
T5
T7
Arkansas
Canada (exogenous)
Michigan
Montana
Nebraska
New York
North Dakota
Ohio
Pennsylvania
Texas 5
Texas 7
1. AL
2. AZ
3. AR
4. CA
5. CO
6. MD
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
FL
GA
ID
IL
IN
IO
KS
KY
LA
MI
MN
MS
MO
NB
NV
NE
NJ
NM
NY
NC
OH
OK
OR
PA
SC
SD
TN
TX
UT
VA
WA
WV
WI
WY
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4.3. Estimated Equations for Gas and Oil Reserves
There are nine equations that determine additions to reserves for both
natural gas and oil from onshore production districts. Single equations are
estimated to explain the total number of exploratory wells drilled (WXT), tle
average sizes of new discoveries per well of natural gas (SZG) and oil (SZO),
and to explain the fraction of wells successful in finding gas (SRG) and in
finding oil (SRO). Together they comprise the equation set for explaining
new discoveries of gas and oil. Finally, four equations are estimated that
explain extensions of gas, extensions of oil, revisions of gas, and revisions
of oil. After describing the discoveries equations in 4.3.1., we shall deal
with the extensions and revisions equations in 4.3.2.
4.3.1. New Discoveries of Natural Gas and Oil
The theoretical relationships for the exploration and discovery of lnatural
gas and oil that were derived in Section 3.2 must be modified for purposes of
estimation. Let us begin by re-examining equation (12) of Section 3,2,1. that
specifies the total number of exploratory wells drilled. Note that the equation
includes the mean and variance of RWG and RWO, the average sizes of gas dis-
coveries and oil discoveries per well drilled. From equation (23) in Section
3.2.5. we can write
2 2 2G2 ^ 2 2 (1)(RWG) = 42 G = 4 (SZG) (SRG) 
v A2 _-_ 2 ^2 2 2(2)(RWO)) = 4( ((RWO) = 4( (SZO) (SRO) (2)
where aG and ag are estimated variances of the error terms
associated with the equations that determine the sizes of gas and oil
discoveries respectively. The equation also contains the mean values of
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oil and gas discovery sizes, and we will use the estimated values of these
variables (obtained from the estimated forms of the size of discovery equa-
tions) in our exploratory wells estimating equation.
The equation for the number of exploratory wells drilled also includes
the expected field prices of natural gas and oil. Since it is im-
possible to observe expected prices, we use as proxy variables a three-year
moving average of past prices. Finally, dummy variables are introduced
(DD1, DD2, DD3, and DD4) to account for heterogeneity between broadly-defined
field markets in the United States. This gives us the following estimating
equation for exporatory wells drilled:
WXT = c + alDD1 + a2DD2 + a3DD3 + aDD4
+ cl[(SZG SRG)(PG_l+PG 2+PG_3)/3 + (SZOSRO)(PO_1+PO 2+P0_ 3)/3]
2 2 2 22 2 2
+ c2[(SZG) (SRG) (PG_ 1+PG_2+PG_3) /9 + (/ao)(SZO) (SRO) (PO l+PO 2+PO3) /9
+ c3ATCM + c4INTA . (3)
Note that this equation cannot be estimated until the size and success ratio
equations for both oil and gas have also been estimated, since the equation
includes the estimated values for sizes and success ratios as well as the
estimated error variances for the oil and gas sizes.
The theoretical specification for the average size of discovery ap-
pears in equation (21) of Section 3.2.3. The argument is that the average
discovery size at a point in time (t + h) depends on the average discovery
size of some previous time t. For purposes of estimation we must choose some
interval of time (which we shall call the "reference period") for which
we can make observations of changes in discovery size. We will use the two-
year interval immediately preceding the middle of the previous year's observa-
tion. The reference value of discovery size will therefore be the average
of sizes over the past three years. We thus define
SZGREF = (SZG + SZG_ 2 + SZG 3)/3 (4)
and
SZOREF = (SZO_1 + SZO_2 + SZ0_3)/3 (5)
for natural gas and oil respectively. Consistent with this, the appro-
priate variable to be used in place of WXS[t, t+h] would be an index of
the number of successful wells drilled from the reference period through
the end of the previous year. The number of successful gas wells drilled
from the middle of the reference period to date can be approximated by
(1/2)WXG_3 + WXG_2 + (1/2)WXG_1 We therefore define the following indices
(proportioned only for numerical convenience):
WXGREF = (WXG_1 + 2WXG_2 + WXG_3)/40 (6)
WXREF = (WXO_ + 2WX0_2 + WXO_3)/40 (7)
Since the theoretical specification includes expected gas and oil
prices, we will again use three-year moving averages of these prices as
explanatory variables (the three-year period also corresponding to
the time interval in the reference period); We thus obtain the following
estimating equations for the size of gas discoveries and size of oil dis-
coveries:
log(SZG) = log(SZGREF) +
WXGREF fI (DEPG_ 1, (PG_1+PG_2+PG 3)/3, (PO_+PPO 2+PO 3)/3) (8)
log(SZO) = log(SZOREF) +
WXO REF.f 2 (DEPO_l, (PG _PG 2+PG_3)/3, (PO_1+PO 2+PO_3)/3) . (9)
d142-
The theoretical specification for the success ratio equations appears
in equation (22) of Section 3.2.4, and applying the same notion of a reference
period we obtain the following equations for the gas and oil success ratios:
3 3
log(SRG) = log(SRGREF) + WXGRE f3(PG PO (10)REF REF · f3 1 _is 1 -i
3 3
log(SRO) = log(SROREF) + WXORE f4(PG-i PO (11
where SRGREF and SROREF are defined by
SRGREF = ((SRG_1 + SRG_2 + SRG_3)/3) SZ (12)
SREF = ((SRO_1 + SRO_2 + SRO )/3)/3) SZO (13)
SZOREF
One problem with equations (10) and (11) is that they provide no
guarantee that the estimated success ratios will take on values between
O and 1. In order to constrain the success ratios to the interval (0,1),
we will use the following logit specification for our estimating equations:
* ISRG 3 3
SRG REF WXG logl = log + X i P (14)
1- SRG 1- SRGREF WXREF 1 - ! 1-REFR 1 * 
I 'SRO 3 3
log SRO lo1 REF + WX f4 (EPG 'Po) . (15)l-SRO o 1 - SROEF REF 1 - 1 _REF1 
-143-
It is important to stress that equations (3), (8), (9), (14),. and (15)
must be estimated in sequential order. First, the size equations (8) and
(9) are estimated and the resulting equations are used to generate size es-
timates for the reference variables in the success ratio equations. In addi-
tion, the estimated standard errors of the size equations will be used in
the estimation of the wells equation. Equations (14) and (15) for the
success ratios are estimated next, and the results are used to generate es-
timated success ratios. Finally, the wells equation can be estimated, using
A2 2
estimated sizes, estimated success ratios, and the estimated ratio (a O/a).
These equations are estimated by pooling data from eighteen FPC produc-
tion districts over the years 1964 through 1972. No data prior to 1964
was used to ensure that the estimation period included only those years
for which regulation was effective (i.e., for which excess demand existed
in reserves markets). Equations were estimated using the generalized
least squares procedure discussed above, except that the serial
correlation coefficient was assumed to be the same in all regions.1 4
The estimated versions of the five equations that determine new dis-
coveries of natural gas and oil are shown below, with t-statistics in paren-
theses. Note that these estimation results, and the associated statistics,
refer to the last stage of our generalized least squares procedure.
Because these reserves equations. contain variables with lags up to three
years, only five years of data can actually be used in the estimation (nine
years are initially available, but three are lost because of lags and one
because of the autoregressive transformation). It was felt that region-by-
region estimates of p. based on five data points would have unacceptably large
variances.
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Exploratory Wells:
WXT = 796.16 - 20.74DD1 + 294.12DD2 - 1.49DD3 + 234.29DD4
(6.01) (-0.03) (2.61) (-0.02) (0.53)
+ 0.00367[SZGSRG(PG_P G _2+PG_3)/3 + SZO-SRO((P +PO 2+P 3)/3](7.074)
- (2.04xlO- 8 - 1.74x10-8 DD1) [SZG SRG ((PG +PG 2+PG 3)/3)
,U.:))
2
+ 2 SZO2 SRO 2((PO+PO2+P
_3)/3) - 0.00204ATCM - 64.15INTA 1
G (-1.36) 
S.E. = 1.781 D.W. = 1.52
2
aO (S.E. of SZO regression)2/(Average value of WXG)
2
oG (S.E. of SZG regression) /(Average value of WXO)
(5.46)2 1
* = 1.01
(3.52)2 2.38
Size of Gas Discoveries (For Successful Gas Wells):
( SZG 
WX log Z )= -0.0717 + 0.02687DD1 + 0.0638DD2 + 0.03825DD3
WXGREG GREF (-1.21) (1.92) (1.53) (0.0255)
+ 0.1146DEPG_ + 0.00285 ((PG + PG_ + PG )/3)
fr, _ -1 -tI 1 -2 + 3 )1l. OU) 1.zl1)
- 0.0241((PO_1 + P 2 + P-3)/3)
(-0.95)
(17)
S.E. = 3.519 D.W. = 1.68
15
Estimated error variances are divided by average values of the number
of successful gas and oil wells to account for the heteroscedasticity
correction used in the estimation of the size equations.
2
R = 0.81 F = 20.84
where15
(16)
2R = 0.95 F = 295.6
k-z.4V)
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where
SZGREF = size of gas discoveries in the reference period immediately pre-
ceding the current period
= (SZGi + SZG_2 + SZG_3)/3
WXGREF = index of number of successful gas wells completed in the refer-
ence period immediately preceding the current period
= (WXG + 2WXG_2 + WXG 3 )/40
Size of Oil Discoveries (For Successful Oil Wells):
1 lotsZO = -0.08228 + 0.02074DD1 + 0.00464DD2 + 0.00233DD3
REF \ REFJ (-1.10) (1.22) (0.66) (0.37)
+ 0.02820DEPO - 0.00195((PGl + PG + PG_)/3)
1 0.35) (-2.08)(0.35) (-2.08)
+ 0.02932((PO_1 + PO_2 + PO_3)/3)
(2.37)
(18)
S.E. = 5.46 D.W. = 1.68
SZOREF = size of oil discoveries in the reference period immediately pre-
ceding the current period
= (SZO_1 + SZO_2 + SZ0_3)/3
index of number of successful oil wells completed in the district
in the reference period immediately preceding the current period
Fraction of Successful Gas Wells:
SRG
lg -SRG °g(-SRG +REF WXG RE[-0.04653 - 0.02706DD1 - 0.02502DD2log SRGREF (-0.902) (-2.60) (-1.88)
- 0.02891DD3 - 0.00312( PG +PG 2+PG 3)/ 3)/ * -onf ' 1 N2 3
-* 3oz) k--L . LI)
+ 0.04384((P01 + PO-2 + PO_3)/3)]
(2.14)
(19)
S.E. = 4.32 D.W. = 1.61
R = 0.84 F = 55.92
where
WXREFRE
2R = 0.76 F = 55.59
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where
SRGREF = ((SRGi + SRG + SRG 3)/3) SG
SZGREF
Fraction of Successful Oil Wells:
SRO SROREF
log 1-SRO = log _ SRO + WXO REF[0.05521 + 0.02815DD1 + 0.02571DD2 + 0.0138DD3
REF (0.98) (1.09) (0.73) (0.69)
+ 0.00208((PGi + PG_2 + PG_3)
(0.80)
- 0.0378((P0_1 + PO_2 + PO_3)/ (20)(-1.27)
R = 0.43 F = 2.88 S.E. = 3.7 D.W. = 1.48
where
SREF ((SRO + SR0_2 SRO 3)/3) S
SZOREF
The estimated equations follow the theory fairly closely. Although
some of the explanatory variables are not statistically significant, the
signs of all the coefficients are consistent with our expectations. For
example, in equation (16) expected return appears with a positive coefficient
while expected risk, drilling costs, and the interest rate all appear with
negative coefficients as expected. The positive coefficients of the depletion
variable in the size equations are also correct, since this index decreases
in size as depletion ensues. Finally, in both the size equations and success
ratio equations the price coefficients for gas and oil prices appear with
opposite signs, as expected if there is directionality in oil and gas
drilling.
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These equations provide us with an important empirical result, namely
that as field prices of natural gas increase, additional drilling is done
on average on the extensive margin. The size of gas discoveries per
successful well increases (from equation (17)), while the success ratio
for gas wells decreases (from equation (19)), indicating that additional
drilling has been undertaken in regions with lower probabilities of success
but higher size of finds. Changes in the price of oil also have resulted
in additional drilling directed on the whole towards the extensive margin,
generally with the size of oil discoveries increasing and the success
ratio for oil wells decreasing as oil prices increase.
The results also relate to the question of whether there has been
"directional drilling". Increases in the price of gas-seem to result in
an increase in the success ratio for oil wells, and a decrease in the size
of oil discoveries. This indicates that as gas becomes more profitable
relative to oil, producers shift to more extensive exploration for gas
and more intensive exploration for oil. This does not mean, however,
that oil discoveries go down; in fact they may increase since the total
amount of drilling activity is increasing. Finally, an increase in the
price of oil, while resulting in more oil discoveries,.will also result
in some additional gas discoveries (both because the total amount of drilling
has increased and because associated gas is found with the oil)
4.3.2. Estimated Equations for Extensions and Revisions
There is little economic explanation for extensions and revisions. We
expect extensions of both natural gas and oil to depend on lagged discoveries
and the number of exploratory wells drilled in the previous years. Equations
were estimated in linear form using these explanatory variables, as shown
below.
Natural Gas Extensions:
XG = -38213 + 1.1307x10 DD1 + 1.9595x10 DD2 + 16080.9DD3 + 0.2942DG_1 + 440.2WXT_
(-0.34) (2.72) (6.18) (0.11) (2.38) (2.17)
(21)
2 5
R = 0.44 F = 22.05 S.E. = 2.87x10 D.W. = 1.84
Oil Extensions:
XO = 4096.0 + 1.7852x105DD1 + 44092.7DD2 - 5192.7DD3 + 0.0924D_1 + 33.928WXT_
(0.79) (10.31) (3.06) (-0.81) (0.93) (2.86)
(22)
2 4
R = 0.69 F = 50.80 S.E. = 1.9x10 D.W. = 1.90
Alternative forms for these equations were estimated to determine
whether the depletion variables and prices would offer any additional ex-
planatory power. Alternative regression equations for extensions of
natural gas are shown in equation (23), which includes the depletion
variable and total reserves, and equation (24), which includes the gas price.
XG = 1.85x10 + 2.15x10 DD1 + 2.16x10 DD2 + 1.69x10 DD3
(0.72) (2.40) (5.81) (0.91)
+ 0.315PG + 463.75WXT - 2.7x10 DEPG - 0.015YG (23)
(2.64) (2.41) (-0.74) - (-1.25)
R = 0.45 F = 18.2 S.E. = 2.73x10 D.W. = 1.85
XG = 2.02x106 + 1.18x10 DD1 + 1.92x106DD2 - 6412.ODD3
(0.64) (2.94) (5.76) (-0.04)
+ 0.289DG 1 + 409.0WXT - 1.04x10 DEPG_1 - 8490.OPG (24)
(2.41) (2.06) (-0.30) (-0.87)
2 5
R = 0.46 F = 17.5 S.E. = 2.8x10 D.W. = 1.82
The reserves, the depletion variable, and the price variable are
statistically insignificant and appear with the wrong signs.
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Alternative regressions for extensions of oil reserves are shown in
equations (25) and (26).
XO = -15853.0 + 1.56xlO DD1 + 2989.6DD2 - 3593.9DD3
(-1.24) (8.58) (0.14) (-0.65)
+ 0.105DO + 30.52WXT_ + 21447.ODEPO + 0.0065YO (25)
(1.02) (2.89) (1.31) (2.44)
2 4
R = 0.76 F = 51.4 S.E. = 1.88x10 D.W. = 1.81
XO = 33743.0 + 1.85x10 DD1 + 45438.ODD2 - 2908.3DD3
(1.38) (10.78) (3.45) (-0.48)
+ 0.098DO + 26.72WXT + 8065.ODEPO - 10748.0PO 1 (26)
(0.95) (2.30) (0.49) (-1.68)
2 4
R = 0.74 F = 44.8 S.E. = 1.9x10 D.W. = 1.84
Here again the price variable appears with the wrong sign, and the de-
pletion variable is insignificant.
Revisions of natural gas and oil reserves tend to defy
economic reasoning as well. We expected that explanatory variables would
include past year-end reserves, changes in production, and the depletion
index. When we actually estimated these equations, we found that all of
the variables did offer some explanatory power in the oil equation, but
changes in productionwere not significant in the gas equation. The final
regression equations, again estimated in linear form, are shown below.
Revisions of Natural Gas Reserves:
RG =-71295 + 0.02007YG_1 + 0.3142A(QG 1) + 930610DEPG_1 (27)
(-2.42) (3.21) (0.52) (2.07)
2 5
R = 0.14 F = 7.3 S.E. = 5x10 D.W. = 1.98
Revisions of Oil Reserves:
RO =-13345 + 0.0483YO + 3.501A(QO_) + 188210DEPO (28)
(-2.38) (5.80) (2.92) (2.33)
2R =0.56 F = 28.3 S.E. = 1.02x10 5 D.W. = 1.75
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Note that the equation for revisions of natural gas reserves has a
rather poor statistical fit, with an R of 0.14 and a standard error
that is about five times the mean value of the dependent variable. We
were unable to obtain a regression equation any better than (27), and
we must simply recognize that natural gas revisions are likely to pro-
vide a large amount of noise in simulation.
4.4. Estimated Equations for Production of Gas
The structural equations for gas production depend on specification
of the marginal costs of developing existing reserves, which in turn
depend on the particular functional form that one chooses to represent
development investment. Using different development investment functions,
we arrived at alternative estimating equations for gas production that would
apply under marginal cost pricing, as in equations (35), (36), and (41) in
Section 3.3. We derived other alternative structural equations, as given
by (43), (44), and (45),that would apply for deviations from marginal cost
pricing resulting from non-competitive market structures.
In estimation we have been faced with the problems of choosing among
the equation forms, deciding whether or not to include the "competition"
variable that accounts for deviations from marginal cost pricing, and selecting
a set of regional breakdowns most appropriate for the estimations. All six
equations (i.e., the three alternative equation forms, each with and without
the competition variable) were estimated over different regional breakdowns,
Price elasticities were calculated, and the equations were simulated historically
to determine how well they tracked past data. The results indicated
that equation (36) would provide the best fit, both in estimation and
simulation, and that the competition variable should not be included, indi-
cating that;marginal cost pricing would apply.
-151-
Before discussing regional breakdowns, let us consider the regression
results for alternative equation forms with and without the competition
variable. A representative set of alternative regressions is shown in
Table 4.1. As can be seen in that table, the competition variable is
statistically insignificant, except in equation (D); but at the same time
the reserve variable appears with an incorrect sign in this regression so
that it is unacceptable. Equation (35) from Section 3.3 is represented by
regression C, and again the reserve variable appears with the wrong sign.
Equation (41) is represented by regression A, but the estimated discount
rate in that regression is negative (it should have a value close to 0.1).
Regressions E through K are all based on equation (36), i.e., on
Q = a0 + a1 log PW + a2YG_l
They differ from each other in that different additive and multiplicative
dummy variables are used as a means of ascertaining the appropriate regional
16breakdown. Estimations using alternative regional breakdowns gave equally
statistically significant results in most cases, and the choice of one
regional breakdown over another was based more on whether the-equations
tracked the historic data closely in all production districts.
When the equation was estimated for the entire United States, excluding
Louisiana South, the general fit was acceptable, but in simulation of historical
production the equation failed to reproduce behavior accurately in the Permian
region. The equation was estimated again using alternative dummy variable
specifications (regressions H, I, and J), but again the results failed to track
production behavior realistically in particular districts. The problem here is
that districts which are fairly homogeneous in their production behavior tend to
16A highly significant dummy variable for a region or group of regions that
accounts for a sizable part of the explained variance in an equation is
indicative that the region(s) might be included in a separate equation.
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fall in regional groups, but production behavior is quite different between
groups--so much so that the heterogeneities cannot be captured with only
a few dummy variables.
As a result, production out of reserves equations have been estimated
separately for four different regions in the country. The regional
breakdown is as follows:
1. Permian (New Mexico South, Texas 7C, 8, 8A)
2. Gulf Coast and Mid-Continent (Kansas, Louisiana South onshore,
Oklahoma, Texas 1, 2, 3, 4, 10)
3. Other Continental (Colorado plus Utah, Louisiana North, Missouri,
Mississippi, New Mexico North, Pennsylvania, Texas 6, Texas 9,
West Virginia plus Kentucky, Wyoming)
4. Louisiana South offshore
Regression results for the three continental production regions are shown
below (the production equation for offshore Louisiana is discussed in the
next section, where we examine the empirical results for the entire offshore
"submodel"). The equations for Gulf Coast - Mid-Continent and Other Continen-
tal were estimated using the generalized least squares procedure, and the
estimated regional serial correlation coefficients and error term standard devia-
tions are shown. Prices have been roughly the same in the four districts
comprising the Permian Region, so that these districts were aggregated
and a simple time series regression was run for the Permian Region. The
equation was estimated, however, using a second-order serial correlation
correction, and the two estimated serial correlation coefficients are
17
shown.
1 7The second-order correction assumes that the error terms are of the form
Jt = P1Jt-l + P2£J,t-2 + Jt
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Permian:
QG = -6447700.
(-2.35)
+ 1856700.
(1.67)
log (PW) + 0.1226 YG
(5.24)
S.E. = 1.42x10 5 D.W.(0) = 1.98
LHS MEAN = 1.73x106
P= 0.990
P2 = -0.822
Gulf Coast and Mid-Continent:
QG = -16942 0. + 5881360. LX
(-0.352) (6.95)
+ 340752. log (PW) + 0.02638YG
(2.00) (6.78)
2
R = 0.906 F = 193.7 S.E. = 0.727 D.W.(7) = 0.90
LHS MEAN = 2.655
(.
_1
111834.
237533.
149732.
93124.
89984.
117108.
81681.
88510.
Remaining Continental Production:
QG = -9424.0 + 23034 log (PW) + 0.05999YG
(-0.22) (1.65) (29.23)
2R = 0.968 F = 1174.2 S.E. = 0.785 D.W.(9) = 1.00
LHS MEAN = 5.21
2R 0.925 F = 67.7
(29)
(30)
p.
_J
KA 0.6402
LX 0.9270
OK 0.8175
T1 0.9319
T2 0.9900
T3 0.8359
T4 0.6161
TO 0.7126
(31)
.
-155-
p _1
COUT 0.3932 43182.4
LN 0.7749 52688.1
MO 0.9900 13369.8
MS 0.5279 14590.5
NN 0.6943 31432.6
PA 0.6970 26713.4
T6 0.2684 23185.6
T9 -0.0365 24564.4
WK 0.35-80 18731.3
WY 0.7456 25310.
These equations are all quite significant. Although they seem in general
to provide no better statistical fit than the alternative forms E through
K in Table 4.1, they do perform considerably better in a simulation context,
and are able to reproduce production behavior in virtually every production
18district in the country.
Note that the average field price PW is based on a "roll-in" of changing
contract prices, and thus is explained by last year's average wellhead price,
the new contract price (PG), and production (QG). The average wellhead price
is defined as follows:
Average wellhead price = (new contract price x new production
+ average wellhead price on old contracts x production on old
contracts)/total production
New Production = (this year's production - last year's production)
+ last year's production x depletion rate
If one assumes that the average wellhead price on old contracts equals last
year's average wellhead price, then one obtains an estimate of the depletion
rate (d) from the following equation (estimated over 18 FPC production
districts from 1967 to 1971):
PWt = [PGt * (QGt - (1 - .1557)QGtl ) + PWt1 . QG . (1 - .1557)]/QGt t (7.07) (7.07)
R = .967 S.E. = 0.707 F = 2667
This equation is the basis for calculating rolled-in prices in all onshore
regions.
-156-
4.5. Estimated Equations for Offshore Reserves and Production
All of the equations in the offshore model are estimated using pure
time-series data, since there is only one district involved. Because a
longer time series is available for each variable (the 15 years 1958 through
1972) than is the case onshore, and because significant autocorrelation is
expected in the estimated residuals, a second-order serial correlation correc-
tion is used as opposed to the first-order correction used in other parts of
the natural gas model. The error term is assumed to be of the form:
Et = P t-l + P2 t-2 + t
where t is the uncorrelated term.
In equations where right hand side variables are predetermined, a simple
search procedure can be used to choose P1 and P2 to minimize the sum of
squared residuals of the regression.1 9 In equations where unlagged endo-
genous variables appear on the right-hand side, a two-stage least squares
procedure must be combined with the second-order serial correlation correc-
tion. This is done using a procedure suggested by Fair, and it accounts for
simultaneous equation bias as well as serial correlation bias.
The available data for wildcat wells (WWT) aggregates those drilled for
oil and for gas, so that the number of wells drilled should be responsive
to changes in both the price of oil and the price of gas. It was not possible,
however, to estimate a wells equation with both oil and gas prices as independent
variables because these prices are highly collinear. Thus two gas-oil
price indices are constructed, one each for the wells and discoveries equations,
1 9This is a modification of the Hildreth-Lu procedure.
20See R.C. Fair, [27].
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and these are used in place of the two prices that would otherwise appear.
The price index for the wells equation is constructed by first estimating
that equation including the price of gas and excluding the price of oil.
Next, the equation is re-estimated including the price of oil but excluding
the price of gas. The coefficients of the oil and gas price terms are then
used as weights in the price index. The price index for the discoveries
equation is similarly calculated.21
The estimation results for the wells equation are shown below (with
t-statistics in parentheses). The first two regressions are used only to
generate the coefficients for the price index. The third regression, equa-
tion(34),is used to explain well drilling in the offshore model. The
estimated values of the two serial correlation coefficients p1 and p2 are
also shown.
WWTt = -2550.6 + 164.5 LOG(ACTt + ACTt_ )/2 + 1210.0 PG t_ (32)(-9.1) (8.7) (5.0)
WWTt = -2522.2 + 156.7 LOG(ACT + ACT )/2 + 106.4 PWO (33)
(-9.0) (9.5) (2.3)
WWTt = -4333.4 + 162.8 LOG(ACTt + ACTt_1)/2(-6.9) (9.9)
+323.0 LOG(1210.0 PG + 106.4 PWOt 1) (34)
(3.5) t-
R = .944 S.E. = 23.0 F(2/12) = 101.0
P = 0.737 P2 = -0.996 LHS Mean - 134.6
All of the coefficients of 'equation (34)are statistically significant and
have the expected signs.
21
For a more detailed discussion of the statistical problems involved in es-
timating these equations, as well as the other equations of the offshore model,
see P.N. Sussman [83].
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The estimation results for new discoveries per well are shown below,
and again the first two regressions are used to create the price index
for the final equation. Note that in this equation price variables include
the new contract price of gas and the ratio of the gas price to the oil
price. The price index thus applies to these two variables, and will differ
from the price index used in the wells equation.
DG/WWTt = 5694.0 - 2161.3 LOG(CWWT ) + 68967 PG
(1.3) (-3.5) (3.4)
DGt/WWTt = -1822 - 2028.8 LOG(CWWT t 1) + 3.2x10 PG /PWOt
(-0.33) (-3.6) (3.8)
DGt/WWTt = 2.0x105 - 2092.1 LOG(CWWTt_ )
t (-3.6) (-3.8) t
+ 20895.7 LOG(68967 PG + 3.2xlO5 PGt/PWOt)
(3.8)
R = .813 S.E. =3.63x10 F(2/11) = 23.9 D.W.
P1 = -0.029 P2 =-1.00 LHS Mean = 7.63x1031 ~~2=-10
(35)
(36)
(37)
= 2.66
All of the coefficients in equation (37), the final regression, are
statistically significant. The positive coefficient on the price index in
this equation describes the extensive mode in which drillers operate. The
coefficients of the components of the price index indicate that an increase
in the price of oil relative to the price of gas leads to more wildcats
drilled for oil and less gas discoveries per wildcat drilled.22
Extensions and revisions of gas reserves are explained by a simple line
relationship, with the explanatory variables the number of field wells
drilled (FWT) and the number of producing acres (ACP) in the previous year:
XRG = -1.66x10 + 4515.9 FWT + 0.405 ACPt (38)
(-5.1) (7.5) (2.5)
R2 = 942 S.E. = 5.0x10 F(2/12) = 96.7 D.W. = 2.19
P1 = -0.625 2 = -0.557 LHS Mean 1.80x0
For a discussion fil and gas directionality see Khazzoom, J.D. [43
For a discussion of oil and gas directionality see Khazzoom, J.D. [43].
ar
2
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The equation describing field wells is a linear relationship between
that variable and the number of offshore drilling rigs DRO and the long-term
interest rate INT:
FWTt = 113.6 + 8.3 DROt - 21.0 INT (39)
(1.2) (7.0) (-1.5)
RSQ = .821 SER = 72.2 F(2/12) = 31.8 D.W. = 1.87
P = 0.073 P2 = -0.140 LHS Mean = 623.0
Here, field wells 'include all offshore wells except wildcat wells,
i.e., they include development wells and exploratory extension wells.
The coefficient on the drilling rig term (8.3) is consistent with empirical
estimates of the average number of rig-days it takes to drill an offshore
well (35-40).23
Production of gas out of reserves (QG) is explained by the average well-
head price of gas (PWG) and total reserves (YT).24 The functional form is
the same as that for onshore, except that the reserve term contains a three-
year lag (as explained in Section 3.4, we could expect this longer lag off-
shore).
Q 6 6 (40)QGt 3.4x106 + 2.3x106 LOG(PWG t) + 0.116 YTt 3
(4.5) (5.1) (32.2)
R2 = .992 S.E. = 9.0x10 F(2/11) = 727.9 D.W. = 2.34
LHS Mean 1.36x106
See Adelman, M.A. and Baughman, M. [1].
24The roll-in mechanism that determines the average wellhead price PWG is
based on a different depreciation rate offshore than onshore. Because
offshore development has been more recent, only a small percentage of con-
tracts have expired in the past. Our estimated roll-in equation (based on
data over 1956-1973) is:
PWGt = [PTt . (QGt - (1 - .0207)QGtl ) + PWGt QG (1 - .0207)]/QG t
(0.70) (0.70)
R2 = .945 S.E. = .0094 F = 292.3
The estimated depreciation rate is incremented by .005 each year after 1973
for forecast purposes to account for future expiration of old contracts.
The estimated equation fits the data well, and has a standard error that is
less than 8 percent of the mean value of the dependent variable.
Next, forfeited acreage (ACRD) is explained by the amount of acreage
leased (ACR) five years previously and an average of the acreage under super-
vision (ACT) five and six years previously:
ACRDt = -1.26x10 + 0.5 ACR + .1 ((ACT + ACT )/2) (41)
(-2.3) (4.7) (4.7) t-5 t-6
R = .853 S.E. = 1.3x105 F(2/10) = 29.1 D.W. = 1.90
^ 5
P1 = -0.985 P2 -0.111 LHS Mean - 2.24x10
Finally, new producing acreage (ACPN) is explained by the amount of
non-producing acreage (ACN) one and two years previously, the amount of
new discoveries (DG) in the previous year, and the cumulative number of
acres leased (CACR) since 1954:
ACPNt = 27923 + 0.02ACNt-2 + .28DG (ACN t_/CACRt) (42)
(1.8) (1.9) (4.4)
R2 = .92 S.E. 3.2x104 F(2/10) = 56.6 D.W. = -1.83
^h~~ 5
Pl = -0.006 P2 -0.850 LHS Mean = 1.22x10
As indicated in equation (42), an increase in non-producing acreage under
supervision in the previous two years and in new discoveries in the pre-
vious year result in additions to producing acreage. This relation-
ship is subject to a geological constraint which is represented by the cumula-
tive acres variable. As more and more acreage is leased, discoveries are
found increasingly on lands that are already productive and decreasingly on
previously non-productive lands.
Total acreage (ACT), which is an explanatory variable in the wells
equation, and producing acreage (ACP), which is an explanatory variable in the
extensions and revisions equation, are now determined through identities.
The annual increase in total acreage is simply equal to acreage leased (an
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exogenous policy variable) minus forfeited acreage. The-annual increase in
producing acreage is equal to new producing acreage minus forfeited producing
acreage (which in turn is 20% of all forfeited acreage).
4.6. sLltaed LlUatiuis to ipelifPt Re 44rtkl
Economic and regulatory conditions lead us to expect the pipeline price
markup to wholesale buyers to depend on mileage, volumetric capacity of the
25
pipeline, an interest rate, average annual sales, and the Herfindahl index.
Generalized least squares regressions for this structural relationship have
been run on a sample over the time span 1963 to 1971 with 40 cross-sections,
comprising a total of 360 observations. The dependent variable in all cases
is the level of the price markup in cents per Mcf. Independent variables
are mileage, capacity, sales, the Herfindahl Index, and the interest rate.
Dummy variables on some states were necessary to explain gross variations in
the markups of similar states that resulted from heterogeneities between states.
Regression results for the equation used in the model are shown
below, with t-statistics in parentheses, together with the estimated
serial correlation coefficients (pj) and the estimated error standard
deviations (oj) used in the GLS procedure:
-4
MARKUP = 9.528 + 0.00773M - 3.306x10 V + 1.109INTA + 8.363NV + 7.394UT
(14.43) (17.15) (-14.93) (10.9) (13.0) (4.61)
- 9.64CA + 7.3840H - 6.365WY + 4.013WV - 5.475C0 - 3.153IL
(-9.28) (5.80) (-8.34) (4.79) (-7.05) (-7.27)
+ 5.476WI - 3.932FL (4:;)
(6.04) (-3.12)
R = 0.960 F = 571.9 S.E. = 0.516 D.W.(0) = 1 97
t5Many of the series for these variables were not directly available, and
had to be constructed from primary data (e.g,, FPC forms) or computed from
other data series. Sources and methods of computation of data are shown in
Section 4.2. above.
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Region
AL 0.529 3.977
AZ 0.582 2.984
AR 0.595 2.529
CA 0.437 3.162
CO 0.199 3.174
MD 0.433 4.509
FL 0.347 4.404
GA 0.570 5.125
ID 0.551 3.107
IL -0.029 2.092
IN 0.836 2.084
IO 0.650 1.605
KS -0.280 1.767
KY 0.556 2.768
LA 0.554 2.682
MI 0.403 1.182
MN 0.376 2.515
MS 0.554 2.138
MO -0.317 2.317
NB -0.547 3.814
NV 0.263 2.439
NE 0.873 5.207
NJ 0.623 2.705
NM 0.202 2.870
NY 0.498 3.128
NC 0.659 1.781
OH 0.332 4.520
OK 0.406 1.641
OR 0.979 2.785
PA 0.593 4.095
SC 0.751 4.030
SD -0.137 3.213
TN 0.495 3.739
TX 0.671 1.854
UT 0.217 6.744
VA 0.454 4.076
WA 0.949 2.275
WV -0.428 6.413
WI 0.586 2.003
WY 0.274 2.661
A number of alternative estimations were also performed, and they
are shown in Table 4.3, As can be seen from that table (as well as in
the final regression) the strongest variable is the mileage series,
which in nearly every regression has a coefficient close to .01 and a
t-statistic of about 20. Assuming effective regulation, so that markups
reflect only costs, this indicates an average total cost of roughly
one cent per Mcf per hundred miles. The capacity, sales, and interest
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variables are also strong in general, with t-statistics in the range of
4 to 10. The Herfindahl Index is the weakest variable in the model, and
is usually statistically insignificant or appears with the wrong sign.
A I)relti:nary hli.torlcal hniitltatloii of the cHt'imat. t'(tljlt Ioll
without dummy variables showed that in several states the markup was
severely under-or over-estimated. This variance was not correlated with
geography. In the Carolinas, for example, wholesale prices seemed to be
about 5 lower than in the neighboring states, while in Ohio they were
about 5¢ higher. These variations could be the result of different tax
structures in the two states of which we are not aware, or- of degrees of
competition not correlated with the Herfindahl Index, In any case, dummy
variables are used for those states which show large initial simulation errors.
Also, the final equation chosen for the model did not contain a sales
term, because the "sales" variable includes interstate sales only. Since
there is no way to separate interstate and intrastate sales in the demand
equations of the model, a markup equation that included interstate sales
only could not be simulated directly, so that this term had to be excluded.
All of the explanatory variables and dummy variables in the final regression
are statistically significant, and the equation simulates the historic data
quite closely.
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4.7. Estimated Equations for Wholesale Demand for Natural Gas
The structural equations for wholesale demands for gas, whether
residential or industrial, explain the level of "new" demand, 6Q, defined as
Qt AQt + rQt-l (44)
with r as a depreciation rate for gas--burning appliances. The gas wholesale
demand equations, then, are of the form:
6Q = f(PGW, POIL, YY, 6YY, NN, ...) (45)
so that the level of new demand is related to the wholesale gas price,
the price of competing fuels (such as oil), and "growth" variables such
as income, population, etc.
Before this equation can be estimated, a value must be determined for
the depreciation rate r.26 An equation of the form;
Qt = a0 + alPGWt + a2POILt + a3YYt-1 + a4Qt-1 (46)
is estimated so as to provide the value of r equal to (l - a4 ). After a series
2 6 Balestra [83 distinguishes between two depreciations rates, one for gas
appliances and the other for alternative fuel-burning appliances, since
lifetime for appliances using alternative fuels differ. He estimates these
two depreciation rates with an equation of the form:
Qt = a0 + alPGWt + a2ANNt + a3NNtl + a4AYYt + a5YYt-1 + a6Qt-
so that depreciation rate for gas appliances is given by (1 - a6). (His
results, however, gave an estimated value of a6 that was always greater
than one, which cannot be justified theoretically.) The alternative fuels
depreciation rate can be obtained from this equation as either the ratio
a3/a2 or a/a 4. Thus, the equation is overidentified, so that the deprec-
iation rate can be obtained only by estimating it subject to the constraint
of a3/a2 = a5/a4. (The resulting estimation problem is nonlinear, but
Balestra uses an iterative method suggested by Houthakker and Taylor [36]
to obtain an estimated depreciation rate equal to 0.11, a number which
seems somewhat high.) Our initial attempts to follow Belestra's approach
failed to provide meaningful estimates of two separate depreciation rates.
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of trials, we obtained a value of the depreciation rate equal to 0.07.
This value is used here for both industrial and for residential/commercial
demand in all parts of the country.
An earlier version of this econometric model divided natural gas
demand into three major categories, sales for resale, mainline sales, and
intrastate sales, and then further subdivided sales for resale into residen-
tia lcommercial demand and industrial demand. (The distinction between
residential/commercial demand and industrial demand was not necessary for
the other two major demand categories since mainline sales
and intrastate sales are largely industrial.) After improving
and extending our data base on wholesale consumption and prices, an attempt
was made to estimate a new set of demand equations using this same break-
down. Representative estimation results for different regions of the
country are shown in Table 4. 4.
As can be seen, some of the regressions for sales for resale demand
show credible results, but the mainline and intrastate demand equations
are extremely poor, often producing negative R2 s.28 Given these results,
an alternative breakdown was made, based on the presumption that sales
for resale industrial demand, mainline demand, and intrastate demand have
roughly the same economic determinants, and that dividing industrial demand
S2 7 ee P.W. MacAvoy and R.S. Pindyck, "Alternative Regulatory Policies for
Dealing with the Natural Gas Shortage", Bell Journal of Economics and
Management Science, Autumn, 1973. The equations described in this article
were estimated by two-stage least squares, however, and therefore are not
directly comparable with the regression results presented in this section,
where a generalized least squares procedure was used.
28 2It is possible to obtain a value of R less than zero using our generalized
least squares estimation procedure. See Section 4.1 for a detailed descrip-
tion of that procedure.
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up into these three categories was simply adding noise to the data through
the process of disaggregation. 9 Industrial demand was aggregated from these
three groups, so that further estimation was done on only industrial and resi-
dential/commercial sectors.
The two demand equations (one for residential/commercial demand, and
the second for industrial demand) are estimated for each of the five wholesale
regions of the country. The regression period was first chosen to be 1963
to 1971 for both the industrial and residential/commercial sectors, as this
covered the period for which our data were most complete. In those regressions,
price terms are unlagged in industrial equations under the assumption that
industrial consumers can rapidly convert new demand to alternative energy
sources, while price variables in the residential/commercial demand equations
contain a one-year lag. Dummy variables are used selectively; in the North
Central region, for example, dummy variables are used for states such as
Illinois, Iowa and Wisconsin since these states use natural gas to generate
electricity which is transported to neighboring states for final consumption.
The results for-these regressions are shown in Table 4.5.
Simulations of the regression equations in Table 4.5 indicated
that industrial demand was being under-predicted in the years 1971 and
1972. The reason for this appeared to be that the equations were es-
timated using observations over the time in which there were curtail-
ments of service to industry (after 1970) so that the industrial de-
mand equations were re-estimated using only data from 1963 to 1969. The
residential /commercial demand equations were also re-estimated, again over
the period 1963 to 1971, but using alternative growth variables in an
attempt to improve their simulation performance. All of these equations
2 9 The division of sales for resale demand into industrial and residential/
commercial sales was based on a ratio derived from Bureau of Mines consump-
tion data.
69 .-
p
I
i
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were estimated using the generalized least squares procedure described in
Section 4.1, except that a single value for the serial correlation coef-
ficient p was used for all districts, since there was almost no variation
in this parameter from state to state. The final wholesale demand equations
used in the model are shown below, with t-statistics in parentheses, and
estimated values for the serial correlation coefficient and error term
standard deviations for each state.
Residential and Commercial Demand for Gas:
Northeast:
6TRCS = 13485
(0.89)
- 719.67PGW + 1343.1PFOIL 1 + 42.856NN (47)
(-3.54) (1.36) (8.77)
R2 = 0.610
p 0.2536
F = 31.8 S.E. = 0.762 LHS Mean = 1.86
a.
MD
NE
NJ
NY
2929..8"
8934.3
6212. 1
18111.2
OH
PA
VA,
WV .\
33490.3
31997.6
3307.9-
10328.3
North Central:
STRCS = 27968 - 1702.4PGW + 90442PALT + 60.306NN + 38998IL
(1.94) (-3.25) (3.27) 1 (6.57) (3.48)
+ 8832.010 + 10505WI (48)
(2.69) (2.55)
R = 0.409
p = 0.0122
F = 7.507 S.E. = 0.690 LHS Mean = 1.4'9
i 4
a.4
IL
IN
IO
MI
MN
38464.0
5551.4 -
12318.4
28207.2
17284.5
MO
NB
SD
WI
15947.9
8645 
6695 D.0
8913D
Southeast:
6TRCS = 11642 - 790.4PGW + 1918.6PFOIL + 1.2406YY - 5469.7FL
(0.74) (-1.81) (1.80) (1.03) (-2.06)
+ 7272.6GA + 7961.8KY - 4077.9SC (49)
(3.21) (2.74) (-2.51)
R2 = 0.394
p = -0.1116
F 4.46 S.E. = 0.649 LHS Mean 1.10
0.
AL
FL
GA
KY
8695.8,
75282
7655.8
9737.8,
NC
SC
TN
6855.3
3967.1
8880.5
South Central:
6TRCS = 42648 - 2355.OPGW + 2912.OPFOIL 1
(1.23) (-3.48) (1.04)
R2 = 0.158
p = -0.1662
F = 4.23 S.E. = 0.819 LHS Mean = 0.713
a.
-A)
AR
KS
LA
12435.0
15894.0
23897.1
MS
OK
-TX
5942.9!
58741.0
39922.6
(50)
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West:
6TRCS = 5804.0 - 313.8PGW + 593.4PFOIL_ 1 + 21.306NN
(1.47) (-6.51) (2.13) (7.97)
+ 45642 CA + 3077.ONV
(6.17) (4.36)
R2 = 0.565 F = 19.22 S.E. = 0.709 LHS Mean 2.03
p = -0.7374
aT.
AZ 10367.9
CA 42064.9
CO 13393.7
ID 1460.7
NV 2017.6
Industrial Demand for Gas:
NM
OR
UT
WA
WY
13050.3
2664.9
3188.8
5378.1
6574.7
Northeast:
6TINS = 25092 - 589.2PGW + 25519PALT + 6.534CAP 1
(3.32) (-3.20) (1.37) (1.85)
+ 35061 OH + 23378 PA
(6.16) (3.16)
2R = 0.570 F = 11.1 S.E. = 0.467 LHS Mean = 1.068
p = -0.0337
CT.
_z
MD
NE
NJ
5475.8
9246.5
17745.9
WV 8328.1
(51)
(52)
OH
PA
VA
22493.6
35184.0
13234.4
NY 31235.3
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North Central:
6TINS = 11099 - 937.OPGW + 64174 PALT + 2.818VAM
(0.629) (-1.42) (1.23) (6.85)
+ 11243 IL ~ 5938.OIN + 1183.0IO +
(0.77) (-1.10) (3.14)
86840MN + 9456.OWI
(1.69) (1.99)
2R = 0.760 F = 17.8 S.E. = 0.461 LHS Mean = 1.01
p = 0.1335
--%
IL.
IN
IO
MI
MN
Southeast:
6TINS = 65234 
- 2145.0OPGW + 97293 PALT + 14.37CAP
(4.53) (-4.70) (5.45) (2.51) 
-1
- 16681NC
(-9.28)
- 17735SC
(-5.96)
2
R = 0.897
P = -0.0923
A.
_1
AR
KS
F = 62.5
31824.3
20615.0
S.E. = 0.460
MS
OK
LHS Mean = 1.88
37416. 0
86610.7
LA 103832.0
I d:
(53)
60259.8
12732.6
14344.4
28859.2
MO
NB
SD
WI
29891.1
13584.6
2622,1
6527.3
22337.1
(54)
TX 218593. 
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South Central:
6TINS = 73360
(1.52)
R = 0.649
p = -0.3645
- 5642.OPGW + 191595 POIL + 158.7CAP + 56895 LA
(-2.85) (2.16) (5.51) (3.08)
F = 14.3
()I<
AR
KS
LA
31824.3
20615').0
103832.0
S.E. = 0.507
MS
OK
TX
(55)
LHS Mean = 1.46
37416.7
86610.0
218593.0
6TINS = 9361.0 - 465.4PGW + 51805PCOAL + 16.99CAP + 108575 CA
(4.00) (-4.22) (3.76) (3.21) 1 (8.08)2 ~ ~ ~ ~ ) )(.8
R = 0.513
p = -0.7624
F = 14.5 S.E. = 0.459
(5( )
LHS Mean 1.03
a.I.
27791.8
110948.0
22064.2
3096.6
5956.9
NM
OR
UT
WA
WY
19329. 0
9381. 8-
16370. 0
32284. 0
16162.4
West:
AZ
CA
CO
ID
NV
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There is still another demand category which must be accounted for,
and that is lease and plant fuel demand. This consists of demand for gas
as an energy source for extracting and pressurizing gas at the field site.
Since there is usually no alternative energy source as easily accessible
at the site as the gas itself, the demand for plant gas is largely a
function of the total quantity of gas produced. We estimated this demand
equation by pooling data over the years 1968 to 1972 for all gas
producing states, and using a dummy variable for the state of Texas to
account for the fact that that state has a larger fraction of older fields,
which probably require more extraction fuel in their operations. The
resulting equation is shown below.
Demand for Gas as Field Extraction Fuel:
FS = 1525.0 + 0.0434QG + 0.04993TX.QG (57)
(1.99) (15.14) (8.18)
2
R = 0.847 F 3 135.9 S.E. = 0.538 LHS Mean = 1.40
p = 0.8390
a
AR 3869.2 OH 1594.7
CA 17666.4 OK 16484.2
CO 857.4 PA 543.4
KS 5787.2 TX 30703.1
LA 27128.5 UT 1909.4
MS 4085.7 WY 1932.7
NM 3267.4
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4.8. Estimated Equations for Wholesale Oil Demand
Oil demand is modeled in the residential/commercial and industrial
sectors where it can be used as a substitute for natural gas. Within the
residential/commercial market, No. 2 distillate home heating oil is the
major competitor with natural gas, while in the industrial market, No. 6
residual fuel oil is the major oil product in use. In formulating and
estimating the oil demand equations, care was taken to make them compatible
with the equations for gas demand, so that structural equations tested were
of the form:
6QOt = f(POt-l, PGt-1,' YY, NN,,..) (58)
with 6QOt = AQOt + rQOt_1 (59)
Here, new demand for oil is modeled as a function of own price, PO, in the
previous period, the price of natural gas, PG, or some other substitute,
lagged one period, and the other explanatory variable (income, etc.) which explain
growth in market size. The parameter r is the depreciation rate discussed
in the last section.
The lags on prices are assigned a priori significance under the assump-
tion that changes in the wholesale prices of oil and gas do not immediately
affect the quantity of oil and gas demanded. The growth term can he
-one of several variables depending on the market being modeled, although
income has been found to be the best general variable for market size.
Other variables for growth are also used, such as value added in manufact-
uring, VAM, for industrial equations.
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Equations of the form shown in (58) were tested over the time period
1964 to 1970 using data for forty states or groups of states in the Conti-
30
nental U.S. The aggregation is the same as that used for natural gas
demand, except that the South East, South Central and West regions are
combined to form one "South" region (because only a small proportion of
total fuel oil consumption occurs in these three regions). The consuming
region breakdowns are shown in Table 4.6. (For a complete list of variable
definitions, as well as data sources, see Section 4,2,)
Table 4.6
Regional Breakdown for Oil Demand Equations
1. North East
2. North Central
3. "South"
Maryland + Delaware, New England, New Jersey, New York,
Ohio, Pennsylvania, West Virginia, Virginia
Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri,
Nebraska, South Dakota, Wisconsin
Kentucky, Alabama, Florida, Georgia, North Carolina,
South Carolina, Tennessee, Arkansas, Kansas, Louisiana
Mississippi, Oklahoma, Texas, Arizona, California,
Colorado, Idaho, Nevada, New Mexico, Oregon, Utah,
Washington, Wyoming
Before the actual demand equations can be estimated it is necessary to
select a value for the depreciation rate parameter r as in the. case of wholesale gas
demand, In this instanee the paramete r was estimated from QOt = (l-r)QOt_1 + AOt
30 For example, the six New England states are combined into one district..
-'-- -·- -I ----
II
I
I II
-178_
where QOt is quantity of oil consumed in period t, and AOt is the total
stock of oil-burning equipment in place in period t. Pooling all 40
consumption districts together, the regression resulted in r = 0.1039
(with t = 2.96 and R = .996), so that a value of 0.1 for r is used in
all equations.
Final equations for residential/commercial demand in each of the
three regions are shown below, with t-statistics in parentheses. The
estimated serial correlation coefficients (p.) and error term standard
deviations (oj) that were used in the generalized least squares estimations
are also snown.
Northeast
6QO.2 = -5829.8 + 237.2PGW_ - 364.3PFOIL + 0.53726YY
(-0.6843) (1.90) (-1.13) - (8.64)
-375,3TDUM(1970) + 3969.9NEW + 2497.1NJ
(-0.83) (2.06) (8.52)
2
R = 0.88 F - 48.4 S.E. - 0.52 LHS Mean m 1.91
State J
MD 0.1798 1666.7
NE 
-0.7295 5660.2
NJ 
-0.3180 1352.6
NY 0.0780 5784.1
OH 
-0.2131 1445.3
PA 
-0.5425 2549.4
VA 
-0.0968 1689.8
WV 
-0.5049 1394.6
North Central
6QO.2 = -1695.0 + 92.52PGW_ - 148.2PFOIL 1 + 0.4706SYY (61)
(-2.00) (4.58) (-1.78) (10.06)
2
R =0.34 F = 8.6 S.E. = 0.67 LHS Mean = 1.17
. A
C.J
1960.3
891.85
1073.6
872.01 -
1068.8
1055.7
363.87
190.26
1116.2
South East and South Central and West ("South")
6Q0.2 = -152.8 + 15.18PGW - 11.27PFOIL_ - 221.1AZ
(-0.89) (5.11) (-0.60) (-4.09)
F = 5.8 S.E. = 0.71
State
AL
AZ
AR
CA
CO
FL
GA
ID
KS
KY
LA
MS
NV
NM
NC
OK
OR
SC
TN
TX
UT
WA
WY
+ 356.6SC - 177.3NM
(1.22) (-2.97)
LHS Mean = 0.60
p
0.9035
-0.6197
0.4483
0. 1560
-0.1423
-0.2998
-0.1404
-0.0545
0.5330
-0.3036
0.5554
-0.1640
0.5811
0.1834
-0.3828
-0.5570
-0.2679
0.1529
0.4002
0.2946
0.6261
-0.6583
-0.5867
c.
_J
113.87
256.29
131.03
301.58
105.88
1032.9
294.63
1796.4
192.27
232.93
223.65
300.73
172.09
158.02
1295.9
226.74
296.74
850.80
292.13
604.85
177.38
885.87
196.10
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State
IL
IN
IO
MI
MN
MO
NB
SD
WI
-0.1743
0.2477
0. 1627
0.1388
0.1566
0.0234
-0.3143
-0.1472
-0.0706
2R = 0.18
(62)
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The wholesale gas and oil prices appear with the correct
signs in all three equations, although the oil price is not significant
in the South, equation. The South equation itself is barely significant
(with an F-statistic of 5.8) and this is a reflection of the very small
amount of oil that is consumed in that region. The growth variable
that has the strongest explanatory power and that was used in the
final equations is personal income. Note that this variable appears in its
"incremental" form, i.e., YY = AYY + rYYt 1, since it is assumed that the
level of total demand depends on total income, so that "new" demand will
depend on "new" income. This variable did not, however, appear significantly
in the South equation, nor did any other growth variable, so that the
only explanatory variable (other than state dummy variables) that appears
in that equation is the wholesale price of natural gas.
A time dummy (TDUM) is used in the Northeast equation, and this is
intended to account for changes in demand resulting from the stricter air
pollution standards that went into effect around 1970 in Northeastern
states. District (state) dummy variables are used in the Nor-theast and South
equations to account at least in part for heterogeneities between some states.
Alternative regressions are given in Table 4.7 to indicate the
results of using different state dummy variables (dummy variables included
are shown together with the signs of the estimated coefficients). Often
dummy variables are significant, but they eliminate any price and in-
-come effects. The objective was to find a combination of dummy variables
that would improve the significance of the overall equation without cancelling out
the significance of the price or income variables. Since this was not
achieved with the equations in the table, they were abandoned in favor of
those shown in the text above.
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Final equations for industrial oil demand in each region are shown below,
again with estimated serial correlation coefficients and error term standard
deviations:
Northeast
SRSID = -23405 + 781.8PGW - 10498POIL + 0.40026YY (63)
(-2.70) (4.45) (-3.03) (1.47)
S.E. = 0.90
0.3489
-0.0605
0.2105
-0.2765
0.1000
-0.0292
0.9116
-0.3579
LHS Mean = 1.11
a.
6195.6
8390.3
10875.
9740.5
2921.5
7121.0
5065.8
1092.9
North Central
6RSID - -634.9 - 502.2POIL + 0.65886YY + 142.110 + 512.3NB + 891.8SD + 336.5IN (64)
(-2.06) (-1.48) (6.97) (1.22) (2.66) (4.71) (0.72)
S.E. = 0.65 LHS Mean = 0.46
p
Lj
-0.2055
-0.0684
-0.5886
0.5936
-0.1494
-0.6152
-0.0772
0.4343
-0.4569
2245.9
1837.5
144.46
2777.4
998.83
918.44
446.27
110.6
644.11
2
R = 0.45 F = 12.0
State
MD
NE
NJ
NY
OH
PA
VA
WV
2
R = 0.51 F = 8.1
State
IL
IN
IO
MI
MN
MO
NB
SD
WI
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Southeast and South Central and West ("South")
6RSID = -168.5 + 11.49PGW - 413.2POIL_1 + 0.67226VAM + 8477.OFL (65)
(-1.21) (2.78) (-3.58) (6.82) (1.41)
+ 4932.0CA + 321.0OWY + 1352.0LA
(2.96) (2.18) (3.25)
S.E. = 0.57 LHS Mean = 0.47
A
-0.4294
-0.1511
-0.9777
-0.4262
-0.4637
0.6158
-0.3867
-0.0363
-0.0426
-0.0394
-0.5730
0.5521
0.3432
-0.1082
-0.1398
-0.5053
-0.4451
0.1818
-0.5145
-0.1831
-0.8124
-0.7868
-0.5411
I
1540.6
389.62
786.57
10044.
796.83
9995.2
1699.0
304.50
522.49
373.53
2803.3
521.35
156.2
940.64
1131.9
718.60
1200.8
1848.0
850.35
2897.8
1135.1
1334.9
1022.5
Income is again used as the growth variable in the NortheasL and
North Central regions, while value added in manufacturing is used in the
South region. Regressions were run using alternative growth variables,
but they were not as significant. Note that both the gas and oil prices
appear significantly in the Northeast and South, but the price of gas
was not significant and was thus omitted in the North Central equation.
State dummy variables are included, this time in both the North Central and
South equations. Again, the South equation is barely significant.
2R = 0.19 F = 4.2
State
AL
AZ
AR
CA
CO
FL
GA
ID
KS
KY
LA
MS
NV
NM
NC
OK
OR
SC
TN
TX
UT
WA
WY
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Alternative regressions for industrial demand are shown in Table 4. 8
These regressions differ in the choice of growth variables (population,
income, and value added), choice of time lags, and the use of state
dummy variables. As before, state dummy variables were chosen for the final
forms so as to improve the overall fit of the equations without decreasing
the significance of price and growth variables. Those equations in the text
would seem to be preferred for a policy model designed to analyze price controls,
so that they are included in the final version of the simulation model.3 1
31It is important to point out that although three regions--the Southeast,
South Central, and West--were merged into one in our oil demand equations,
it is still possible to determine oil demand (under different price
policies) for each of the regions over which gas demand equations are
estimated. Values for price, income, etc., for each particular state are
simply inserted into the equations when the model is simulated. The
merging of three regions is simply a pooling process that is used because
consumption in those regions is small and erratic, so that it is impossible
to estimate individual equations (that are statistically significant) for
each region. This does not limit our ability to analyze changes in demand
on a regional basis.
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4.9, Interregional Flows of Gas in the Econometric Model
As explained in Section 3.7, interstate gas production is allocated
from 8 producing regions to 40 demand regions through a set of static
input-output coefficients fij and gij which determine, respectively, the
fraction of state i's gas which comes from supply region , and the fraction
of district j's production which is supplied to state i. The only further
allocation is between intra- and interstate markets; this is made according to
a price-dependent distribution equation. In this section we describe the method
used to calculate the input-output coefficients, as well as the estimation of
the interstate-intrastate distribution equations. The actual breakdown of
producing and consuming regions used in the model is shown in Table 4.9.
In estimating the I-O coefficients for gas from the different supply
regions to each demand region, there are three determining factors: (1) how
much gas each pipeline company obtains from each production region,(2) how
much is delivered to each state, and (3) how much each state obtains from each
pipeline company. These are accounted for as follows. First, a schematic
diagram is drawn for each pipeline company (see the example in Figure 4.1 in
which the sale of gas in each state is represented by a square and each
pipeline segment by a horizontal directed arrow. A purchase by the pipeline
in a given state is represented by an incoming vertical arc which is labeled
by type (i.e. field purchases and pipeline's own production (A), or purchases
from another pipeline (0)). Sales are similarly represented by outgoing
vertical arcs.3 2
32
These diagrams are based on the FPC map, Princpa turl Na ur as lPiplInes
in the U.S. as well as on pipeline sales data extractted from FI'(: Form II
reports.
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TABLE 4.9
PRODUCING AND CONSUMING REGION BREAKDOWNS
Aggregated Producing Regions
1. Mid-Continent Texas 10
Oklahoma
Kansas
Arkansas
2. Permian New Maxico San Juan
New Mexico Permian
Texas 7C
Texas 8
Texas 8A
3. Mid-Texas Texas 1
Texas 9
Texas 5
Texas 7
4. Gulf Coast Texas 2
Texas 3
Texas 4
Louisiana South (onshore)
Louisiana South (offshore)
Louisiana North
Mississippi
Texas 6
5. Rocky Mountain Colorado
Utah
Wyoming
Montana
Nebraska
North Dakota
6. California California Intrastate
7. Appalachia West Virginia
Kentucky
Pennsylvania
Michigan
New York
Ohio
8. Canada Canadian Imports
Aggregated Consuming Regions (for Table 4.9)
1. NE Maryland-Delaware, New England,
New Jersey, New York, Ohio
Pennsylvania, West Virginia, Virginia
2. NC Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Michigan
Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska,
South Dakota, Wisconsin
3. SE Alabama, Florida, Georgia, North
Carolina, South Carolina,
Tennessee, Kentucky
4. SC Arkansas, Kansas, Louisiana,
Mississippi, Oklahoma, Texas
5. W Arizona, California, Colorado,
Idaho, Nevada, New Mexico, Oregon,
Utah, Washington, Wyoming
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
4
1. AL Alabama
2. AZ Arizona
3. AR Arkansas
4. CA California
5. CO Colorado
6. MD Maryland
Delaware
District of
Columbia
7. FI, Florida
8. GA Georgia
9. ID Idaho
.0. IL Illinois
.1. IN Indiana
L2. IO Iowa.
L3. KS Kansas
L4. KY Kentucky
.5. LA Louisiana
L6. MI Michigan
L7. MN Minnesota
8. MS Mississippi
[9. MO Missouri
!0. NB Nebraska.
21. NV Nevada
2. NE New England
!3. NJ New Jersey
4. NM New Mexico
25. NY New York
26. NC North Caroli a
27. OH Ohio
28. OK Oklahoma
29. OR Oregon
30. PA Pennsylvania
31. SC South CarolilLa
32. SD South Dakota
33. TN Tennessee
34. TX Texas
35. UT Utah
36. VA Virginia
37. WA Washington
38. WV West Virginia
9. WI Wisconsin
.0. WY Wyoming
Consumers
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Figure 4. 1
Florida Gas Transmission Pipeline System Model
Transcontinental
Gas
Pipeline
Sales for
Resale
in Florida
Sales
------- Transmission
4c--- Purchases
Texas Texas Texas
RR #2 RR #3 RR #4
Louisiana Southern Mid
South Natural Louisiana
Gas Gas Co.
Sales for
Resale.
in Texas
Mainline
Sales
in Texas
330 miles 600 miles
From these diagrams it is possible to determine how different production
districts feed gas into different states along each pipeline. Figures on
sales and purchases from 1966 to 1971 are used to
estimate on a state by state basis the approximate fraction of sales which
have come from each of the eight supply regions along each pipeline. For the
majority of pipeline companies, this estimation is trivial as they receive
gas from only one region, and hence the fractions are 1.00 or 0.00. Some
companies, however, receive gas from several regions and other pipelines as
well, and in these cases estimates (assumed to be time-invariant) are made
33
from simple calculations based on the more recent :FPC Form II data. The next
step involves multiplying every sale made by an interstate natural gas pipe-
line company (other than sales to other interstate pipeline companies) by
these fractions and then summing the products over the various pipelines:
S =Ea t (66)
Sij k ijktik
Sij = total sales in state i from production district j
tik = sales in state i by pipeline k
aik = fraction of pipeline k's sales in state i coming from
production district j.
This quantity (Sij) is then divided by the total quantity of gas de-
livered to state i and by the total quantity of gas supplied to the states
by supply district j, to determine, respectively fiJ and giJ:
S..
f = -i- (67)
ij ij
33
'For example, Consolidated Gas Supply gets approximately 11% of its gas from
Appalachia and 89% from Gulf Coast, while Michigan-Wisconsin Pipeline Company
delivers Midcontinental gas to Kansas, Missouri, Iowa, Illinois, and Wisconsin
but Gulf Coast gas to Louisiana, Tennessee, Indiana, Ohio and Michigan.
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S..
ij = ES ij
where fij = fraction of state i's gas obtained from supply region j,
and gij = fraction of gas supplied by district j which goes to state i.
The. coefficients were calculated for each year over the period 1966
through 1971, and are shown for three representative years in Tables 4 .10a
_b, and c.'34 Note that the coefficients do change somewhat over time, since
the quantities sold by each company to each state varied over this period.
The variations, however, are usually less than 10%, so that we may treat the
coefficients as constant. We use the coefficients calculated for 1971 in the
final simulation model,3 5
This procedure has been . altered somewhat to account for those sales of
gas which are not regulated by the FPC and which therefore are not included
in the Form II reports--that is, intrastate sale and lease .and plant fuel
sales. We account for these sales by using the identity
inter intra LPF (69)
J j 3 j j
where
P. = total production in district j
inter
S = total sales by producers of gas in district j to interstate
pipeline companies
The taDles present a reduced verions of the complete input-output matrices
(which specify demand on a state-by-state basis). In these tables demand is
aggregated into 5 large demand regions.
35Time-varying coefficients were also estimated which were functions of the
prices offered by the producing regions to the consuming regions. Regressions
were run in which the dependent variable was the fraction f., and the inde-
pendent variables were the prices offered by each of the regions that supply.
the given consuming region. (The regression coefficients were constrained so
that the fractions would always add to one.) The estimation results were
largely insignificant because there was too little variance in the dependent
variables--largely due to the rigidity of the pipeline structure and the
supply shortages brought on by regulation. Consequently the constant input-
output coefficients were used.
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S ntra= total intrastate sales in district j
SPF = lease and plant fuel sales in district j
L losses, including losses in extraction of natural gas jiquids
Since the production figures of the API and AGA 3 6exclude extraction
losses and since intrastate and lease and plant fuel losses due to trans-
portation are expected to be relatively small, we can write:
intra LPF in te r (70)S + S = 5inteS
J J j j
where P is the AGA estimate of production in district j. These sales (left-
hand side of (70)) are then added to Sij for those states which produce gas
and equations (67) and (6&) are used to calculate the fij and gij.
One remaining computational problem is that of allocating supplies
of gas between inter- and intrastate markets. We argued in Chapter 3 that
the fraction of gas allocated to intrastate sales (PCT) in gas-producing
states should be a function of the ratio of the intra- and interstate prices,
Pi /Pot. The simplest functional specification for this fraction would be:
PCT = c + Cl(Pin/Pout) (71)
This equation can be estimated on a region-by-region basis, or all the regions
can be pooled and a single estimate of c1 obtained. The coefficient cl
should have a positive sign since we expect production supply to depend
positively on price.
The PCT series was derived from the FPC Form II data Intrastate sales
were available on a state-by-state basis, making it straightforward to ag-
gregate states served by a given producing region. The only computational
problem was the state of Texas, since it obtained intrastate gas from four
regions (Midcont., Permian, MidTexas, Gulf), while no
3 6Reserves of Crude Oil, Natural Gas Liquids, and Natural Gas in the U.S. and
Canada AGA, API, CPA.
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state received intrastate gas from more than one region. Texas intrastate
sales were therefore divided among the four regions in the same proportion
as total sales in Texas (this is reasonable since less than 15% of gas con-
sumption in Texas is interstate). Total intrastate sales could then be
divided by total sales in that region to obtain the percentage estimate.
Interstate prices were obtained by averaging Table F data for each
district, weighted by total production. Intrastate new contract prices
were obtained from FPC Docket No. R-389A, which were averaged and weighted by
total production to obtain regional new contract prices. These were then
"rolled in" to obtain average intrastate wellhead prices by region.
Equation(71) was estimated over the years 1966-71 using data from five
supply regions. California was omitted from the estimation because all gas
produced there is assumed to be intrastate; Canada was omitted because
any gas produced there that enters the U.S. is by definition interstate: and
Kentucky and West Virginia were omitted because almost all of their gas
production has been interstate.
It was expected that the dependence of percentage allocation on the
ratio of prices would vary among production regions, and some attempt was
made to account for this heterogeneity when estimating equation(71). It
was found that best estimates were obtained through the use of two separate
regression equations, the'first estimated over the Midcontinent, Permian,
Mid-Texas, and Rocky Mountain production regions (but including regional
intercept dummy variables), and the second estimated over only the Gulf
region. The estimation results are shown below in equations (72) and (73)
which apply, respectively, to the four pooled regions and to the Gulf region:
3 7The "roll-in" equation is given in footnote 18 in Section 4.4.
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PCT = -0.463 - 0.O11DPERM - 0- .252DTEX + 0.499DMTN + 0.841(Pi /P )
(-1.39) (-2.62) (-4.10) (11.61) (2.50) (72)
R = .962 F(4/19) = 120.5
PCT = -0.202 + 0.507(P /P ) (73)
(-0.49) (1.28) in out
R2 = .290 F(1/4) = 1.63
Equation(72) fits the data well, with the relative-price term significant
at the 95% level. Although equation(73) as a whole is not significant at the
90% level, the dependent variable has very little variance in the Gulf region,
so that the equation will be adequate for simulation purposes.38
In the final form of the model the static input-output coefficients
calculated for 1971 are used for all states, But in those five regions
where intrastate sales are significant, the relative price equations
(72) and (73) are applied to state sales first. In these states intrastate
sales are subtracted from consumption figures in Table 4.9.6, and new
fij and gij coefficients are calculated. In simulations of the model,
the fraction (1-PCT) of gas which leaves each producing region is allocated
via the gij coefficients to the different demand regions, and the remainder
is sold as intrastate gas within that production region.
38 The regression equations (72)and (73)provide no guarantee that PCT will
remain in the interval (0,1), thus logical operators are included in the
simulation program to prevent PCT from taking on values outside this interval.
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4.10. Summary
The estimated equations that are used in the final form of the model
are summarized on a block-byblock basis in Table 4.11 (with references to
the regression results in the text). Each equation was chosen not only
on the basis of statistical fit,'but also on how well the equation tracked
the actual data when simulated over an historical time period individually
or as part of the block to which it belongs.3 9
The statistical fit of the individual equations varies from block to
block, but on the whole is good, particularly considering the degree of
structural and regional detail in the model. The reserves equations have
the weakest fit and contain a good deal of unexplained variance, reflecting
the stochastic elements of the discovery process that do not conform to
economic laws. The production, offshore, markup, and demand equations all
fit the data well, however. The reserves equations are also the most non-
linear part of the model, so that errors 'in these equations, as they are
squared and multiplied, may become magnified during simulation of the model.
Since it is the level of reserves (and not reserve additions) that affects
production in the model, errors in the reserves equations should not accumulate
across other blocks of equations.
There are a total of only thitty-nine estimated behavioral equations,
but a much larger number of equations must be solved siniultaneousl.y when the
model is simulated. This is due to the regional structure of the model, and
the fact that equations were estimated by pooling cross-section and time-series
data. Thus although a single equation is estimated for the pipeline price
markup, forty equations must be written to explain the wholesale price in
39Much of the model's explanatory power, however, lies in the dynamic inter-
actions of variables both within and across- blocks, so that an important est
of the validity of the model is its ability to track historical data when
simulated as a whole. This overall historical simulation is described in
Chapter 5.
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each of forty demand regions when the model is simulated. Similarly, the
nine reserves equations become 180 equations that apply to 20 production
districts, the six wholesale oil demand equations become 80 equations that
determine (separately) residential/commercial and industrial oil demand
in each of the forty demand regions, etc.
In addition to this "multiplication" of the behavioral equations,
all of the accounting identities in the model are "multiplied" (e.g.,
equations defining cumulative wells drilled, total reserves, etc., must be
written for each production district). Finally, the input-output matrix
must be expressed as a set of simultaneous equations that determine gas
flows from producing to consuming regions. As a result the model, in its
simulation format, contains some 1250 equations (or "statements") that must
be solved simultaneously.
00M. Simulation results for the model are presented in the next chapter,
We will first examine a simulation of the model over an historical time
period, and this will test the ability of the model as a whole to reproduce
the actual behavior of gas markets, Then we will present the forecast
simulations that were used in the policy analyses of Chapters 1 and 2.
-2-02-
Table 4.11
Estimated Equations of the Model
Block
Reserves
Production
(onshore)
Offshore
,Model
Price Markup
Wholesale Gas
Demand
Wholesale Oil
Demand
Interregional
Flows
Variables Explained
Exploratory Wells (WXT)
Size of Discovery, gas
and oil (SZG,SZO)
Success Ratio, gas and
oil (SRG,SRO)
Extensions, gas and oil
(XG,XO)
Revisions, gas and oil
(RG,RO)
Production out of reserves
(QG), for each of 3
regions
Acreage, Reserves,
Production (WWT,DG,
XRG, FWT, QG, ACRD,
ACPN).
Wholesale Gas Price(PGW)
Res./Comm. Demand (TgCS)
and Indus. Demand(TINS)
for each of 5 regions;
Extraction fuel demand
(FS)
Res./Comm. Demand (QO2)
and Indus. Demand(RSID)
for each of 3 regions.
Input-Output Coefficientf
Intrastate Allocations
(PCT) for each of
2 regions
Number
of Equa.
1
2
2
2
2
7
1
11
6
2
Estimation
Method
T
GLS,
with single p
for all districts
I
Second-order
serial corre-
lation with
TSLS.
GLS
GLS with TSLS
GLS
see Section 4.9
GLS
Equation Numbers
in Text
(16)
(17), (18)
(19), (20)
(21), (22)
(27),
(34),
(38),
(40),
(28)
(37)
(39)
(41), (42)
(43)
(47), (48), (49)
(50), (51), (52)
(53), (54), (55)
(56) ,(57)
(60),(61),(62),
(63),(64),(65)
Tahl 4 9 Qr
(72), (73)
'A (1-7. I - 4 #- PQ f a, ) \ 03 
_· XJX WlLLL 1-JIzJ k ":7 ) , - U , \)JL 
--
~~~r- u\ . , _
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CHAPTER 5:
SIMULATIONS OF THE ECONOMETRIC MODEL
The model of the natural gas industry described in the last two
chapters consists of a set of equations which have been specified and
estimated independently from each other. Taken one at a time, these
equations are of limited use for forecasting the behavior of the gas indus-
try. As we said in the beginning of Chapter 3, in order to analyze the
industry it is necessary that one take into account the simultaneous inter-
action of supply and demand on both field and wholesale levels, i.e., that
one view the industry as a complete system. This is done by simulating
the model as a whole, i.e., by solving as a simultaneous system the set
of equations that comprise the model.
In this chapter, simulation results will be presented that relate to
both the past and future behavior of the natural gas industry. Ln Section
5.1, we examine a simulation performed over a; period in the recent past,
namely 1967 through 1972. This historical simulation serves an important
purpose. By comparing the simulated with the actual historical values of
the endogenous variables in the model, we can determine how well the model
reproduces the behavior of the industry, and this provides one measure of
model validation. If, for example, the simulation shows no upward or down-
ward bias in production over time, it might be expected that the model's
predictions for future excess would show no bias when compared to actual
values five years hence. On the other hand, any bias in the historical
simulation might be expected to be repeated in forecasting.
In the second set of simulations we use the model for forecasting and
The word "simulation" simply refers to the solution of a set of simul-
taneous time-dependent equations.
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policy analysis. In Section 5.2 simulations are presented for the model
through'the year 1980, under alternative regulatory policies and alter-
native assumptions about future economic conditions. These alternative
forecast simulations have been discussed in Chapter 2 in the context of
their policy implications. In this chapter, we examine them in more
detail and determine how sensitive they are to assumptions made about exo-
genous economic variables. Finally, in Section 5.3, we illustrate the
diverse uses of the model by forecasting the demands by region of a gas
substitute contingent on Federal price policies for gas in the field.
5.1. Historical Simulations
An historical simulation is performed by using actual 1966-1972 values
for the exogenous variables and actual 1966 values for the endogenous var-
iables as "start up" values to solve the model for 1967-1972 values of
the endogenous variables. The computed values are shown for the most import-
ant endogenous variables of the model in Tables 5.1 through 5.20. In
addition to listing the simulated values, actual values, and errors for
each variable, we indicate the mean and root-mean-square (RMS) simulation
errors.
Additions to reserves and its components for both gas and oil are
shown in Tables 5.1 and 5.5. Although total wells drilled is simulated
with an RMS error of only 12 percent, these errors are combined with errors
from the success ratio and size of discovery equations so that new discov-
eries of natural gas simulate with an RMS error that is about 40 percent
of the mean actual value. New discoveries of oil have a percentage RMS
error that is relatively smaller, as smaller errors are introduced in the
oil success ratio. Combined with errors in extensions and revisions, addit--
ions to reserves for natural gas have an RMS error that is about 50 percent
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of the mean actual-value, and additions to reserves of oil have an RMS
error that is about 20 percent of the mean actual value.
Although these RMS errors are large in magnitude, particularly for
natural gas, we can observe from the tables that most of the error occurs
in one year, namely 1968, when the model fails to reproduce a large one-
year decrease that occurred in new discoveries. (The very low level of
new discoveries in that year is impossible to explain on economic grounds or
on the basis of geological conditions). Much of the remaining error in additions
to gas reserves comes from revisions which, as explained in Section 3.2, is
an erratic series that is difficult to analyze in an econometric model. The
model simulates positive (though small) gas revisions over the entire period,
while actual gas revisions were negative from 1969 to 1972. The net result is
that the model overpredicts additions to gas reserves. For these reasons the
level of total gas reserves is overpredicted by about 10 percent by 1972.
Simulation values for production, the average wellhead price, and the
average wholesale price are all shown in Table 5.7. Although the simulated
values for total reserves are too high by about 6 percent in 1970 and 9 percent
in 1971, the simulated values for production in 1971 and 1972 are almost exactly
equal to the actual values. Although this is in part a result of emphasis in
the production model on variables other than reserves, in part it is a result
of too-high predictions of reserves-to-production ratios.
In all, it is not possible to say that policy analysis of the 1960's
would have been much affected by upward bias in historical simulations of
reserves, and downward bias in reserve-production ratios. Policy analysis
is focused on gas production and demand, and the dependence of these on
regulated prices. We thus place a greater emphasis on the ability of the
model to reproduce past behavior of production, demand, and prices in eval-
uating its applicability to such policy analysis.
As can be seen in Table 5.7, gas production is simulated with an
RMS error that is about 2 percent of the average actual value. Average
wellhead and wholesale prices are simulated with RMS errors that are
respectively 1 percent and 3 percent of their average values, so that the
field price "roll-in" mechanism is being accurately represented, as is the
price mark-up charged by pipeline companies.
Simulation results of the demand for gas are shown on a regional and
sectoral basis in Tables 5.8 through 5.15. Simulated values for demand in
all regions are close to the actual values, with average RMS errors that
range from 1 percent to 6 percent. The larger errors occur in the Soutl
Central region, which is not surprising in view of the poor statistical.
fits of the demand equations that were estimated for that region.2
Finally, historical simulation results for wholesale oil demand are
shown by region and by type (distillate oil for residential/commercial
use and residual oil for industrial use) in Tables 5.16 through 5.20.
Although simulations for oil demand are not as close to the actual values
as in the case for natural gas demand, the RMS simulation errors are generally
less than 10 percent of the mean actual values, so that we have enough
confidence in this part of the model to include an analysis of wholesale
oil markets in our forccasts under alternative policy assumptions.
In summary, the historical simulation shows a small upward bias
in the prediction of reserve levels, but this is counterbalanced by an over-
prediction of the reserve-production ratio, so that there is no net bias
in predictions of natural gas supply. This would indicate that our policy
analyses and estimates of future gas shortages are, if anything, somewhat
conservative.
2Simulated values for both production demand and supply are much closer to the
actual values than was the case in the earlier version of this model described
in P.W. MacAvoy and R.S. Pindyck L57], and demand equations have essentially
the same functional form that they did in that earlier model. We attribute
at least part of the improvement in the model's simulation performance to thel
GLS technique that was used in its estimation.
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5.2. Use of the Model for Forecasting and Policy Analysis
Chapter 2 presents,in summary form, a set of simulations of the model
through the year 1980 under alternative regulatory price policies. In this
section, we examine these simulation results in more detail, so as to' ascer-
tain to what degree they are dependent upon assumptions on field and wholesale
prices of oil, as well as on economic variables such as GNP and the rate of
inflation.
In fact the forecasts in Chapter 2 are based on a specific set of values
for the variables that are expected to hold during the 1970's. The important
exogenous determinants of demand for gas and oil include state-by-state
value added in manufacturing, population, income, and capital equipment
additions. It is assumed that value added, income, and capital additions
will grow at 4.2 percent per annum in terms of constant dollars.3 We chose a
-conservative expected rate of growth of prices of 6.5 percent; the rate of
inflation likely to prevail in the late 1970's is rather uncertain and is under
considerable debate, and the rate of 6.5 percent simply represents a rough
average of several inflation forecasts that have been made recently. Thus,
value added, income and capacity grow at 10.7 percent in current dollar
terms. It is assumed that the rate of growth of population will be limited
to 1.1 percent per annum for the rest of the decade (in keeping with the
assumptions used in the economy-wide models for generating the rates of
growth of value added and capacity). The domestic price of crude oil
is assumed to remain constant at $6.50 per barrel in 1974 dollars for
the remainder of the decade, and wholesale prices for both distillate
and residual oil are also assumed to remain constant in real terms.
Finally, average drilling costs are expected to increase at a rate of
3.3% per annum in real terms, in keeping with the trend of cost increases
3This assumption is based on the Data Resources Quarterly Economic Model
forecast for the period 1972 to 1.980.
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over the late 1960's and early 1970's.
These values of the exogenous variables can be altered, and new
values inserted into the model to produce new simulations that would
indicate how the forecast results presented in Chapter 2 would depend
on the particular assumptions that have been made. It is of particular
interest to determine how these results depend on the assumptions made
regarding the price of oil (the future of which is open to considerable specu-
lation), as well as assumptions made regarding general economic conditions
such as the growth in output and the rate of inflation. As an alternative
to the set of "medium" assumptions for exogenous variables described
above, we have chosen "high" and "low" assumptions for both oil prices
and economic variables.
In contrast to the "medium" scenario for oil prices, we offer a "low"
scenario in which the crude oil price declines by 25¢ per barrel each year (from
$6.50 in 1974 to $5.00 in 1980) and a high scenario in which the price of
crude oil increases from $6.50 per barrel in 1974 to $7.50 per barrel in 1980
(again in constant 1974 dollars). Wholesale oil prices (as well as prices
for alternative fuels such as coal and electricity) are assumed to change in
these scenarios at the same percentage rate as the crude oil price.
In contrast to the "medium" scenario for economic growth, we offer a 'low'
scenario in which output variables (such as income, value added, and capital
additions) grow at 2.5 percent in real terms with a rate of inflation of
4.0 percent, and a high scenario in which output variables grow at 5.0 percent
in real terms and the rate of inflation is 8.0 percent.
5.2.1. Alternative Forecasts for Natural Gas and Oil
: Alternative simulation results for the three oil price scenarios are
shown in Table 5.21. In this table, it is assumed that the !'FPC Regulation"
policy . on natural gas is in effect. Alternative results for the "Phased deregu-
lation" price policy are shown in Table 5.22.
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Under the "FPC Regulation' policy, new discoveries and additions to reserves
are affected by the particular assumption made regarding oil prices, but there
is less sensitivity under the 'Phased Deregulation" policy. The reason for
this is that when gas prices are low, as under regulation, a higher oil price
serves as an incentive for additional exploratory drilling which results in
significant additional gas discoveries.. But when the price of gas is allowed
to rise, as under "Phased Deregulation", there is already sufficient incentive
for exploration on the extensive margin,and the additional incentive provided by
the higher oil price is largely to increase directionality towards oil drilling.
In both the "FPC Regulation" and the "Phased Deregulation" policies the
changes in oil prices add little more than 2 or 3 trillion cubic feet to total
gas reserves. With small changes on reserves, the level of gas production
remains almost the same under all three ceiling price scenarios. Demands for
production, however, are quite sensitive t the. price of oil.i Under a scen--
arieod6f low oil prices, for example, there is a shift in demand from natural
gas to oil, and in 1980 the excess demand for natural gas is only 2.7 trillion
cubic feet under the "FPC Regulation" policy. Under these oil price conditions,
with "Phased Deregulation" the shortage of gas could be eased fairly soon. If
oil prices decline in real terms by 5 percent per year, a field price increase
for natural gas of only 10¢ or 15¢ in 1974 and 5 per year thereafter would
be sufficient to clear markets by the end of the decade...
Alternative simulations for the three economic scenarios are shown for
the "FPC Regulation" policy and the "Phased Deregulation" policy in Tables 5.23
and 5.24. Again there is relatively little variation in the level of production,
but the demands for gas vary significantly. Under conditions of relatively
slow economic growth, for example, the excess demand for natural gas in 1980
under the "FPC Regulation" policy is predicted to be 4.0 trillion cubic
feet, in comparison with 8.4 trillion cubic feet under the medium economic
economic scenario and 11.0 trillion cubic feet under the high economic
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scenario. This is not-unreasonable in terms of direction; any decline in the
long-term rate of growth for the American economy ought to reduce the rate of
growth of demand for natural gas (as well as for other energy resources). If
the rate of economic growth is slower than we have anticipated in our medium
economic scenario, then smaller increases in the field price of gas will be
necessary to clear natural gas markets by the end f the decade.
The econometric model can also be used to forecast the impact of alternative
natural gas regulatory policies on the supply and demand for' oil. This impact
is of course also dependent upon the particular values chosen for the exogenous
variables. Forecasts are presented here for new discoveries, and total additions
to reserves, for crude oil under alternative regulatory policies for natural
gas, alternative oil prices, and alternative scenarios for economic growth.
Table 5.25 shows results for the "FPC Regulation" and "Phased Deregulation"
gas price policies under the-three alternative oil price scenarios and the
three alternative economic scenarios. As can be seen, total additions to
oil reserves grow by about 30 -percent over the eight-year pariod 1972-1980
under both the "FPC Regulation" policy and the "Phased Deregulation" policy.
Changes in reserves are slightly dependent on assumptions made about oil
prices and economic variables (a 15 percent increase in the price of crude
oil, for example, results in only a 3 percent increase in additions to oil
reserves by the end of the decade). One might expect both an increase in
well drilling and an increase in oil discoveries to result from higher oil
prices. There is an increase in well drilling, but a slightly lower oil
success ratio combined with only a small increase in discovery size (due
in part to depletion) results in only modest increases in discoveries.
Alternative forecasts for wholesale oil demand under the "FPC Regulation"
golicies.are shown in Table 5.26 through 5.29. As can be seen from
those tables, the demand for oil is dependent on future oil prices -
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and rates of economic growth, as well as on gas regulatory policies. These
dependencies vary, of course, from region to region as well as between
residential and industrial demand. However, oil demand generally shows
more long-term responsiveness to the oil price in the Northeast and North
Central regions of the country, and less responsiveness in the Southeast,
South Central, and West regions. Oil demand shows a great deal more responsive-
ness to the price of gas, and can be seen by comparing Tables 5.26 and 5.28
and Tables 5.27 and 5.29. There is also greater dependence on economic growth
variables in the Northeast and North Central regions than elsewhere for resi-
dential demand, and greater dependence on growth in all regions for industrial
than for residential demand.
These patterns could have been predicted from the regression equations
alone. Those growth variables accounting for a large fraction of the explained
variance in the regression equations also have the greatest effect on the
simulations. The results are reasonable in view of the magnitudes of
price increases and economy-wide growth in the past.
5.5.2. Simulations of Alternative Offshore Leasing Policies
Government policies affecting the natural gas industry include not
only field price regulation but also the leasing of offshore lands for
exploration, development, and production. Alternative offshore leasing
policies can be simulated with the econometric model since the number of
*acres leased each year is an exogenous policy variable in the "offshore sub-
model", and affects (through reserve additions) offshore production.
*All of the simulation results presented above are based on the assumption
that two million-acres of offshore lands would be leased each year by the
Department of Interior's Bureau of Land Management. Simulation results for
additions to reserves and production are shown in Table 5.30 for the
alternative leasing policies of one million and three million acres per year.
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These results are presented for the "FPC Regulation" and "Phased Deregulation"
field price policies, and in both cases "medium" oil price and economic
conditions are assumed.
As can be seen from the table, additions to reserves and production
show very little sensitivity to the number of offshore acres leased annually.
An increase of one million acres in offshore leasing results in only a 1 percent
increase in production of gas by 1980. This is significant.because it has
been claimed that more liberal offshore leasing policies will serve to
ameliorate the shortage of gas caused by stringent field price regulation.
In fact the model indicates that expansion of offshore leasing will not
significantly reduce future shortages of gas.
5.3. The Demand Function for Liquified Natural Gas
The model has other forecasting and analysis applications besides those
dealing with FPC field price regulation. As an example, the econometric
model can be used to determine the demand function for Liquified Natural
Gas (or another substitute for natural gas) in different regions of the
country under one or another particular field price regulatory policy. We
explain in detail here how the LNG demand function is calculated, and present
demand schedules for different regions of the country under the "FPC Regulation"
price policy.
The demand function for. Liquified Natural Gas is assumed to be the
excess demand persisting after the supply of natural gas from existing
sources, both onshore and offshore, has been parceled out regionally. Thus,
the LNG demand function is obtained by horizontally subtracting supply
from the demand function for natural gas in each region. This LNG demand
function is of course conditional on the particular FPC price policy that
is in effect.
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It should be noted, however, that the demand function for natural gas
that is relevent for this purpose is not the estimated equation in a particular
region, but must be derived from simulations of the entire'model. There are
several reasons for this. First, the model determines demand in individual
states through regional demand equations that contain exogenous variables
(population, income, etc.) that, along with dummy variables, vary from state
to state. This means that we cannot determine a price-quantity relationship
for wholesale gas demand on a regional basis independent from exogenous and
dummy variables. Furthermore, residential/conmmercial and industrial demand
equations have been estimated separately, and there is no way of "summing"
across states or across residential/commercial and industrial demand to
form an aggregate demand function that is a relationship between quantity
demanded and wholesale price. Finally, the input-output table in the model
allocates flows of gas between producing and consuming regions, not to the
level of individual states. By calculating simulated values of gas demand
by state and by residential/commercial and industrial markets, along with
regional supplies obtained after feeding in relevant values of the exogenous
variables and other policy parameters, we estimate a weighted-average wholesale
price and wholesale demand by region for each price simulation. By performing
enough simulations (varying the regulated field price across simulations),
sufficient "data points" can be obtained for price and demand to allow esti-
mation of regional demand functions (i.e., quantity demanded in the region
versus the weighted-average wholesale price).
Our estimation procedure, then, begins by obtaining total demand schedules
for natural gas by region, for the three important excess demand regions,
Northeast, North Central, and West. These demand schedules are of the
form:
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XXWD = cO + clXXWP0 1
where XX represents a regional prefix, and WD and WP are the wholesale demand
and wholesale price respectively. Thus the schedule is a.relationship between
total quantity and weighted-average price. Once equation (I) has been
estimated by a regression equation on the data derived.for each region, we
determine the LNG schedule by simulating the following equation for each
4
region of the country:
4Equation (2) is simply another way of writing equation .(1), except that total
gas demand is set equal to supply plus excess demand, and this excess demand
is assumed to be the demand for LNG. P is the wholesale price (resulting
in excess demand LNGD) and P** is the weighted-average price that results
from P and the LNG price for that portion of (excess) demand. The equation
is illustrated graphically in Figure 5.1. Note that in the figure, LNGP
is the price at which LNG can be sold to that volume exceeding SUP and
satisfying total demand at P**. By simulating equation (2) we find pairs of
values (LNGP, LNGD) that make up the LNG demand schedule.
Figure 5.1 Calculation of LNG Demand Schedule
price
LNGP
P
P
(domestic
gas)
... ,. Q
LNGD. sup
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XXLNGD + XXSUP = c +
cl[((XXLNGD· XXLNGP) + (XXSUP· XXP)) /(XXLNGD + XXSUP)] (2)
The coefficients c and c1 in equation (2) take on the values of the regression
estimates of equation (1) in each region of the country. It is also
important to remember that the data from which equation (1) is estimated
are simulation results that apply to a single year, and that the simulation
of equation (2) and the resulting LNG demand schedule should apply to
the same year.
We have estimated equation (1) over the Northeast, North Central,
and West regions, using simulation results for the year 1980. These
regression results are shown below as equations (3), (4), and (5). Note
that the number of observations used in each regression is simply equal
to the number of states in the particular region.
Northeast:
NEWD - 7.18x10 - 21,600NEWP (3)
(90.9) (-32.0)
2 5.29X10 4
R = 0.99 F = 1023 S.E. 5.29xlO
North Central:
NCWD = 1.261x10 - 469500 NCWP (4)
(76.5) (-28.9)
2 1l0 5
R = 0.99 F = 834 S.E. 1.18x10
West:
WWD = 6.73x106 - 22 300WWP (5)
(96.9) (-29.7)
2 4
R = 0.99 F = 884 S.E. = 4.89x10
At this point we determine the LNG demand schedule in the Northeast, for
example, by taking the estimated values of c and c1 from equation (3),
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substituting them in equation (2) and simulating equation (2) for various
LNG prices to determine LNG demand at those LNG prices in 1980. This is
repeated for the North Central and West regions to determine three regional
LNG demand schedules, all of which apply, of course, tothe "FPC Regulation"
field price regulatory policy. The schedules are shown in Table 5.31. It
is interesting to note that the table indicates that the greatest demand
for LNG will be in the North Central region, ranging from 5.5 trillion cubic
feet at a price of 50¢ per Mcf to 2.2 trillion cubic feet annually at a price
of $2.50.
Although the magnitudes of LNG differ considerably from region to region,
the demand elasticities do not differ widely. We have calculated average demand
elasticities based on the schedules of Table 5.30 equal to -0.44 for the North-
.east, -0.61 for the North Central, and -0.43 for the West. Of course these
demand elasticities and the schedules from which they were derived are completely
dependent on a particular natural gas regulatory policy, and an alternative
policy-would result in different LNG demand schedules and possibly different
elasticities of demand.
5.4. Summary
The derivation of the LNG demand schedule is just one example of how the
model can be applied to forecasting and policy analysis problems. There are
other interesting applications. For example, it is straightforward to use the
model to measure the gains and losses that would result from Federal allocation
policies that shift gas from one region of the country to.another. This would
involve adding .equations to demand regions according to criteria other than
the input-output matrix (this would be similar to the method used now to
allocate gas between intra- and interstate markets). Another application example
would be to measure gains and losses resulting from the regulation of intrastate
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TABLE 5.31: Regional LNG Demand Schedules for the Year 1980
Under "Status Quo" Policy
(Demands in trillions of cu. ft.)
Price of LNG
(cents per mcf)
50.
55.
60.
65.
70.
75.
80.
85.
90.
95.
100.
105.
110.
115.
120.
125.
130.
135.
140.
145.
150.
155.
160.
165.
170.
175.
180.
185.
190.
195.
200.
205.
210.
215.
220.
225.
230.
235.
240.
245.
250.
Northeast
Demand
0.3441
0.3361
0.3286
0.3213
0.3143
0.3076
0.3012
0.2950
0.2890
0.2833
0.2778
0.2725
0.2673
0.2624
0.2576
0.2530
0.2486
0.2443
0.2401
0.2361
0.2322
0.2284
0.2247
0.2212
0.2177
0.2144
0.2111
0.2080
0.2049
0.2019
0.1991
0.1962
0.1935
0.1908
0.1883
0.1857
0.1833
0.1809
0.1785
0.1763
0.1740
North Central
Demand
5.500
5.364
5.231
5.101
4.974
4.850
4.729
4.611
4.496
4.383
4.274
4.167
4.064
3.963
3.865
3.770
3.678
3.588
3.501
3.417
3.335
3.256
3.180
3.105
3.033
2.964
2.897
2.831
2.768
2.707
2.648
2.591
2.536
2.482
2.430
2.380
2.332
2.285
2.239
2.195
2.153
West
Demand
0.2113
0.2066
0.2021
0.1977
0.1935
0.1895
0.1857
0.1820
0.1784
0.1750
0.1717
0.1685
0.1654
0.1624
0.1596
0.1568
0.1541
0.1515
0.1490
0.1466
0.1442
0.1420
0.1398
0.1376
0.1355
0.1335
0.1316
0.1297
0.1278
0.1260
0.1243
0.1226
0.1209
0.1193
0.1177
0.1162
0.1147
0.1132
0.1118
0.1104
0.1091
gas so as to make its price always equal to the interstate price. Such a
policy would change the allocation of supplies and would also affect the
levels of supply and demand, and the extent of the impact could be measured
using the model.5
Detailed econometric models of particular industrieshave been applied
to forecasting and.policy analysis only over the past few years, and have
lagged the application of macroeconometric models. Industry models have
the same limitations as macroeconometric models--their forecasts are subject
to the errors that result from model misspecification, unexplained variance
in regression-equations, imprecise coefficient estimates and an inability
to accurately predict exogenous variables. This model of the natural gas
industry must also have these limitations. On the other hand, the model
provides a consistent framework that simultaneously accounts for the inter-
actions among producers, pipelines, and consumers in the gas industry and
determine its behavior with respect to regulation and other government policies.
Only the decade of the 1970's will tell whether its forecasts were accurate
and whether its lessons on regulatory policy were effective.
5
Individuals who desire to access the model for these and other simulation
experiments can write to the authors at M.I.T., Cambridge, Massachusetts,
U.S.A. for information on how to do so.
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